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ABSTRACT 
 
Three essays on mutual fund governance and sponsorship 
Mahmood Mohebshahedin, Ph.D. 
 
Concordia University, 2016 
 
This thesis explores the role of governance and sponsorship on mutual fund 
characteristics like advisory contracts, fees and returns. My first and second essays are related to 
board governance for a special type of mutual funds called closed-end funds (CEFs herein). 
Unlike corporates and open-end funds, CEFs have unique characteristics like similarity in size 
and complexity along with compulsory public filings which make them an exemplary laboratory 
for an examination of questions dealing with corporate finance and investments.  
In June 2004, the SEC required mutual fund boards to reveal additional information about 
the inputs and processes involved in advisory contract approvals to help investors make more 
informed decisions and to encourage independent directors to act more independently when 
negotiating advisory fees. Using a hand-collected governance panel database of all U.S. closed-
end funds (CEFs) during 1994-2013, we examine the effect of this change on advisory fees. We 
find that the percentage of independent directors is significantly and negatively related with 
advisory fees only after this event. The maximum (minimum) numbers of advisory fee decreases 
(increases) occur in the year after the 2004 SEC amendments. We find that advisory-rate 
decreases are significantly more likely for a CEF with a higher percentage of independent 
directors after but not before the event even after controlling for post-event board structure 
changes. Overall, our results support the idea that the 2004 SEC amendments successfully 
encouraged independent fund directors to act more independently in negotiating advisory fees 
with fund advisors. 
Using the same governance data, the second paper explores how CEF governance affects 
expense ratios, returns and premiums. Independent directors are more effective in monitoring 
and influencing fund performance measures that are less complex and more directly controllable. 
The results suggest that CEFs with higher board ownerships are better aligned with shareholders’ 
interests. Ownerships of directors are positively and significantly associated with most variables 
that are expected to indicate greater value from the monitoring of directors. Using a dynamic 
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panel two-step system generalized method of moments estimator, the results are robust in the 
presence of endogeneity concerns (reverse causality, unobserved heterogeneity and 
simultaneity).  
In the third essay, we focus on mutual fund governance at the sponsor level. Taking 
advantage of the wide variety of sponsors in the Canadian mutual fund market, we examine how 
different fund sponsorships affect measures of fund performance. We find that cost minimization 
and manager abilities are important drivers of performance differences among Canadian fixed-
income funds differentiated by sponsor and fund types. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
INTRODUCTION 
 
According to a recent report of the Investment Company Institute (ICI)1, the combined 
assets of U.S. mutual funds has risen to $16.26 trillion of which about 90% is held by U.S. 
households in July 2015. Recent late trading and market-timing scandals along with rumors 
about fund governance which built on friendships between directors and executives raise serious 
doubts about whether the governance system in place for mutual funds are effective in protecting 
shareholders’ interests. However, unlike corporate governance, mutual fund governance has 
received less attention by researchers mostly due to lack of governance data. 
In my first essay (chapter 2), we investigate the effect of transparency of fund board 
activities on governance efficiency. In June 2004, the SEC adopted a new rule2 requiring 
enhanced disclosure dealing with the approval of investment advisory contracts by the boards of 
directors of mutual funds to improve the board effectiveness and enhance its independence. 
Taking advantage of our hand-collected governance panel database of all U.S. closed-end funds 
(CEFs) during 1994-2013, we examine the effect of the 2004 SEC amendments on advisory fees. 
We address this question by conducting a natural experiment that contains a test of the effects of 
board characteristics on advisory contracts before and after the 2004 SEC amendments. To this 
end, we study the effect of board characteristics on advisory fees and on the probability of 
changes in advisory fees using estimation specifications that are robust to endogeneity.    
 
We find that the relationship between advisory rates for CEFs with higher percentages of 
independent directors is not significant for the 1994-2004 period and is significant (and negative) 
for the 2005-2013 period. This is consistent with the notion that more transparency about board 
activities and approvals may lead to more effective governance and better align the interests of 
independent directors and shareholders. We also examine the effect of CEF board characteristics 
on the probability of changes in CEF advisory rates. For the 1994-2004 period, we find that 
CEFs with higher percentages of female directors and higher average ages are more likely to 
increase advisory rates. For the 2005-2013 period, we find that CEFs with lower percentages of 
                                                          
1 www.ICI.org 
2 SEC Final Rule “Disclosure regarding approval of investment advisory contracts by directors of investment 
companies”, Release Nos. 33-8433; 34-49909; IC-26486; File No. S7-08-04 
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independent directors, larger board sizes, higher excess compensations of their independent 
directors and higher percentages of female directors are more likely to increase their advisory 
rates. Our results regarding the relationship between the percentage of independent directors and 
advisory rate changes before and after the 2004 SEC amendments are consistent with the idea 
that more transparency about board activities and approvals may lead to more effective 
governance and monitoring aligned with the interests of shareholders. 
In my second essay (chapter 3), we examine the relation between fund board 
characteristics (e.g., independence, ownership, gender diversity and compensation) and fund 
expenses, return performances and premiums. CEF boards are responsible for negotiating the 
fees charged shareholders annually by fund sponsors3 and for monitoring the performance of the 
funds they oversee. To help us better understand the incentives of directors to monitor CEFs, we 
also study the determinants of director compensation in the CEF industry. Unlike most of the 
literature on board effectiveness, this study focuses on boards of directors of CEFs. Del Guercio 
et al. (2003) argue that mutual funds provide a better environment to measure whether boards act 
in the interests of shareholders. Unlike industrial corporations that represent a heterogeneous 
collection of industrial classifications, mutual funds are a somewhat more homogeneous 
industrial grouping.  
Our results show that CEF boards with higher percentages of independent directors are 
associated with lower expense ratios and different CEF benchmark-adjusted returns but not with 
CEF premiums. Thus, independent directors are more effective in monitoring and influencing 
fund performance measures that are less complex (fees versus CEF returns). We also find that 
CEFs with higher board ownerships are better aligned with shareholders’ interests. Ownerships 
of directors are positively and significantly associated with most variables that are expected to 
indicate greater value for investors. Our results show that larger funds and funds with higher 
board meeting frequencies and higher levels of ownership by directors pay more to their 
independent directors. 
My third essay (chapter 4) focuses on mutual fund governance at the sponsor level. We 
examine whether different fund sponsors like Banks, Insurers, financial cooperatives and 
                                                          
3 Sponsors are advisory firms such as Fidelity or Putnam which manage and offer a set of funds.   
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Independents have different investment or pricing behaviors that differentiate their fund 
performances (as measured, for example, by benchmark-adjusted returns and fees). Mutual funds 
are provided to investors by different entities. Mutual fund sponsors are different in their 
ownership structures (public/private, and mutual/stock) and access to information. For example, 
bank-sponsored funds may have more information about the securities of the firms in which they 
invest through their interactions with those firms in an investment banking context. We conduct 
our tests using the data from Canadian fund environment providing an interesting laboratory for 
such tests due to the differences in institutional characteristics, the richness in sponsor types 
(stock or mutual) and whether or not the sponsors are publicly traded.  
We find that the funds sponsored by Banks outperform, on average, the funds sponsored 
by the other three sponsor types based on benchmark-adjusted net and quasi-gross returns for all 
fund categories based on investment objective (fund type) in the Canadian fixed-income fund 
market except for funds with short-term investment objectives which account for almost 15% of 
the market. Funds sponsored by Banks also have the lowest average fees for almost all 
investment objective categories (fund types). 
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CHAPTER TWO 
TRANSPARENCY AND EFFICACY OF FUND GOVERNANCE:  
THE EFFECT OF THE SEC’S DISCLOSURE RULE FOR ADVISORY CONTRACTS 
2.1. INTRODUCTION 
 Fund advisors are investment companies which administer, monitor and market closed-end 
funds (CEFs). Advisory fees account for the majority of fund fees (54% in our sample) that 
investors pay for fund services. Advisors are generally paid a percentage, referred to as the 
advisory rate, of the net asset value (NAV) of a mutual fund to compensate for their services.  
 Fund directors have the fiduciary duty to evaluate and approve advisory contracts (including 
advisory rates) annually based on the extent and quality of the services provided by the advisors. 
Section 15(c) of the Investment Company Act of 1940 clearly describes the duties of boards of 
directors as follows: “It shall be the duty of the directors of a registered investment company to 
request and evaluate, and the duty of an investment advisor to such company to furnish, such 
information as may reasonably be necessary to evaluate the terms of any contract whereby a 
person undertakes regularly to serve or act as investment advisor of such company.” Thus, the 
Investment Company Act relies on boards of directors to resolve any conflicts of interests 
(agency issues) including those related to advisory fees.  
 Critics of the mutual fund industry believe that the compensations of mutual fund advisors are 
excessive due at least in part to the lack of independence of fund directors.4 Freeman and Brown 
(2001) argue that advisory charges are higher for mutual than pension funds due to the more 
independent bargaining associated with the latter. Haslem (2010) believes that “Traditionally, 
independent directors have been nominated, employed, and compensated at the pleasure of 
mutual fund advisers. This control, often with very generous pay and retirement benefits, may 
also influence directors to “go along” with adviser plans and actions.” Proponents of more 
effective fund governance believe that fund agency issues will be reduced by the provision of 
                                                          
4 See for example Barker (1999), Haslem (2004), Freeman and Brown (2001, 2008), Bogle (2005), Moyer and Light 
(2014), and Wall (2015). 
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more information about, for example, portfolio managers, portfolio holdings and board of 
director actions and approvals.5 
 Since 1994, the Security and Exchange Commission (SEC) as the primary regulator of 
investment companies requires funds seeking shareholder approval of advisory contracts to 
contain a discussion of the material factors on which the boards recommended such approval in a 
fund’s proxy statements.6 To increase the visibility of such disclosures, the SEC in 2002 required 
funds to provide the basis for a board’s approval of an existing investment advisory contract in 
its Statement of Additional Information (SAI).7 In June 2004, the SEC adopted a new 
rule8 requiring enhanced disclosure dealing with the approval of investment advisory contracts 
by the boards of directors of mutual funds to “…improve the effectiveness of fund boards of 
directors and enhance their independence in dealing with matters such as the advisory fee.” This 
followed growing discontent with the efficacy of advisory fee setting which involved over 500 
class actions and derivative suits filed against mutual fund advisers starting in 2003, and cases 
involving mutual funds accounting for almost 10% of all federal securities class actions in 2003 
and 2004 (Coats and Hubbard, 2007).9 Following the adoption of this rule, the SEC’s 
Enforcement Division has been actively pursuing failures to fulfil statutory duties, such as 
approving advisory contracts without having all the necessary information to evaluate them. In 
one such action,10 the SEC’s Enforcement Division similarly agreed to civil money sanctions in 
the respondents’ offer on June 17, 2015. This Section 15(c) proceeding was against the SEC-
registered mutual fund advisor Commonwealth Capital Management (CCM), its owner-president 
                                                          
5 See Haslem (2004) for his proposed complete disclosure template.   
6 Item 22(c)(11) of Schedule 14A. See Investment Company Act Release No. 20614 (Oct. 13, 1994) [59 FR 52689 
(Oct. 19, 1994)] (adopting amendments to Schedule 14A). 
7 Item 12(b)(10) of Form N–1A (registration statement for open-end management investment companies); Item 
18.13 of Form N–2 (registration statement for closed-end management investment companies); Item 20(l) of Form 
N–3 (registration statement for separate accounts organized as management investment companies that offer 
variable annuity contracts); Investment Company Act Release No. 24816 (Jan. 2, 2001) [66 FR 3734, 3744 (Jan. 16, 
2001)] (adopting requirement for disclosure in SAI of basis for board’s approval of advisory contract). 
8 SEC Final Rule “Disclosure regarding approval of investment advisory contracts by directors of investment 
companies”, Release Nos. 33-8433; 34-49909; IC-26486; File No. S7-08-04 
9 About a quarter of the funds faced at least one lawsuit for excessive fees between 2000 and 2009 (Curtis and 
Morley, 2012).   
10 In the Matter of Commonwealth Capital Management, LLC, Commonwealth Shareholder Services, Inc. et al., 
Respondents, Order instituting administrative and cease-and-desist proceedings pursuant to Sections 9(b) and 9(f) 
of the Investment Company Act of 1940, making findings, and imposing remedial sanctions and a cease-and-desist 
order, SEC Rel. No. IC-31678 (June 17, 2015). https://www.sec.gov/litigation/admin/2015/ic-31678.pdf.  
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and also interested director/trustee, and three independent trustees/directors of two funds where 
Commonwealth was the advisor.  
 Although fund boards are a major participant in the determination of advisory contracts, 
research on their effectiveness is limited. Coles, Suay and Woodbury (2000) examine the cross-
sectional relationship between advisory rates and CEF characteristics and one board 
characteristic (aggregate ownership of CEF officers and directors). Deli (2002) examines the 
cross-sectional variation in advisory rates during 1997 using only fund and no governance 
characteristics. Warner and Wu (2011) examine the association of board characteristics (such as 
board independence, size and director compensation) with advisory rates using only the 442 
funds with changes in advisory rates during the 1994-2001 period.11 As a result, they could not 
examine the effect of board characteristics on the probabilities of decreases or increases in 
advisory rates (see Warner and Wu, 2011, Table IV).  
 Thus, this study fills an important gap in the literature by addressing an important question 
about fund governance: Does enhanced transparency on fund board activities and approval of 
advisory contracts make fund governance more effective? We address this question by 
conducting a natural experiment that involves an examination of the effects of board 
characteristics on advisory contracts before and after the 2004 SEC amendments to enhance 
disclosure of advisory contract renewal. To this end, we examine the effect of board 
characteristics on advisory fees and on the probability of changes in advisory fees using 
estimation specifications that are robust to endogeneity and a large database that includes hand-
collected data on board characteristics. Furthermore, similarities in size, complexity, public 
reporting of advisory contracts, board information and share prices make CEFs an exemplary 
laboratory for an examination of questions dealing with corporate finance and asset pricing 
(Cherkes, 2012). 
                                                          
11 Their subsample results regarding the effect of the percentage of independent directors on the magnitude of 
advisory fee decreases for 1994-2001 period differ from our full sample results for 1994-2004 period reported in 
section 2.6 of this chapter. Furthermore, their time period does not capture most of the effects of various other 
changes designed to curb conflicts of interest, and improve the accuracy and reliability of corporate disclosures and 
governance. These include changes in March 2001 to the Investment Company Act of 1940 by the SEC requiring, 
amongst other things, that 50% of the directors of a CEF be “not interested” (i.e., independent), the passing of the 
Sarbanes–Oxley Act (SOX) in July 2002, and the adoption of rules in February 2004 where CEFs (and OEFs) must 
file their complete portfolio holdings schedules with the SEC. 
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 Our survivorship-bias free sample includes all U.S. CEFs in existence at any point in time 
during 1994-2013. Following Coles et al. (2000), we define the advisory rate or marginal 
compensation rate as the compensation to an advisor for a small change in CEF assets based on 
CEF advisory rates and the current level of assets. We examine the cross-sectional relationship 
between CEF advisory rates and board characteristics (e.g., board independence, size, 
compensation and ownership). Many studies stress the need to address endogeneity issues when 
examining the relation between board governance and firm characteristics (e.g., Wintoki, Linck 
and Netter, 2012). As Adams, Hermalin and Weisbach (2010) explain “…many studies of boards 
can best be interpreted as joint statements about both the director-selection process and the effect 
of board composition on board actions and firm performance.” Since the past performance of a 
fund can affect both its advisory rates (which represent the compensation of its managers) and its 
governance, endogeneity issues may be present when examining the relationship between 
advisory rates and board governance. Consistent with this conjecture, we show that that past 
advisory-rate values are related with current values and value changes of board characteristics 
(like board independence and size) for our sample of CEFs. Random and fixed-effect estimators 
are inconsistent in such situations (Nickell, 1981; Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). Thus, our 
primary estimation specification is the two-step system generalised method of moments, 
“system-GMM”, which for unbalanced panels and endogenous regressors accounts for 
endogeneity issues such as simultaneity, reverse causality and unobserved heterogeneity 
(Flannery and Hankins, 2013). Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) state 
that the system-GMM is suitable for estimating a dynamic model, particularly when it is difficult 
if not impossible to find exogenous instruments to reduce endogeneity concerns (e.g., in 
governance variables).  
 We find that the relationship between advisory rates for CEFs with higher percentages of 
independent directors is not significant for the 1994-2004 period and is significant (and negative) 
for the 2005-2013 period. This is consistent with the notion that more transparency about board 
activities and approvals may lead to more effective governance and better aligns the interests of 
independent directors and shareholders. One possible explanation for the significant relationship 
in the second period could be the 2001 SEC rule requiring that the board has a minimum of 50% 
of independent directors. To control for this possibility, we re-examine the relationship between 
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advisory rates and board characteristics for those funds with no significant change in the 
percentage of independent directors around 2004. We identify significant changes by testing 
whether the average percentage of independent directors are equal using 3 and 5 years windows 
around 2004 at 5% and 10% significance levels. The results for these subsamples confirm our 
previous findings using the whole sample. Our results also show no significant relationship 
between advisory rates and other board characteristics for the 1994-2004 and 2005-2013 periods.          
 We also examine the effect of CEF board characteristics on the probability of changes in 
CEF advisory rates. We find that 2.8% (424 out of 14,972) of the CEF advisory rates changed 
during the 1994-2013 period after adjusting for asset growth. When we consider advisory rate 
changes for the 1994-2004 period, we find that CEFs with higher percentages of female directors 
and higher average ages are more likely to increase advisory rates. For the 2005-2013 period, we 
find that CEFs with lower percentages of independent directors, larger board sizes, higher excess 
compensations of their independent directors and higher percentages of female directors are 
more likely to increase their advisory rates. Our results regarding the relationship between the 
percentage of independent directors and advisory rate changes before and after the 2004 SEC 
amendment support the notion that more transparency about board activities and approvals may 
lead to more effective governance and monitoring aligned with the interests of shareholders. 
Using a sample of funds which may or may not change their advisory contracts for the 1994-
2004 period,12 we find that our results regarding the relationship between board characteristics 
and advisory rate changes do not support the results from Warner and Wu (2011) based solely on 
the funds who changed their advisory rates. To control for the effect of changes in board 
structure, we examine the effect of board characteristics on the probability of changes in CEF 
advisory rates for the sample of funds which do not significantly change their percentages of 
independent directors. Our results once again confirm our previous findings using the whole 
sample. As an additional robustness check, we also test whether a change in board characteristics 
during the past three years affects a board’s decision to increase or decrease the advisory rate for 
its fund. Considering the results for the advisory rate changes using changes in independent 
variables over the past three years, our results once again are consistent with our previous 
findings. 
                                                          
12 This period covers the Warner and Wu (2011) sample for the 1994-2001 period.  
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 This paper contributes to the literature in various ways. First, to the extent of our knowledge, 
this is the first study which examines the transparency effects of board decision making on board 
effectiveness in the mutual fund industry. This study provides evidence on the effects of the 2004 
SEC amendments requiring greater transparency in the decision-making process behind advisory 
contracts.  
 Second, this paper contributes to the literature on the value to investors of information 
disclosure.13 The common view is that more information disclosure helps investors make more 
informed decisions and makes governance more effective by reducing information asymmetry 
(Leuz and Verrecchia, 2000; Verrecchia, 2001; Rezaee and Jain, 2005; Jain, Kim and Rezaee, 
2006). Other studies argue that information disclosure can have adverse effects like direct 
accounting costs and benefits for product-market competitors (Feltham, Gigler, and Hughes, 
1992; Hayes and Lundholm, 1996; Zhang, 2007; Sidhu, Smith, Whaley, and Willis, 2008). Our 
results from examining the relationship between the percentage of independent directors and 
advisory rates and the probability of advisory rate changes support the notion that the 2004 SEC 
amendments to transparency improved board effectiveness and reduced agency problems by 
reducing fund fees. 
 Third, this paper contributes to our understanding of the relationship between CEF boards 
and an important advisory contract term, advisory fees, for a fund group where the efficacy of 
the relationship is more important. Unlike OEF (open-end fund) investors, CEF investors do not 
have the ability to redeem their investments at NAV and reduce the fund assets under 
management (AUM) of fund advisors to discipline poor performing fund advisors. Although 
CEF investors can trade their shares in the market, the CEF fund advisors have no fear of 
reductions in fund assets or dollar fees due to shareholder redemptions. In turn, this places a 
greater responsibility on CEF boards of directors to better align the interests of fund advisors 
with those of the funds’ shareholders. While CEF liquidation or conversion to an OEF 
theoretically can provide external discipline for a CEF, the extensive effort and cost and low 
probability of success associated with such actions ensure that these actions are seldom effective 
in practice.  
                                                          
13 See Leuz and Wysocki (2006) for a survey of the literature on information disclosure. 
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 Fourth, our study contributes to the more general literature on compensation and contracts by 
considering both cross-sectional variation and time-series dynamics in advisory rates. Fifth and 
finally, we use what we believe is the longest time-series of board information in the mutual fund 
literature, which allows us to study the effect of changes in board characteristics and past 
benchmark-adjusted share return performance on an important aspect of the advisory contract 
negotiation. This helps us to better understand the effect of recent board dynamics on the 
advisory contract oversight behaviors of CEF boards.   
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a very brief 
review of the 2004 SEC amendments. The section 2.3 reviews the relevant literature that leads to 
various testable hypotheses. The section 2.4 describes the data used in our analysis. Sections 2.5 
and 2.6 discuss the results of examining the relation between board characteristics and CEF 
advisory rates and their changes, respectively. Section 2.7 reports on some further robustness 
checks. Section 2.8 concludes the chapter. 
2.2. DISCLOSURE OF INVESTMENT ADVISORY CONTRACT APPROVALS BY 
INVESTMENT COMPANY DIRECTORS14 
 
        The 2004 SEC amendments require that the material factors, processes and conclusions 
associated with board approval of investment (sub-)advisory contracts be reported in Form N-1A 
for OEFs, N-2 for CEFs, and N-315 for separate accounts managed by management investment 
and insurance companies. Fund prospectuses inform investors that this information is available 
in the shareholder report. Proxy statements are also required to discuss the factors considered and 
the process used to negotiate contracts with (sub-)advisors. 
 The 2004 amendments clarified that a board’s decision about the selection of an investment 
advisor and the approval of advisory fees and any other fees paid under an advisory contract 
must be included in its discussion. They stipulated that the board discussion needs to discuss how 
at least the following factors were used to arrive at their final contract decision: the nature, 
extent, and quality of the services to be provided by the investment adviser; the investment 
performance of the fund and the investment adviser; the costs of the services to be provided and 
                                                          
14 SEC Release Nos. 33–8433; 34–49909; IC–26486; File No. S7–08–04 
15 Item 21(d)(6) of Form N–1A; Instruction 6.e. to Item 23 of Form N–2; Instruction 6(v) to Item 27(a) of Form N–
3. These factors are similar to those used by courts (called “Gartenberg factors”) in “excessive fee” cases. 
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profits to be realized by the investment adviser and its affiliates from the fund relationship; the 
extent to which economies of scale would be realized as the fund grows; and whether fee levels 
would  reflect these economies of scale for the benefit of fund investors.16 A note must be 
included to explain why a factor not so discussed is not applicable. The 2004 amendments 
require a fund’s discussion to specify whether the board relied upon comparisons of other 
investment advisory contracts in terms of services and compensation like those of the same 
investment advisor with pension funds and other institutional investors or those with different 
investment advisors, and whether such comparisons assisted the board in deciding to approve the 
advisory contract. 
 The SEC appears to have two goals in adopting the 2004 amendments. The first is to 
increase the visibility of this disclosure to help investors make more informed fund choices. The 
second is to encourage fund boards to engage in more independent monitoring of advisory 
contracts by providing considerably greater detail to investors about the material factors and their 
use by boards in concluding advisory contracts.  
2.3. HYPOTHESES 
 Except for compliance oversight responsibilities, independent fund directors have two 
important responsibilities as Warren Buffet noted in an annual letter to shareowners of Omaha 
Insurance and Investments (McDonald, 2003); namely, hiring the best available investment 
manager and negotiating low fees on behalf of shareholders. As noted in the introduction, many 
critics blame the lack of independence of independent directors as the main reason behind high 
fees and the seldom turnover of fund advisors. Radin and Stevenson (2006) argue that 
independent directors face personal financial risk if they try to replace fund advisors due to the 
lack of empowering regulations. For example, independent directors were both unsuccessful and 
sued by the fund advisors when they attempted to replace the fund advisors of Navellier Series 
fund and Yacktman fund.17 As aptly stated by Buffet (McDonald, 2003): "If you or I were 
empowered, I can assure you we could easily negotiate materially lower management fees with 
incumbent managers of most mutual funds." Thus, this major impediment to the replacement of 
                                                          
16 Section 36(b) of the 1940 Act allows the SEC or a shareholder to file lawsuit against a fund’s advisor for breach 
of fiduciary duty regarding excessive advisory fees.  
17 See Radin and Stevenson (2006) for board problems regarding fund advisor replacement.  
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advisors not only makes the negotiation of fees more difficult but the SEC in 2004 felt the need 
to adopt amendments to enhance the information disclosed about the factors and process used by 
a fund’s board to approve an advisory contract. The passage of time since its adoption provides 
an excellent opportunity to assess whether or not it has lowered advisory fees. While interested 
directors assist the board to be better informed about firms, independent directors provide 
neutrality (and expertise) that is expected to reduce potential agency issues between fund 
advisors and investors. Fama and Jensen (1983a) contend that independent directors are better 
monitors since retaining their personal reputations in the directorship market is tremendously 
important. Consistent with the greater role of boards as monitors than advisors, studies report 
that lower fees are associated with higher percentages of independent directors; namely, Ferris 
and Yan (2007) and Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa (2012) for OEFs, and Tufano and Sevick 
(1997), Del Guercio, Dann and Partch (2003) and Kryzanowski and Mohebshahedin (2016) for 
CEFs. Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa (2012) report that higher expense ratios are associated with 
board size for a sample of U.S. index funds.    
 The net effect of any disclosure that is mandated by regulation depends on its costs and 
benefits. Potential benefits of the 2004 SEC amendments are reduced information asymmetry 
and agency issues between boards and investors, and the provision of greater transparency on 
how fund boards arrive at their advisory contracts which could improve the governance practices 
by facilitating improved investor oversight. Potential costs include the direct costs associated 
with the preparation, certification and dissemination of reports, and the indirect costs associated 
with the use of the disclosed information to the benefit of competitors and other parties in the 
market. The total external costs of additional disclosure are estimated by the SEC as being 
around 4.5 million dollar for all funds annually.18 We expect that indirect costs would be a minor 
addition to total external costs, and that the benefits of the 2004 SEC amendments to the 
reduction in advisory fees would be substantially higher than its associated costs. Thus, our first 
set of two hypotheses in their alternative forms is 
: After the 2004 SEC amendments, CEFs with higher percentages of independent board 
directors are associated with lower advisory rates.  
                                                          
18 See SEC Release Nos. 33–8433; 34–49909; IC–26486; File No. S7–08–04 
13 
 
: After the 2004 SEC amendments, CEFs with higher percentages of independent board 
directors are more likely to decrease their advisory rates.  
 
2.4. DATA, GOVERNANCE VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
2.4.1 Sample and Data 
 Information about the investment advisory contracts are collected from semi-annual reports 
(items 45-48) from the SEC EDGAR database, referred to as NSAR forms hereafter, for all 
CEFs with unique CIK numbers (Central Index Key) from 1994 (first filling date) through 2013. 
The NSAR forms contain information regarding fund advisor, administrator, affiliated broker-
dealer, portfolio transactions, financial information, and condensed balance sheet data at the 
level of registrants with unique CIKs. This information is aggregated over all the classes of the 
same fund. Unlike OEFs, only two of the CEFs in our sample have more than one share class. 
We collect 23,152 N-SAR fillings on all the CEFs during the 1994-2013 period. Since almost all 
the NSAR forms are filled according to the strict reporting standards of the SEC, the data in 
these forms can be captured electronically before it is verified manually. 
 We carefully hand-collect the CEF board information from all the associated annual proxy 
statements, referred to as the DEF-14A form hereafter, with unique CIK numbers from 1994 
(first filling date) through 2013. The DEF-14A forms cover information regarding each director 
on the board including the term of office and the length of time served, whether the director is 
independent, the dollar range of equity securities in the fund (beneficially) owned by the director, 
the aggregate dollar range of equity securities owned in all registered investment companies 
overseen by the director in the fund family, and the total dollar amount of cash compensation 
received by each independent director serving on the fund and for all other funds in the fund 
family. Since the board information is presented in different formats in the DEF-14A forms, this 
data need to be hand collected.  
We use Morningstar Direct to get survivorship-free data regarding share and NAVPS (net-of-
fees) returns, fund inceptions, and fund categories. Morningstar Direct contains information for 
1,031 CEFs during the 1994-2013 period. We match our datasets from NSAR and DEF-14A 
14 
 
forms based on unique CEF CIK numbers which are available on both forms. Our final database 
is built after all data from the Morningstar Direct and SEC Edgar databases are matched. After 
eliminating index funds and institutional funds and CEFs without advisory contract or board 
information from our initial sample, our final sample consists of 815 CEFs and 14,972 semi-
annual fund observations.19 The six investment objective categories used herein are equity, 
international equity, bond, municipal bond, allocation and specialty.  Panel A of Table 2.1 
reports the number of CEFs with each fund investment objective based on Morningstar Direct 
and their total numbers for every two-year period. The number of CEFs increases from 42 in 
1994 to its highest level of 463 in 2008. CEFs with bond and municipal bond (allocation and 
specialty) investment objectives comprise the most (least) number of funds in the sample 
annually.  
[Please place Table 2.1 about here.] 
2.4.2 Marginal Compensation Rate (Advisory Rate) 
 Like OEFs, CEFs are managed either internally by employees of the fund sponsor or 
externally by investment advisory firms who provide various services like portfolio management 
in return for fees. The structure of advisory rates is flexible by regulation as long as investment 
advisors are compensated for gains and penalized for losses. In almost 85% of the contracts in 
our sample, the fee is determined based on a percentage of NAV. Some other fees are 
benchmark-based (Elton, Gruber, and Blake, 2003).  The percentage fee can be either fixed or 
fixed up to a NAV breakpoint.20 Most of the contracts with breakpoints are concave21 meaning 
that advisory rate percentages decline above each NAV breakpoint (Golec, 1992; Deli, 2002). 
For example, the advisory fee for Cutwater Select Income Fund in 2013 was 0.50% for the first 
$100 million of NAV and 0.40% for any additional NAV.  
 We calculate the marginal compensation rate as a measure determining the sensitivity of 
CEFs advisory rates to changes in CEF NAVs as in Coles et al. (2000), Deli (2002) and Warner 
                                                          
19 Voya Senior Income Fund and Franklin Mutual Recovery Fund are institutional Funds. Dow 30 Enhanced 
Premium and Income is the only index closed-end fund.  
20 Question 48 (A-K) of the semi-annual reports of investment companies includes all the breakpoints and 
corresponding percentage fees.     
21 In our sample only 7 out of 14,979 observations show convexity in that their advisory rates grow as their NAVs 
grow. These apparent data entry errors are deleted from our sample as no other source is available to correct them.  
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and Wu (2011). Coles et al. (2000) define the marginal compensation rate (advisory rate) as “the 
percentage of a relatively ‘small’ change in NAV that will be captured or lost by the investment 
advisor.” Panel B of Table 2.1 reports the descriptive statistics (mean, median, and standard 
deviation) of the advisory rates for each category of funds for every two year period. The 
average and median advisory rates are the highest for CEFs belonging to the international equity 
fund category and the lowest for bond and municipal bond CEFs. Also, the mean and median 
advisory rates of 0.76% and 0.71% respectively, grew gradually over our sample period to reach 
their highest level in 2012.  
 In Panel C of Table 2.1, we report whether advisory fees have changed around the 2004 SEC 
amendments. Using three years of data around 2004, our results show that the average yearly 
advisory fees decrease or do not change for CEFs with equity, international equity and municipal 
bond investment objectives that represent over 75 percent of CEF industry NAV and they 
increase for CEFs with bond, allocation and specialty objectives. Therefore, we can infer that the 
average annual advisory fees decreased after the 2004 SEC amendments. There is a possibility 
that the decrease in advisory fees is due to the 2001 SEC amendment that at least 50% of 
directors should be independent or the 2002 Sarbanes-Oxley Act regulatory changes dealing with 
corporate governance. To control for the effect of a change in board structure (especially board 
independence), we construct a sub-sample of CEFs with no change in the percentage of 
independent directors around the 2004 SEC amendments. Based on the results for the three years 
around 2004 that are presented in Panel C of Table 2.1, we observe that the average annual 
advisory fees decrease or do not change after the adoption of the SEC 2004 amendments for all 
categories of fund investment objectives.      
2.4.3 Governance Variables22 
We use  as the percentage of independent directors on a CEF board. If a 
director is an employee of the investment advisor or a member of the family of an employee, 
employee of a registered broker-dealer or a 5-percent shareholder of it, or affiliated with any 
recent legal counsel to the fund, the director is considered as being “interested”.23 Based on our 
                                                          
22 The definitions of all variables and their data sources are described in the appendix.   
23 Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company 1940 Act. 
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data, the mean and median percentage of independent directors has risen gradually during our 
sample period.    
  is the total number of CEF board directors. The average  in our sample has 
increased gradually. The mean and median numbers of board directors are 8.6 and 8, 
respectively, during our sample period (Panel D of Table 2.1). Larger boards might be 
considered to be less efficient than smaller boards because of higher free-riding and coordination 
costs (Jensen, 1993) and lower cohesion (Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003) or to be more valuable 
for firms requiring advice (Coles, Daniel and Naveen, 2008; Adams and Mehran, 2012). As 
noted earlier, Tufano and Sevick (1997), Del Guercio et al. (2003) and Adams, Mansi and 
Nishikawa (2009) find a significantly positive relation between mutual fund board size and 
expense ratios.  
 ( ) is the average dollar value of compensation 
received by the independent directors from a CEF (fund family). Panel D of Table 2.1 shows that 
the cross-sectional mean  and  have their highest 
and lowest values in 2000 and 1994, respectively. Following Tufano and Sevick (1997), we 
calculate unexplained compensation, , as the average residual (in millions of 
dollars) from an annual regression of director compensation on the number of boards a director 
serves on and the total assets overseen by that director. Directors who receive relatively large 
compensations from a fund or fund family are less likely to disapprove of the fees proposed by 
fund sponsors (Sevick and Tufano, 1997; Ferris and Yan, 2007; Meschke, 2007). Thus, we 
expect director excess compensations to be positively related with CEF advisory rates. 
 measures the percentage of independent directors who hold more 
than $50,000 worth of a CEF’s shares. We expect that the interests of directors who have greater 
equity dollar investments to be more aligned with the interests of investors which is supported by 
the findings that director ownership is positively related with fund performance (e.g., Chen, 
Glodstein and Jaing, 2008; Cremers et al., 2009). Based on an order passed by the SEC, the 
dollar range of equity securities beneficially owned by the directors as part of a fund’s 
compensation plan or from their personal investment in a fund became public after February 
2002. Funds are required to disclose each director’s holdings within the following investment 
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ranges: no investment; $1 to $10,000; $10,001 to $50,000; $50,001 to $100,000; or more than 
$100,000. Based on Panel D of Table 2.1, the average percentage of independent directors in the 
highest category was highest in 2012 at 11%, and averaged 8% over our total sample period.     
 is the percentage of female directors to test if gender diversity can 
improve board effectiveness. The average  is about 15% over the full period 
and has its highest level of 21% in 2012. Robinson and Dechant (1997) and Adams and Ferreira 
(2009) argue that female directors are relatively more diligent with better communication skills 
which can lead to better problem solving by boards. Higher percentages of female directors are 
associated with increased board meeting attendances and not better firm performances (Adams 
and Ferreira, 2009) but more informative stock prices (Gul, Srinidhi and Ng, 2011). On balance, 
we expect that more gender diverse boards are more effective in protecting shareholder interests. 
 is the average number of years that the independent directors served on 
a CEF board. We form no expectation for this variable since directors may become more 
informed but be subject to greater capture by fund sponsors with longer board tenures (Del 
Guercio et al., 2003). The mean and median average tenures of independent directors for our 
sample are 6.2 and 5.9 years, respectively (Panel D of Table 2.1).  
  is the average age of the independent directors serving on the board. 
Based on Panel D of Table 2.1, the full-sample average of this variable is 63 years old.    
2.4.4. Fund and Family Variables 
Panel E of Table 2.1 reports the means and medians of the cross-sectional distributions of 
CEF characteristics for every two year period. The number of advisors and sub-advisors 
( ) and the number of services ( ) they provide are obtained from the NSAR 
filings. Their average numbers have gradually increased from 1994 to 2012. They provide an 
average of six services to the CEFs. The mean annual CEF share returns ( ) have 
their lowest (highest) values in 2008 (2006). The highest and lowest cross-sectional average (and 
median) annual CEF premiums [(share price - NAVPS)/NAVPS] occur in 2008 and 2012, 
respectively. The average (median) fund size ( ) as measured by total net assets (TNA) 
has increased steadily from almost $200 million ($130 million) in 1994 to $380 million ($260 
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million) in 2012. The highest (lowest) value of the average annual CEF turnover ratio 
( ), which is measured using the lesser of purchases or sales divided by average 
monthly net assets, is in 2012 (2000). The average fund age (  in years measured from a 
fund’s inception is almost 11 years. Dividend yield ( ) and leverage ( ), which 
are respectively the ratios of dividends to share price and non-common equity to total assets, are 
5.9 (6.0) percent and 23.5 (30.5) percent, respectively.  
Spearman rank correlations between the advisory rates and CEF NAVPS returns 
(NAVPSReturn) with board characteristics are reported in Table 2.2. We observe that fund 
advisory rates and the cross-sectional mean percentages of independent directors 
( ), board sizes ( ), percentages of female directors ( ) and 
CEF premiums ( ) are negatively correlated at the 0.01 level. NAVPS returns 
( ) are negatively correlated with the cross-sectional mean percentages of 
independent directors ( ) and board sizes ( ) at the 0.01 level. NAVPS 
returns ( ) and CEF premiums are positively related to the percentages of 
independent directors who hold more than 50,000 dollars of fund shares (
). Since no correlation other than between the different advisory-rate measures exceeds 0.38, 
multicollinearity is not considered to be an issue of concern. 
[Please place Table 2.2 about here.] 
2.5. ADVISORY RATES AND BOARD CHARACTERISTICS 
2.5.1. Methodology  
 To examine the relationship between CEF advisory marginal compensation rates ( ) 
and board characteristics, we estimate the following panel regression using semi-annual data:    
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  (2.1) 
where the variables are as previously defined (also see the appendix). Equation (2.1) is estimated 
for both the 1994-2004 and 2005-2013 periods to examine the effect of the 2004 SEC 
amendments. Due to data availability, the regression estimated for 1994-2004 does not include 
board ownership. 
 As briefly discussed in the introduction, many researchers highlight the importance of 
dealing with potential endogeneity problems when examining governance effects on firm or fund 
characteristics. One source of endogeneity herein is the effect of fund performance on both 
governance and advisory rates. Past advisory contracts approved by CEF boards might affect 
CEF governance due to, e.g., status and prestige, religious, political or ethnic ties.24 Warner and 
Wu (2011) report that advisory-rate increases are associated with superior past (not extremely 
poor) market-adjusted performances. To investigate if this source of endogeneity is present, we 
follow Wintoki et al. (2012) and examine how strongly changes and the current values of various 
governance and control regressors, such as board independence ( ), board size 
( ) and fund size ( ), are related to past advisory rates. These regressions also 
include other control variables such as the lag of CEF governance variables and CEF 
characteristics like the logarithm of fund age ( ) and family size ( ).  
 Panel A of Table 2.3 reports the results from regressing the present values (levels) of some 
regressors in equation (2.1) on the CEF advisory rates and characteristics from the prior year. We 
find that board independence ( ), board size ( ) and fund size ( ) in 
the current year are significantly and negatively related to CEF advisory rates ( ) in the 
prior year. Panel B of Table 2.3 reports the results from regressions of the one-year changes of 
some regressors in equation (2.1) on the CEF advisory rates and characteristics from two years 
prior to the year of interest. For the 2005-2013 period, the current year’s changes in board size 
( ) and in fund size ( ) are significantly positively and negatively 
associated with the previous year’s changes in CEF advisory rates (Margrt). 
[Please place Table 2.3 about here.] 
                                                          
24 In their review article, Johnson, Schnatterly and Hill (2013) categorize these as being social capital. 
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 Thus, the results reported in Table 2.3 show that some of our governance variables (e.g., 
board independence and size) and control variables (e.g., fund size) may be dynamically 
endogenous.  As discussed earlier, we adopt the recommendation of Flannery and Hankins 
(2013) to use the system-GMM estimation specification as they find that it performs better than 
its competitors for unbalanced panels with endogenous regressors. We also use the OLS and 
fixed-effects estimation specifications to illustrate how the results change if the specification 
does not account for dynamic endogeneity. To deal with endogeneity in the OLS and fixed-
effects regressions regarding equation (2.1), we use one-year lagged governance variables 
(Adams et al., 2009). Our fixed-effects model specification includes fund and year fixed effects. 
 Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998)  propose the use of a “system-
GMM” to estimate a dynamic panel model, particularly when it is difficult if not impossible to 
find exogenous instruments to reduce the endogeneity concerns in the independent variables 
(e.g., governance). The “level” equation in the system-GMM includes the variables in their 
levels, and the “differenced equation” includes the differenced variables. The system-GMM uses 
some combinations of variables from a firm’s history as “internal” instrumental variables to deal 
with endogeneity.25 The finite sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005) is used to 
address the tendency of this estimation method to generate downward biased standard errors.  
 The key exogeneity assumption for the system-GMM estimator is that the instruments (lagged 
dependent and independent variables) are exogenous to current shocks in the dependent variable. 
Two tests are used to examine the exogeneity of the instruments. The first (second-order serial 
correlation) examines if enough lags of the dependent variable are included. If the model has 
enough lags of the dependent variable, then any subsequent lags of the dependent variable are 
potential valid instruments for current shocks in the dependent variable. Therefore, the residuals 
in first (second) differences should (not) be correlated if our model has enough lags of the 
dependent variable. The autocorrelation tests of the first and second differences are referred to as 
AR(1) and AR(2) in all of our tables. Since multiple lags are used in our system-GMM, we can 
test whether our model is over-identified. Thus, the second test is a Hansen test of over-
                                                          
25 We use “xtbond2” module in STATA to estimate coefficients based on the system-GMM specification. For 
further discussion on system-GMM, please see Roodman (2009).  
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identification which provides a J-statistic with a 2 distribution under the null hypothesis of the 
validity of the instruments.26  
 All our panel-regression inferences reflect the recommendation of Petersen (2009) that year 
dummies and clustered (Roger) standard errors be used to avoid rejecting the null hypothesis too 
often when both potential time-series and cross-sectional correlations exist in the panel data. To 
preserve valuable journal space, the coefficients for the time dummies are suppressed when the 
panel regression results are tabulated.  
2.5.2. Results  
 Summary results for panel regression (2.1) for both time periods are reported in Table 2.4. 
The insignificant test statistics of second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) and for the Hansen J-
statistics of over-identifying restrictions indicate that the system-GMM specification is well 
fitted. Consistent with our first alternative hypothesis ( ), we find a significant and negative 
relationship between advisory rates and the percentage of independent directors ( ) 
for the system-GMM model specifications only for the period after the 2004 SEC amendments. 
The results are consistent using the OLS and fixed-effect model specifications. This is consistent 
with the notion that independent directors were more independent in that they were better able to 
negotiate lower advisory fees after the 2004 SEC amendments. Using estimates from Panel C of 
Table 2.1, one standard deviation increase in the percentage of independent directors 
( ) implies a decrease of 0.72 [i.e., 0.03 times 0.24 (standard deviation)] percentage 
in advisory rates. Our results show no significant relationship between advisory fee rates and the 
other board characteristics for all three model specifications.  
[Please place Table 2.4 about here.] 
 Our results could be due at least partly to a SEC 2001 requirement that 50% of fund directors 
be independent. To address this potentially confounding event, we construct a sub-sample of 
CEFs with no changes in their percentage of independent directors around the 2004 SEC 
                                                          
26 The R-squared for the system-GMM regression is calculated herein as the squared correlation coefficient between 
actual and fitted values.   
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amendments.27 The results reported in Table 2.5 continue to display a negative and significant 
relationship between the percentage of independent directors and advisory fees after but not 
before the 2004 SEC amendments.     
[Please place Table 2.5 about here.] 
  Table 2.4 also includes the estimated coefficients for the control variables in equation (2.1). 
We find a positive and weakly significant relationship between advisory rates and benchmark-
adjusted share returns ( ) for the 2005-2013 period. We find that fixed-income 
CEFs ( ) in the combined bond and municipal bond fund categories are associated 
with lower advisory rates compared to their equity counterparts for the 2005-2013 period. This is 
consistent with the finding of Deli (2002), which is based on the argument that equity fund 
advisors have higher marginal products and advisory rates than debt fund advisors, since equity 
funds have higher returns volatilities (Khorana, 1996). We find that the coefficient of the 
international fund dummy ( ) is positive and significant as in Deli (2002) for the 1994-
2004 period. The system-GMM findings show a significant and positive relationship for the 
2005-2013 period between advisory rates and the number of advisors or sub-advisors 
(# ) engaged by the CEFs and the number of different services ( ) they 
provide. We find a significant and positive relationship between CEF advisory rates and the 
logarithm of portfolio turnover for both periods. This is consistent with the finding of Deli 
(2002) who bases his explanation on the findings of Ippolito (1992) and Edelen (1999) that better 
informed advisors trade more intensely. We find no significant relationship between CEF 
advisory rates and the dummy variable, . This is consistent with the descriptive 
statistics reported in Chen, Hong, Jiang and Kubik (2013, Table II) for a sample of OEFs for the 
1994-2007 period that show no difference between the average expense ratios of in-house versus 
outsourced funds.  
2.6. ADVISORY RATE CHANGES AND BOARD CHARACTERISTICS 
                                                          
27 A CEF is selected if the mean difference test of its percentage of board independent directors using data from 
three years before and three after the adoption of the 2004 SEC amendments is rejected at a 10% significance level. 
As a robustness test, we also try a 5% significance level and our untabulated results are similar.     
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To further examine the effect of additional disclosure due to the 2004 SEC amendments, we 
now study the changes in advisory rates and the effect of board characteristics, especially 
independence, on such changes for both time periods.    
2.6.1 Measurement of Advisory Rate Changes and Descriptive Statistics 
We define the change in advisory rates ( ) as the difference between the advisory rate 
from item 48 on a current NSAR filing and the advisory rate from the previous NSAR filing as in 
Warner and Wu (2011). For linear contracts the change is simply the change between two 
consecutive NSAR filings for six-month periods.  For concave contracts, the change is any 
change in the breakpoints between the current and previous NSAR filings that is obtained from 
NSAR filings items 48, A through K. To ensure that advisory rates changes are attributable to a 
contract change and not to asset growth we use the current period NAV for both current and 
previous contracts (NSAR filings) to obtain the marginal compensation rate for concave 
contracts, as in Warner and Wu (2011).  
Figures 2.1 and 2.2 depict the number of advisory rate decreases and increases, respectively, 
for the 1994-2013 period. The maximum number of advisory rate decreases of 48 (Figure 2.1) 
and the minimum number of increases of 2 (Figure 2.2) are in 2005 (the year after the 2004 SEC 
amendments). The second highest number of advisory rate decreases in Figure 2.1 is in year 
2001 when the SEC mandated that at least 50% of the directors be independent.  
[Please place Figures 2.1 and 2.2 about here.] 
Panel A of Table 2.6 reports the distribution of contract changes for the 1994-2013 period. Of 
the 424 advisory rates changes,28 300 (124) are decreases (increases). Panel B of Table 2.6 
reports summary statistics on advisory rates ( ), advisory rate changes ( ), and 
board characteristics for advisory rate increases ( ), decreases ( ), 
changes ( ) and no changes ( ). Based on these results, we 
observe that the mean and median of those CEFs which increase (decrease) their advisory rates 
have higher (lower) advisory rates after the change. The average absolute magnitude of the 
                                                          
28 The initial number was 451. We manually double-check each of the advisory rate changes and change the ones to 
no change when the change is erroneously due to an obvious NSAR data entry. For example, we would record no 
change for the following series: 0.7, 0.7, 7.0, 0.7. 
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changes ( ) for CEFs with increased advisory rates is, on average, higher than that for 
CEFs with decreased advisory rates. CEFs that increase their advisory rates on average have a 
lower percentage of independent directors ( ), a larger board size (BdSize), a lower 
average tenure of their independent directors ( ), a higher average age of their 
independent directors ( ), a lower percentage of female directors 
( ), a higher average compensation of their independent directors 
( ) and a higher director ownership ( ).  
[Please place Table 2.6 about here.] 
2.6.2 Methodology 
 We continue by examining the effect of board characteristics and other control variables on 
the likelihoods and magnitudes of various types of advisory rate changes for both 1994-2004 and 
2005-2013 periods. We use separate probit regressions to disentangle any asymmetric effects of 
various potential determinants on CEFs with increases from those with decreases in advisory 
rates. We use an ordered logit model specification to test our hypothesis described in Section 2.3. 
We use an OLS model specification controlling for year fixed-effects to examine the magnitudes 
of the effects of our independent variables on the CEF advisory rate changes.  
  The following probit model specification is used to test our hypotheses on the factors that 
affect the likelihood of CEF advisory rate changes based on semi-annual data:  
  (2.2) 
 The dependent variable ChgType is either advisory rate increases, decreases or unsigned 
changes. For advisory rate increases ( ), the dependent variable is equal to one for 
an increase in advisory rates and zero for a negative or no change in advisory rates. For advisory 
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rate decreases ( ), the dependent variable is equal to one for a decrease in advisory 
rates and zero for a positive or no change in advisory rates. For unsigned advisory rate changes 
( ), the dependent variable is equal to one if advisory rates decrease or 
increase and is equal to zero otherwise. For each of these specifications, we include time 
dummies and cluster the standard errors following Petersen (2009). 
2.6.3 Results 
2.6.3.1 Advisory-rate changes 
 Table 2.7 presents the results of our tests of equation (2.2). For each variable, we begin with a 
discussion of the logit regression results reported in columns (5) and (6) for advisory rate 
changes ( ) and then we compare the results with the ones from the 
likelihoods of advisory rate increases ( ) in columns (1) and (2) and decreases 
( ) in columns (3) and (4). 29 Consistent with our first hypothesis ( ), our 
ordered logit regression results show that that advisory-rate decreases are significantly more 
likely for a CEF with a higher percentage of independent directors ( ) for only the 
period after but not before the 2004 SEC amendments (columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.7). This is 
consistent with the notion that independent directors negotiate and question advisory fees with 
greater independence after the 2004 SEC amendments. The results from the probit regression of 
the likelihoods of advisory rate decreases ( ) support this finding (columns (3) and 
(4) in Table 2.7). Since this variable is not significantly related with advisory-rate increases, this 
suggests that a larger percentage of independents on CEF boards is effective in decreasing 
advisory rates but not in preventing increases in advisory rates. Our ordered logit regression 
results show that a CEF with a larger board size ( ) is significantly more likely to increase 
its advisory rates for the 2005-2013 period (columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.7). This is consistent 
with the notion that larger boards are less diligent in their monitoring responsibilities due to 
higher free-riding and coordination costs and lack of cohesion compared to smaller boards 
(Jensen, 1993; Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003). The results from the probit regression of the 
likelihoods of advisory rate increases ( ) support this finding (columns (1) and (2) 
                                                          
29 Our untabulated results using the dynamic probit and ordered logit regressions as a robustness check produce 
results that are consistent with those reported using probit and ordered logit regressions.  
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in Table 2.7). This suggests that a larger CEF board is more likely to approve an increase in 
advisory rates probably due to free-riding and coordination problems.  
[Please place Table 2.7 about here.] 
 The ordered logit regression results show that a CEF with a higher unexplained compensation 
of its independent directors ( ) is less likely to decrease its advisory rates 
based on the findings for the period after but not before the 2004 SEC amendments (columns (5) 
and (6) in Table 2.7). The results from the probit regression of the likelihood of advisory rate 
decreases ( ) support this finding (columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.7). Our ordered 
logit regression results show that a CEF with a higher percentage of female directors 
( ) is significantly less (more) likely to increase its advisory rates for the 1994-
2004 (2005-2013) period (columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.7).  
 We not only control for the effects of fund growth, economies of scale, good performance, 
market share and mergers and acquisitions as in Warner and Wu (2011) but also for the effects of 
special CEF characteristics like premiums and leverages. As in Warner and Wu (2011), we 
remove the mechanical effect of CEF size on advisory rates by using fund family size and market 
share lagged two periods. We find evidence for economies of scale based on the logarithm of 
family size ( ) for both periods. The likelihood of advisory rate decreases is lower for 
a CEF that belongs to a larger family for both periods or to a family with a higher market share 
( ). We find that advisory-rate increases are significantly less likely for a CEF 
with an already high advisory rate ( ) for both periods. This finding is consistent with 
that of Warner and Wu (2011) and Khorana and Servaes (2005), and the conjecture that it is 
potentially easier for funds to raise currently low versus currently high rates. The likelihood to 
increase advisory rates is higher for a CEF with a larger change in portfolio turnover 
( ) and in the number of its advisors and sub-advisors ( ) for the 
2005-2013 period. The effect of a change in portfolio turnover on advisory rates may indicate 
that higher advisory rates are required to compensate better-informed advisors who are more 
likely to trade based on their information (Ippolito, 1992; Edelen, 1999; Deli, 2002).  We find 
that advisory-rate increases are not related significantly with past benchmark-adjusted share 
returns ( ), high leverage ( ) and high dividend yield 
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( ) for both periods. Our results show that advisory-rate increases are significantly 
and positively related for a high premium CEF ( ).   
 To control for the effect of a change in board structure, we examine equation (2.2) using the 
sub-sample of CEFs which did not change their percentages of board independence before and 
after the 2004 SEC amendments as explained in Section 5.2. The results from Table 2.8 show 
that advisory-rate decreases are significantly more likely for a CEF with a higher percentage of 
independent directors ( ) for only the period after but not before the 2004 SEC 
amendments (columns (3), (4), (5) and (6) in Table 2.8). Therefore, this relationship exists even 
after controlling for the change in the percentage of independent board members.  
[Please place Table 2.8 about here.] 
2.6.3.2 Magnitude of advisory-rate changes  
 The results for an examination of the factors that affect the magnitudes of the actual rate 
change ( ) as the dependent variable using OLS regressions are reported in Table 2.7 
(columns 7 and 8). Consistent with our results on the direction of the advisory rate changes, we 
find that smaller advisory rate changes (smaller increases or larger decreases in magnitude) are 
associated with a CEF with a higher percentage of independent directors ( ) after 
but not before the 2004 SEC amendments. Advisory-rate changes are significantly higher for a 
CEF with a higher unexplained compensation of its independent directors ( ) 
for the 2005-2013 period. We continue to find that advisory-rate changes are significantly higher 
for a CEF with a high premium ( ) and a not high pre-change advisory rate 
( ) for both periods.  
2.7. ROBUSTNESS CHECKS 
 In section 2.6, we examined the effect of lags of board characteristics on the direction and 
magnitude of advisory-rate changes. Taking advantage of our long time-series of board 
characteristics, we now test whether changes in board characteristics during the previous X years 
affect the likelihood of advisory rate changes (increases or decreases). Since board members 
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renew their contracts every three years,30 we set X to three years in order to capture the recent 
dynamics in CEF governance variables. Also, the choice of three-year changes in the governance 
variables are an additional way of dealing with potential endogeneity concerns between CEF 
board characteristics and advisory-rate changes. 
 Based on the ordered logit regression results reported in Table 2.9, we observe that the 
change in the percentage of independent directors ( ) is significantly and 
negatively related to advisory-rate increases for after but not before the 2004 SEC amendments 
(columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.9). The results from the probit regressions of the likelihood of 
advisory rate decreases ( ) support this finding (columns (3) and (4) in Table 2.9). 
Our results suggest that funds with boards with more independent directors are more likely to 
decrease than increase advisory rates. Our results based on ordered-logit regressions show that a 
change in board size ( ) is positively and significantly related with the likelihood of 
an advisory-rate change (columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.9).  These results suggest that a larger 
board size may make a board less efficient in its monitoring of the compensation of advisors.  
[Please place Table 2.9 about here.] 
 Consistent with our results in section 2.6, the ordered logit regression results show that a CEF 
with a higher unexplained compensation of its independent directors ( ) is 
less likely to decrease its advisory rates based on the findings for the period after but not before 
the 2004 SEC amendments (columns (5) and (6) in Table 2.9). Unlike our earlier results reported 
in section 2.6, we find no significant relationship between larger changes in the percentage of 
female directors ( ) and advisory rate changes. Consistent with our 
findings reported earlier in section 2.6, we find no significant relationship between a change in 
the ownership of directors ( ) and an advisory rate change.  
 2.8. CONCLUSION  
    We use a large database of equity and fixed-income U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs) during 
1994-2013 that includes hand-collected governance data. We find that the highest number of 
                                                          
30 Three years is also long enough to completely change all board members in staggered boards if the fund decides 
to do so. 
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decreases and lowest number of increases in advisory rates occur in the year after the 2004 SEC 
amendments. We find that CEFs with higher percentages of independent directors are associated 
with lower advisory rates and a significantly greater likelihood of advisory-rate decreases for the 
period after but not before the 2004 SEC amendments even when we confine our sample to those 
CEFs with no change in their percentage of independent directors around the 2004 SEC 
amendments. In summary, we can infer that the 2004 SEC amendments have been successful in 
encouraging independent directors to act more independently in questioning and negotiating 
advisory fees with fund advisors after their adoption. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
BOARD GOVERNANCE, MONETARY INTEREST AND CLOSED-END FUND 
PERFORMANCE 
3.1. INTRODUCTION 
 Several monitoring mechanisms exist to alleviate agency problems between mutual fund 
managers and investors. Since the redemption right does not exist for closed-end funds 
(henceforth CEFs), their shareholders need to rely on other mechanisms, particularly the Board 
of Directors, to mitigate any agency problems. This appears to be the reason that regulators and 
legislators pay attention to board oversight, and especially to the role of board structure in 
dealing with agency issues. Under the Investment Company Act of 1940, the Security and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) initially required that 40% of directors must be “not interested” 
(i.e., independent). New rules added to this Act on March, 2001 required 50% of the directors to 
be independent. On January 15, 2004, the SEC proposed and adopted a new rule requiring every 
mutual fund board to have an independent chairman and raising the proportion of independent 
directors from the previous 50% to at least 75%.31  However, the rule was twice vacated by the 
D.C. Circuit in 2004 and 2005. In its second ruling, the court found fatal procedural irregularities 
in the adoption of the new rule, which included the SEC’s failure to have a public comment 
period after a decision of an appellate court and the SEC’s reliance on data outside the public 
rulemaking record (Roiter, 2015).  Accordingly, these additional requirements are largely 
followed in practice but remain unimplemented in law.  
 Although it has been widely studied, the effect of boards of directors in controlling agency 
conflicts is still under debate. Some studies find boards are efficient in controlling agency issues 
which leads to higher firm performances (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Dahya et al., 2007; Paul, 
2007; Balsam et al., 2011). These studies find that higher percentages of independent directors 
are associated with higher firm performances. Other studies find no relation or even a negative 
relation between a board’s characteristics and its firm’s performance (Hermalin and Weisbach, 
1991; Cheng, 2008).  
                                                          
31 http://www.sec.gov/rules/proposed/2006/ic-27395.pdf 
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 Board effectiveness is also debated in the popular financial press. To illustrate, we now 
summarize the positions attributed to two knowledgeable commentators included in a Wall Street 
Journal Article by Sterngold (2014). John Morley, a Yale Law School Professor, believes that, 
unlike their mutual fund counterparts, industrial boards fire CEOs or change the directions of 
their companies. He argues that even independent mutual-fund directors are often chosen by the 
fund advisors. However, Laura Lutton, a research director at Morningstar Inc., believes that, 
given their responsibilities, fund boards properly exercise their roles in representing investors. 
She argues that fund directors usually are retired senior corporate executives who devote 
sufficient time to fulfill their duties. She blames the lack of transparency in mutual fund boards 
as the main reason preventing a proper measurement of their performance. In an article in Forbes 
(Maiello, 2009), Daniel P. Wiener, editor of Independent Adviser for Vanguard Investors and 
CEO of Adviser Investments, argues that mutual-fund boards can be more effective with equity 
based compensation and with the greater disclosure of compensation details.   
 Unlike most of the literature on board effectiveness, this study focuses on boards of directors 
of CEFs. Del Guercio et al. (2003) argue that mutual funds provide a better environment to 
measure whether boards act in the interests of shareholders. Unlike industrial corporations that 
represent a heterogeneous collection of industrial classifications, mutual funds are a somewhat 
more homogeneous industrial grouping. CEF boards are responsible for negotiating the fees 
charged shareholders annually by fund sponsors32 and for monitoring the performance of the 
funds they oversee. The results of negotiating the fees and monitoring the performance of CEFs 
can be measured by examining fund expense ratios, fund returns and fund premiums (i.e., the 
market price of a fund share minus its net asset value per share or NAVPS). 
 Using a large and unique database of U.S. CEFs, this study examines the relation between 
their board characteristics (e.g., independence, ownership, gender diversity and compensation) 
and fund expenses, return performances and premiums. We also study the determinants of 
director compensation in the CEF industry which helps us better understand the incentives of 
directors to monitor CEFs. Since our sample includes all CEFs in existence at any point in time 
during the period 1994-2013, it is free of survivorship bias. To the extent of our knowledge, our 
                                                          
32 Sponsors are advisory firms such as Fidelity or Putnam which manage and offer a set of funds.   
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database has the longest time-series of board information among the studies which examine the 
effect of board characteristics on both open-ended fund (OEF) and CEF performances.  
 Our study contributes to the literature in different ways. First, our sample includes board 
information for virtually all stock and bond CEFs. Most of the studies on mutual fund 
governance focus on random samples or samples of equity mutual funds or the funds associated 
with large fund families (e.g., Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Meschke, 2007; Cremers et al., 2009; 
Ding and Wermers, 2012). If their sample sizes are relatively large, these studies examine one or 
only a few years of observations. As such, they suffer to varying degrees from various biases 
(e.g., sampling error, over- or under-representation of various types of funds or time periods) 
which could meaningfully affect their generalizability.  
 Second, taking advantage of the large number of time periods captured in our unique panel 
data, this study overcomes issues related to cross-sectional data like lack of power and 
endogeneity.33 To examine the relation between board governance and firm characteristics, 
researchers should deal with endogeneity concerns as emphasized by many studies in the 
literature (e.g., Hermalin and Weisbach, 1991; Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Del Guercio et al., 
2003; Wintoki, Linck and Netter, 2012). Unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity are two 
potential sources of endogeneity that most empirical researchers recognize. However, there is 
another neglected source of endogeneity in which current governance variables are related to 
past fund characteristics like performance. Wintoki et al. (2012) show that ignoring this source 
of endogeneity can seriously affect inferences by changing the magnitudes or signs of the 
estimated coefficients. We show that in our sample past values of the dependent variables, like 
CEF benchmark-adjusted returns and expense ratios, are related with current values and changes 
in the values of board characteristics (such as board independence and size). Thus, in addition to 
the use of common statistical methods to study panel data (like OLS, fixed-effects models, and 
Fama-MacBeth), we use a two-step system generalised method of moments estimation, “system-
GMM”, which accounts for endogeneity issues (simultaneity, reverse causality and unobserved 
heterogeneity). Flannery and Hankins (2013) evaluate the performance of different dynamic 
panel estimators (e.g., Arellano and Bond’s (1991) difference GMM, Blundell and Bond’s 
                                                          
33 To the extent of our knowledge, only Meschk (2007) and Adams et al. (2009) use a panel dataset of board 
characteristics. Meschke (2007) uses 400 investment companies which are chosen randomly in each year for the 
1995-2004 period. Adams et al. (2009) use data for U.S. equity index OEM funds from 1998 to 2007.  
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(1998) system-GMM, Huan and Ritter’s (2009) Four Period Long Differencing, and Hahn, 
Hausman and Kuersteiner’s (2007) Longest Differencing) using corporate finance data and 
recommend that system-GMM should be used in the presence of endogenous regressors and 
unbalanced panels. Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) argue that this 
methodology is suitable for estimating a dynamic model, particularly when it is difficult if not 
impossible to find exogenous instruments to reduce endogeneity concerns (e.g., in governance 
variables). To the extent of our knowledge, this study is the first to apply the dynamic panel 
system-GMM estimator in the mutual fund governance literature.  
 Third, while many studies examine the relationships between some board characteristics and 
CEF premiums (Del Guercio et al., 2003; Gemmill & Thomas, 2006; Bradley et al., 2010), most 
use a more limited choice of board characteristics.  Fourth, our long time-series data allows us to 
study better the effects of boards of directors on some funds characteristics like benchmark-
adjusted returns which require at least two or three years to facilitate robust estimation.  Finally, 
we study the relationship between CEF board compensations and board characteristics to shed 
more light on the pecuniary motivations of directors to be aligned with shareholders’ interests. 
 We find that boards with higher percentages of independent directors have lower fees 
(expense ratios), which is consistent with the literature (e.g., Gemmill & Thomas, 2006; 
Meschke 2007). Using various measures of CEF returns (benchmark-adjusted returns based on 
CEF share prices and returns based on CEF NAV) and accounting for any possible endogeneity 
issues between fund governance and performance, we find significant and negative relationships 
between the percentages of independent directors and CEF performances.34 We find no 
significant relationship between CEF premiums and the percentage of independent directors. Our 
results regarding CEF returns and performances are consistent with the notion that firms with 
high information asymmetry, especially for those which have greater need for specialised 
knowledge and operate in more uncertain environments, may benefit from more inside directors 
as they are more knowledgeable about firm-specific information (Fama and Jensen, 1983).35 
Therefore, independent directors in CEFs with high information asymmetry may not be effective 
monitors and advisors as suggested by the theoretical models of Raheja (2005) and Adam and 
                                                          
34 Pathan and Faff (2013) document a negative relation between performance and governance in the banking 
industry. 
35 Duchin, Matsusaka and Ozbas (2010) empirically test this using the information cost of firms. They find that firms 
cannot protect the interests of shareholders when independent directors face severe information disadvantages. 
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Ferreira (2007). Also, our results suggest that the effect of board independence depends on the 
measure boards monitor and can directly influence. Monitoring and influencing fees (MER) 
needs more knowledge about the benchmarks in the market (readily available publicly) and less 
specialised and complex knowledge in the investment field (not publicly available) compared to 
monitoring and affecting returns and premiums where this knowledge ordering is reversed. 
Therefore, our results suggest that independent directors are more effective in monitoring and 
influencing simpler measures like CEF fees and less effective in monitoring and influencing 
more complex measures like CEF returns and premiums. This is consistent with Kuhnen (2004) 
who finds that mutual fund boards seldom change the fund’s management company or its in-
house advisers, and seldom renegotiate the advisory contracts even when it is beneficial for 
funds to do so.  
 Theoretically, board size can have positive or negative effects on firm value. Lipton and 
Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) contend that larger boards cause less effective monitoring due 
to more complicated coordination and process issues. However, more independent directors can 
add more knowledge to the board and increase board power in negotiations with managers. 
Consistent with Meschke (2007), we find board size is negatively related to benchmark-adjusted 
returns and fund fees. The negative relationship between board size and fund fees can be due to 
the fact that mutual fund directors play the monitoring role more than the advisory role. 
Therefore, larger boards might be negatively associated with benchmark-adjusted returns. 
However, increases in board size may increase the negotiation power of boards with managers 
and lead to lower fees. We find no significant relationship between board size and CEF 
premiums.   
Meschke (2007) finds that funds with independent directors that have higher ownerships are 
associated with lower fund fees. Cremers et al. (2009) find a positive relation between the 
ownerships of directors and fund performances for equity funds which belong to the top 25 U.S. 
fund families. Following Meschke (2007), we measure the ownership of directors as the 
percentage of independent directors who hold more than $50,000 of CEF equity. Our results 
suggest that director ownership has a positive and significant association with most variables that 
are expected to indicate greater value from the monitoring and influence of directors. We find 
that greater director ownership is associated with lower fund fees (expense ratios) and higher 
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returns. This is consistent with the notion that directors with more ownership (“more skin in the 
game”) are more effective in solving agency conflicts and are more aligned with the interests of 
shareholders due to greater self-interest. Our findings are generally consistent with Meschke 
(2007) and Cremers et al. (2009). Both studies find that the funds with higher board ownership 
create more value for investors through either reducing fund fees or increasing fund returns. 
The idea of gender diversity has received increased attention in recent years (e.g., Gul et al., 
2011; Adams and Ferreira, 2009). Increasing the presence of female directors is consistent with 
the notion that they can increase the problem solving abilities of boards because of their nature to 
work hard and their better communication skills (Adams and Ferreira, 2009; Robinson and 
Dechant, 1997). The literature reports mixed results on the effects of female presence on boards. 
Adams and Ferreira (2009) document that having more female directors leads to increased board 
meeting attendance, but has no significant direct effect on firm performance. Gul et al. (2011) 
find that the stock prices of firms with boards which have higher levels of gender-diversity are 
more informative. Endogeneity can be a concern in determining the relationship between firm 
characteristics and board gender diversity. For example, larger firms with better performances 
are more likely to hire female directors (Adams and Ferreira, 2009). We find no significant 
relationship between CEFs with more gender diversity and fees, but a positive and significant 
relationship with benchmark-adjusted returns. Our results show that CEFs with more 
independent female directors have lower premiums.  
We also examine the effect of board characteristics on directors’ total compensation. 
Consistent with Hempel and Fay (1994), Linn and Park (2005) and Brick, Palmon and Wald 
(2006), our results show that compensation is higher for larger funds and  funds with higher 
average numbers of meetings and higher levels of directors’ ownership. As we explain more 
fully later, the data on directors’ ownership does not separate the ownership based on a CEF’s 
compensation plan from personal investment decisions by its directors and it is highly possible 
that most of the ownerships of directors is due to the compensation plans of funds.  Therefore, 
the positive relationship between the ownerships of directors and their compensations is 
expected.  We also find that funds with independent directors who sit on more funds within the 
same family are paid less from each fund. We conjecture that independent directors might be 
satisfied with less compensation per fund when they expect to increase their total compensation 
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from the fund family by sitting on more boards. Our results show no relationship between past 
fund returns and the compensations of independent directors.  
 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section provides a very brief 
review of the relevant literature and hypotheses. The section 3.3 discusses the institutional 
setting of the CEF industry. The section 3.4 describes the sample used in our analysis. Sections 
3.5, 3.6, 3.7 and 3.8 report the methodology and discuss the results of examining the relation 
between board characteristics and CEF expense ratios, returns, premiums and compensations, 
respectively. Section 3.9 reports on some further robustness checks. Section 3.10 concludes the 
chapter. 
3.2. DEVELOPMENT OF THE HYPOTHESES 
CEFs (like OEFs) are regulated under the Investment Company Act of 1940 which makes 
little delineation between CEFs and OEFs with respect to board structure and monitoring. 
Presently, the board chair and a minimum of 75% of the board directors for both types of funds 
are generally independent in practice. However, they must be nominated and selected only by 
other independent directors to promote more independent directors on the boards. In addition, the 
advisor and any legal counsel for independent directors for both types of funds must be 
independent.  
Directors of CEFs (like OEFs) have the fiduciary duty to evaluate and approve the advisory 
contract between the fund and its sponsors. The fund fees (expense ratios) are one of the key 
parts of the advisory contracts that boards negotiate with fund sponsors based on the nature, 
extent, and quality of services provided by them. Directors are also responsible for overseeing a 
fund’s performance, voting the proxies for the securities held in a fund’s portfolio, and fair 
valuations of certain securities held by the fund.36 
Theoretically, Fama and Jensen (1983a) contend that boards of directors in open-ended funds 
(OEFs) are less important in controlling the agency conflicts between shareholders and managers 
(fund sponsors) compared to boards of industrial corporations due to stronger internal discipline. 
Unlike OEF investors, CEF investors cannot redeem their investments at net asset value (NAV) 
                                                          
36 www.ici.org 
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if they want to discipline poor performing fund advisors. Since CEF investors can only show 
their displeasure with management by transacting in the market, the responsibilities of CEF 
boards of directors to protect their shareholders are similar to those of industrial boards. 
Although the possibility of liquidation or conversion to OEFs can theoretically provide external 
discipline for CEFs, these actions require extensive effort, are expensive and are seldom 
undertaken. 
In this study, we examine the effects of various board characteristics (namely, board 
independence, board size, board ownership, board compensation and gender diversity) on the 
following four CEF characteristics: fees, returns, premiums and board compensations. To 
prepare for this examination, we now formulate testable hypotheses and our expectations for the 
relation between each of the board and CEF characteristics after briefly reviewing the relevant 
literature.  
Board independence is one of the main characteristics of the board structure which has been 
examined by researchers and legislators who believe that increased board independence helps to 
reduce agency conflicts which, in turn, lead to higher fund returns, reduced fees, and higher 
premiums. However, John Bogle (the founder of Vanguard) believes that ''The watchdog, a word 
almost universally used to describe the role of the independent director, simply doesn't bark 
(Barker, 2001).” He argues that independent directors do not jeopardize their well-paid salaries 
by disagreeing with fund sponsors. Raheja (2005) and Adams and Ferreira (2007) argue that the 
optimal composition of a board depends on their role in the activities of their firms. More 
independent directors do not necessarily improve board effectiveness when the boards are 
expected to be mainly advisors to the managers rather than monitors. Managers may be less 
willing to give information to independent directors who solely want to act as monitors.  
Therefore, a more “management-friendly board” (i.e. with more interested directors) may have a 
greater impact on firm performance if there is high degree of information asymmetry between 
managers and directors especially when firm operations require specialised knowledge.  
However, the empirical results for the effect of board composition on entity performance are 
mixed. Hermalin and Weisbach (1991) and Cheng (2008) find no relation, and Baysinger and 
Butler (1985), Dahya et al. (2007) and Paul (2007) find a positive relation between the 
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percentage of independent directors and firm performance. Using Portuguese stock market data, 
Fernandes (2008) finds that boards with higher percentages of independent directors pay higher 
wages to their executives and have lower alignments of the interests of their managers with those 
of their shareholders. Tufano and Sevick (1997) find that funds have lower fees with larger 
percentages of independent directors and directors who are present on a larger fraction of the 
other boards of the fund sponsor. Del Guercio et al. (2003) examine the effect of board 
characteristics on U.S. CEF premiums during 1995. They find that governance variables, such as 
the percentage of independent directors, are not significantly related to premiums. Ferris and Yan 
(2007) find that board independence is not related to the probability of a fund scandal nor overall 
fund performance for an OEF sample in 2002. Khorana et al. (2007) study board effectiveness 
through fund decisions to merge with another fund during the 1999-2001 period.37 They find no 
significant relation between board structure and merger decisions. However, they find that 
boards with more independent directors are less tolerant of underperformance and are more 
likely to approve within family mergers.  
Although the effect of board independence depends on the firm environment like the degree 
of information asymmetry, uncertainty and required specialised knowledge of firm operations, 
we believe that the effects of board independence is contingent on the complexity of the measure 
over which directors are expected to monitor and influence. For example, negotiating fees with 
investment advisors does not require specialised knowledge in the investment field and requires 
more comprehensive knowledge about market benchmarks that is publicly available. While one 
can argue that monitoring and influencing fund returns can be done through replacement of fund 
advisers after poor performance, changing advisers results in a known material cost for the fund 
and its shareholders and very uncertain expected future benefits. If such is the case, then having 
more independent directors can lead to lower return performances. Thus, our first three 
hypotheses stated in their alternative forms are:  
: CEF expense ratios are lower for CEFs with higher percentages of independent board 
directors. 
: CEF returns are lower for CEFs with higher percentages of independent board directors. 
                                                          
37 The authors are currently pursuing this effect in a separate study. 
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: CEF premiums are lower for CEFs with higher percentages of independent board 
directors. 
 If outside directors create value for a CEF, then we expect a CEF with more independent 
directors to have higher average compensations. Furthermore, since most CEFs exceed the SEC 
requirement that at least 50% of the directors should be independent, we argue that the demand 
for qualified and knowledgeable independent directors is larger and more costly. Thus, 
: The total compensation of an average independent director is higher for CEFs with 
higher percentages of independent board directors. 
With respect to board size, Lipton and Lorsch (1992) and Jensen (1993) conjecture that 
larger boards cause less effective monitoring due to more complex coordination and process 
issues. On the other hand, more independent directors could add value to the firm by bringing 
more knowledge to the board and also increasing their power in negotiations with managers. The 
empirical evidence for mutual funds and industrial firms on the effect of larger boards are mixed. 
Many studies find that board size is negatively associated with firm performance (Yermack, 
1996; Eisenberg, Sundgren, and Wells, 1998). Del Guercio et al. (2003) find a significant 
negative (positive) relation between board size (expense ratios) and premiums. However, Cheng 
(2008) finds that larger boards are associated with less variability of corporate performance 
measured as monthly stock returns, annual accounting returns on assets, Tobin's Q, accounting 
accruals, extraordinary items, analyst forecast inaccuracy, the level of R&D expenditures, and 
the frequency of acquisition and restructuring activities. Raheja (2005), Coles, Daniel and 
Naveen, (2008), Linck et al. (2008) and Adams and Mehran (2012) find that smaller boards are 
not necessarily more desirable for all firms and firms may benefit from larger boards. For a 
sample of CEFs in 1996, Del Guercio et al. (2003) find that larger boards have higher expense 
ratios, and are less vigilant monitors (less effective) in that they are more likely to approve rights 
offerings and are less likely to suggest fund restructurings to increase fund premiums. Using a 
large panel of U.S. index OEFs, Adams, Mansi and Nishikawa (2010) find an inverse relation 
between board size and fund performance.  
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The results for the effect of board size on director compensation also are mixed. Hempel and 
Fay (1994) find a positive but not significant relation between board size and a director’s total 
compensation. Ryan and Wiggins (2004) find a negative and significant relationship between 
board size and a director’s total compensation. Adam and Ferreira (2009) find that board size has 
a negative but not significant effect on a director’s total compensation. Thus, we believe that the 
effect of board size on CEF performance can be determined only through empirical examination. 
Brick et al. (2006) examine the relation between the compensations of CEOs and directors 
and industrial firm performance. They find that the excess compensations of directors are 
associated with firm underperformance. Sevick and Tufano (1997) find a positive relation 
between fees and unexplained compensation for a sample of U.S. OEFs in 1992. They find that 
the directors who receive this relatively large compensation are less likely to disapprove of the 
fees proposed by fund sponsors so as to not jeopardize their positions in fund families. Similar 
findings are reported by Ferris and Yan (2007) and Meschke (2007). Similar to these studies, we 
expect the excess compensation of a director to have a negative effect on CEF performance 
measures. Thus, our second set of three hypotheses in their alternative form is:  
: CEF expense ratios are higher for CEFs where the average independent director has 
higher excess compensation. 
: CEF returns are lower for CEFs where the average independent director has higher 
excess compensation. 
: CEF premiums are lower for CEFs where the average independent director has higher 
excess compensation. 
Fich et al. (2005) find that the firms in a sample of Fortune 1000 firms from 1997 to 1999 
that adopted stock-option plans for independent directors had higher book-to-market ratios and 
profitability metrics. Morck et al. (1988), McConnell and Servaes (1990), and Hermalin and 
Weisbach (1991) find a positive relationship between the stock ownership of directors and firm 
performance measured as Tobin's Q.  Chen, Gloldstein and Jiang (2008) find that a significant 
portion of directors hold shares of funds they monitor during the 2002-2003 period. Ownership 
trends confirm optimal contracting equilibrium in a way that the ownerships of directors are 
positively correlated with the variables shown to have higher values of director monitoring. 
Gemmill and Thomas (2006) find that fund premiums are associated negatively with only the 
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ownerships of managers and outside directors for a sample of U.K. CEFs during the 1995-1998 
period. However, Meschke (2007) finds that funds with independent directors that have higher 
ownerships are associated with lower fund fees. Chen et al. (2008) find that director ownership 
in mutual fund boards is positively and significantly related with variables that create greater 
values for shareholders. Cremers et al. (2009) find a positive relation between the ownerships of 
directors and fund performances for equity funds which belong to the top 25 U.S. fund families. 
Their findings imply that higher ownerships could indicate a higher alignment of the interests of 
fund directors and shareholders. Thus, we expect that director ownership has a positive 
relationship with CEF performance measures.  The data of directors’ ownerships in CEF proxy 
statements does not separate the ownership based on CEF compensation plans or personal 
investment decisions. Therefore, we expect to observe a positive relationship between the 
ownerships and compensations of directors. Our third set of four hypotheses stated in their 
alternative forms is:  
: CEF expense ratios are lower for CEFs with higher ownerships of their independent 
directors. 
: CEF returns are higher for CEFs with higher ownerships of their independent directors. 
: CEF premiums are higher for CEFs with higher ownerships of their independent 
directors. 
: Total compensations of directors are higher for CEFs with higher ownerships of their 
independent directors.  
Female directors are considered to be hard working with better communication skills that 
can increase the problem solving abilities of the boards on which they sit (Adams and Ferreira, 
2009; Robinson and Dechant, 1997). Like most of the other board characteristics, the literature 
has mixed results on the effect of female presence on the boards. Although they could not find 
any direct effect on firm performance, Adams and Ferreira (2009) find that more female 
directors lead to increased board meeting attendance. Gul et al. (2011) find that the firms with 
boards which have higher levels of gender-diversity have more informative stock prices. Thus, 
we expect that boards with more female independent directors have higher CEF performance 
measures. Since there is no theoretical study predicting the effect of female presence on the 
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compensations of board directors, the sign and magnitude of this relationship can only be 
determined empirically. Our fourth set of three hypotheses stated in their alternative forms is:  
: CEF expense ratios are lower for CEFs with higher percentages of female directors on 
the boards. 
: CEF returns are higher for CEFs with higher percentages of female directors on the 
boards. 
: CEF premiums are higher for CEFs with higher percentages of female directors on the 
boards. 
   
3.3. DATA, VARIABLES AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS  
3.3.1 Sample Selection 
Our main sources of data are Morningstar Direct and the SEC EDGAR database. We 
carefully collect the information in all annual proxy statements, referred to as the DEF-14A 
forms hereafter, and semi-annual reports filed with the SEC, referred to as NSAR forms 
hereafter, for all CEFs with unique CIK numbers (Central Index Key) from 1994 (first filling 
date) through 2013. The DEF-14A forms contain information regarding each director on the 
board including the term of office and the length of time served, whether the director is 
independent, the number of portfolios in the fund complex overseen by the director, the dollar 
range of equity securities in the fund (beneficially) owned by the director, the aggregate dollar 
range of equity securities in all registered investment companies overseen by the director in the 
fund family, and the total dollar amount of cash compensation received by each independent 
director serving on the fund and for all other funds in the fund family.  Since the DEF-14A forms 
contain information about the boards of directors in different formats, their data must be hand 
collected. 
The NSAR forms contain information regarding fund advisor, administrator, affiliated 
broker-dealer, portfolio transaction, financial information, and condensed balance sheet data at 
the registrant level with unique CIK. This information is aggregated over all the share classes of 
the same fund. Unlike OEFs, only two of the CEFs in our sample have more than one share 
class. We collect 23,152 N-SAR fillings and select 10,897 NSAR-B forms (annual data) on all 
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CEFs during the 1994-2013 period. Since almost all NSAR forms are filled according to the 
strict reporting standards of the SEC, the data in these forms can be captured electronically. For 
example, we use NSAR forms to collect the CEF size (item 74T of form NSAR or “Net assets of 
common shareholders”) and turnover (item 71D of form NSAR).38  
We use Morningstar Direct to get survivorship-free data regarding share and NAVPS (net-of-
fees) returns, annual fees, fund inceptions, fund advisors, and fund categories. Morningstar 
Direct has information for 1031 CEFs during the 1994-2013 period. We match our datasets from 
NSAR and DEF-14A forms based on unique CEF CIK numbers which are available on both 
forms. To build our final dataset, we match the fund standard name from the Morningstar Direct 
database with that from the SEC Edgar database. This results in a sample of 9,914 fund-year 
observations for 906 CEFs with unique CIK numbers after eliminating index funds and 
institutional funds from our database.39  
3.3.2 Governance and Ownership Variables40 
In this section, we discuss the governance variables used in our subsequent analyses of fund 
fees, performances, premiums and director compensations. 
 is the percentage of independent (non-interested) directors for the CEF boards. 
A director is considered as “interested” if she is an employee of the investment adviser or a 
member of the family of an employee, employee of a registered broker-dealer or a 5-percent 
shareholder of it, or affiliated with any recent legal counsel to the fund.41 
 is the total number of independent directors on a CEF board. Information 
related to independent directors is filed in the proxy statements of funds called DEF-14A.   
 is the percentage of independent directors who hold more than 
$50,000 worth of the shares of a fund. We expect that directors who hold more fund shares are 
more aligned with the interests of investors.  In 2001, the Security Exchange Committee (SEC) 
                                                          
38 While Morningstar also has fund size and turnover data, the NSAR forms provide this data for a longer time-
series. 
39 Voya Senior Income Fund and Franklin Mutual Recovery Fund are examples of institutional Funds. Dow 30 
Enhanced Premium and Income is the only index closed-end fund.  
40 The definitions of all variables used in this study and their data sources are described in the appendix.   
41 Section 2(a)(19) of the Investment Company 1940 Act. 
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passed an order stipulating that all fund directors must disclose their ownerships in the funds that 
they serve on by the end of January 2002. This information became public after February 2002 in 
the form of a dollar range of equity securities that are beneficially owned by a director in the 
fund and the aggregate dollar ranges of equity securities owned in all the registered investment 
companies overseen by the director in the family of investment companies. The beneficial 
ownerships of directors in the fund and fund family are collected from the filed DEF-14A forms 
beginning with their first availability in 2002. This value could represent both the ownership of a 
director as part of a compensation plan from the fund or from their personal investment in the 
fund. Funds are required to disclose the holdings of each director within the following ranges: 
either no investment, or an investment of $1 to $10,000, $10,001 to $50,000, $50,001 to 
$100,000, or more than $100,000. We calculate the percentage of independent directors in each 
board, whose beneficial ownership is zero ( ), from $1 to $10000 
( ), from $10,001 to $50,000 ( ), from $50,001 to $100,000 
( ), and more than $100,000 ( ). 
 is the percentage of female directors on a board to test if gender diversity 
better aligns the interests of the board with shareholders.  
 is the average dollar value of compensation received by a board from 
a CEF. Following Tufano and Sevick (1997), we calculate unexplained compensation, 
, as the average residual (in millions of dollars) obtained from annually 
regressing director compensation on the number of boards a director serves on and the total 
assets overseen by that director.  
We also consider , which is the number of meetings that a CEF holds 
within a year. Like other types of corporate boards, state law requires mutual fund boards to hold 
meetings on a regular basis. These meetings help board members to be better informed about the 
matters of importance to the fund, and to discuss and vote on important fund issues.  
 
 is the average number of years that independent directors have been on 
a CEF board. Experienced directors can be more effective in their monitoring responsibilities. 
However, the longer they serve on a board, the more likely it is that they will lose independence 
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due to the influences of the fund sponsors (Del Guercio et al., 2003). Therefore, only an 
empirical examination can determine the effect of long-serving directors on CEF performances.  
3.3.3 Descriptive Statistics 
Table 3.1 reports the descriptive statistics for our sample. Panel A of Table 3.1 shows that the 
number of CEFs with each fund investment objective based on Morningstar Direct and their total 
number for every five year period. The six investment objective categories used are equity, 
international equity, bond, municipal bond, allocation and specialty.42 The number of CEFs 
increases from 191 in 1995 to its highest level of 606 in 2008, and then decreases to 559 in 2013. 
CEFs with bond and municipal bond (allocation and specialty) investment objectives comprise 
the most (least) number of funds in the sample annually.  
[Please place Table 3.1 about here.] 
 We have three variables to proxy for CEF return performance; namely, yearly share returns 
( ), NAVPS returns ( ) and benchmark-adjusted share returns 
( ). To examine the relationship between CEF board characteristics and return 
performances (see Section 3.5), we rely mainly on benchmark-adjusted share returns 
( ), and use share returns ( ) and NAVPS returns ( ) in 
tests of robustness (see Section 3.8). Each fund’s yearly share returns ( ) and 
NAVPS returns ( ) are given by the change in its share price and net asset value 
per share (NAVPS) adjusted for all distributions. We obtain the benchmark-adjusted share 
returns following Chen et al. (2013), Ferreira et al. (2013) and Meschke (2007).  Specifically: 
  (3.1) 
Where  is the benchmark-adjusted share return of fund i at time t, 
is the realized share return of fund i at time t, K is the number of factors in the 
benchmark model,  is the realized return for benchmark factor k at time t, and  are the 
                                                          
42 Following Khorana and Servaes (2005), we aggregate Morningstar investment objectives into the six broader 
investment objective categories.  
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estimated factor betas of fund i at time t obtained by regressing the previous 36 months of 
realized share returns against the corresponding realized benchmark factor returns.  
 The benchmark-adjusted share return performances for funds with an investment objective of 
equity, international equity and specialty are calculated using a 5-factor model. The factors are 
the monthly excess returns on the CRSP value-weighted index, the differences in returns 
between small and large stock portfolios, the differences in returns between high and low book-
to-market stock portfolios, the Carhart (1997) momentum factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh 
(2003) liquidity factor.43 For the bond and municipal bond CEFs, we use a 7-factor model that 
includes the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index, Barclays U.S. Treasury Long, Barclays U.S. 
Treasury Intermediate, Barclays U.S. Mortgage Backed Securities, Barclays U.S. Corp 
Investment Grade, Barclays Municipal Bond and Barclays U.S. Corp High Yield Bond, which is 
consistent with the models used in Blake, Elton, and Gruber (1993) and Chen et al. (2013). For 
the allocation CEFs, we use a 12-factor model that includes the 5 factors used for the equity 
CEFs and the 7 factors used for the bond CEFs. CEFs are included in the samples for the tests of 
benchmark-adjusted return performances only if they have at least 36 non-missing monthly 
return observations. The monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are compounded to annualize 
them. 
Panel B of Table 3.1 reports statistics on the cross-sectional distributions of CEF 
characteristics for every five year period. The yearly share returns ( ) and 
benchmark-adjusted returns ( ) of CEFs have their lowest (highest) values based on 
both their means and medians in 2008 (2003). Fund size is proxied by total net assets (TNA).44 
The average (median) fund size ( ) has grown steadily from $257 million ($163 million) 
in 1995 to $404 million ($263 million) in 2013. CEF premium ( ) is defined as [(share 
price - NAVPS)/NAVPS]. The cross-sectional average (and median) yearly CEF premium is 
lowest in 2008 and is highest in 2003. The annual CEF turnover ratio ( ) is 
calculated using the lesser of purchases (NSAR item 71A) or sales (NSAR item 71B divided by 
                                                          
43 The factor data are collected from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). 
44 The top and bottom 1% of the fund size values are winsorized to control for outliers. 
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average monthly net assets (NSAR item 71C). The average turnover ratio has its highest (lowest) 
value in 2013 (1998).  
Panel C of Table 3.1 reports descriptive statistics on CEF board characteristics. The cross-
sectional median number of board members ( ) has increased from 8 in 1995 to 9 in 
2013. The cross-sectional median of the percentages of independent directors45 ( ) 
has also increased from 73% in 1995 to 84% in 2013. The cross-sectional mean compensation of 
directors from a CEF ( ) or fund family ( ) has its 
highest and lowest values in 1998 and 1995, respectively. Most of the boards are comprised of 
directors who own no securities of the fund (  category) for all of the cross-
sections.   
Spearman rank correlations between the expense ratios and board characteristics are 
reported in Table 3.2. The results show that fund expense ratios and the cross-sectional mean 
percentages of independent directors ( ), board sizes ( ) and 
percentages of female directors ( ) are negatively correlated at the 0.01 level.  
We also find that the unexplained compensations of board members ( ) are 
positively correlated with fund expense ratios at the 0.01 level.  
[Please place Table 3.2 about here.] 
Table 3.2 reports the Spearman rank correlations between the CEF share returns 
( ) with the various board characteristics. We observe that the fund expense ratios 
( ) are positively correlated with share returns ( ) at the 0.01 level. 
Share returns ( ) are also negatively related to the cross-sectional mean percentages 
of independent directors ( ), board sizes ( ), average director tenures 
( ), and percentages of female directors ( ) at the 0.01 level. 
CEF expense ratios and average director tenures ( ) are negatively 
correlated with premiums. We also find that CEF premiums are positively correlated with the 
levels of board independence ( ) and the percentages of female directors 
( ). All of these relationships are significant at the 1% level. 
                                                          
 
48 
 
3.3.4 Methodology 
To examine the relationship between CEF characteristics (e.g., expense ratios, returns, 
premiums and independent directors’ compensations) and board characteristics, we estimate the 
following generic panel regression where  is one of the four performance 
measures (see sections 3.4, 3.5, 3.6 and 7) for CEF i for year t discussed earlier:  
●
 (3.2) 
 The board characteristic variables are discussed in section 4.2 and further defined in the 
appendix. For each dependent variable, we replicate equation (3.2) with different control 
variables. All of the relationships between the CEF performance measures and various board 
characteristics and control variables are estimated for the period of 2002-2013, which 
corresponds to the availability of the ownership data, and the period of 1994-2013. Since the 
2002-2013 period contains the most recent data, all the governance variables (including the  
ownership of directors) and the effects of the corporate governance mandates of the Sarbanes-
Oxley Act (SOX) of 2002, we present our results primarily based using this period and use the 
findings of the 1994-2013 period as a robustness check. 
 Following Wintoki et al. (2012) and in order to determine the most appropriate model 
specification for testing our hypotheses, we examine how strongly the present values and 
changes in the values of various governance and control regressors, such as board independence 
( ), board size ( ) and fund size ( ), are related to the past 
dependent variables such as the CEF benchmark-adjusted returns ( , expense 
ratios ( ), premiums ( ) and median compensations of  independent 
directors from a fund ( ). These regressions also include other control 
variables such as the lag of CEF governance variables and CEF characteristics like the logarithm 
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of fund age ( ), family size ( ), logarithm of fund turnover 
( ), dividend yield ( ) and leverage ( ).  
 The results are presented in Table 3.3. Panel A of Table 3.3 shows the results from regressing 
the present values (levels) of some regressors in equation (3.2) on the CEF performance 
measures and characteristics from the prior year. We find that past CEF benchmark-adjusted 
returns (  are significantly and positively related to both board sizes 
( ), as suggested by Fama and Jensen (1983) and empirically shown by Coles et al. 
(2008) and Linck et al. (2008), and with CEF fund sizes ( ). We also find that past CEF 
expense ratios ( ) are significantly and negatively related to board independence 
( ), board sizes ( ) and fund sizes ( ). Our results show that 
past CEF premiums ( ) are significantly and positively related to fund sizes ( ). 
We also find that the past median compensations of the independent directors from a CEF 
( ) are significantly and negatively related to the levels of board 
independence ( ) and board sizes ( ), and are significantly and 
positively related to fund sizes ( ).  
[Please place Table 3.3 about here.] 
 Panel B of Table 3.3 shows the results from regressions of the one-year changes of some 
regressors in equation (3.2) on the CEF performance measures and characteristics from two years 
prior to the year of interest. We find similar results to those reported in panel A. Changes in 
board independence ( ) are significantly and negatively related to past CEF 
benchmark-adjusted returns ( as shown by Hermalin and Weisbach (1998). Our 
results show that changes in board sizes ( ) are significantly and positively related 
to past CEF benchmark-adjusted returns ( . We also find that past CEF expense 
ratios ( ) are negatively (positively) related to changes in board sizes (CEF sizes).  
 Overall, our results reported in Table 3.3 show that potentially some of our governance 
variables (e.g., board independence and size) and control variables (e.g., fund size) are 
dynamically endogenous.  There are different dynamic panel estimators that can deal with 
endogenous regressors.  Using Monte Carlo simulations, Flannery and Hankins (2013) examine 
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the performances of the following estimators using corporate finance data: the difference GMM 
of Arellano and Bond (1991), the system-GMM of Blundell and Bond (1998), the Four Period 
Long Differencing of Huan and Ritter (2009), and the Longest Differencing of Hahn et al. 
(2007). Based on it superior performance, Flannery and Hankins (2013) conclude that the 
system-GMM should be used in the presence of endogenous regressors and unbalanced panels. 
Since some of our governance variables are dynamically endogenous and our panels are 
unbalanced, we use two-step system generalised methods of moments (GMM) estimation 
specifications to estimate all of the panel regressions,46 and the OLS, fixed-effects, and Fama-
MacBeth estimation specifications to examine robustness.  
 Arellano and Bover (1995) and Blundell and Bond (1998) propose that the GMM is suitable 
for estimating a dynamic panel model, particularly when it is difficult if not impossible to find 
exogenous instruments to reduce the endogeneity concerns in the independent variables (e.g., 
governance). Their approach involves two equations, together called “system-GMM”. The first 
equation includes the original equation of variables in their levels, which is called the “level 
equation”. The second equation involves differenced variables, which is called the “differenced 
equation”. In this method, some combinations of variables from a firm’s history are used as 
“internal” instrument variables to address endogeneity. Therefore, the method uses the lags of 
independent and dependent variables to eliminate the use of external instruments.47 Since the 
two-step estimates of the standard errors have a tendency to be downward biased, we use a finite 
sample correction proposed by Windmeijer (2005).  
 The key exogeneity assumption for the system-GMM estimator is that the instruments (lagged 
dependent and independent variables) should be exogenous with respect to current shocks in the 
dependent variable. There are two tests to examine the exogeneity of instruments. The first test 
responds to the question of whether enough lags of the dependent variables are included (the 
second-order serial correlation test). If we believe that our model has enough lags of the 
dependent variable, any lagged dependent variable beyond those lags could be a potential valid 
instrument for current shocks in the dependent variables. Therefore, the residuals in first 
                                                          
46 The use of system-GMM has recently been used in the finance literature to deal with different sorts of 
endogeneity in panel data (Pathan and Faff, 2013; Wintoki et al, 2012). 
47 For further discussion of the system-GMM, please see Roodman (2009).  
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differences should be correlated and in second differences should not be correlated if our model 
has enough lags of the dependent variable. The autocorrelation tests of the first and second 
differences are referred to as AR(1) and AR(2) in all of our tables. The second test is a Hansen 
test of over-identification. Since we use multiple lags in our system-GMM, we can test whether 
our model is over-identified. The Hansen test provides a J-statistic with a 2 distribution under 
the null hypothesis of the validity of the instruments.48  
 To deal with endogeneity in OLS, fixed-effects and Fama-MacBeth regressions, we use one-
year lagged governance variables (Adams et al., 2010). We also use fund and year fixed effects 
in our fixed-effects model specification. As explained above, we do not use lags of the 
governance variables in the two-step GMM model since this model uses the lags of variables as 
instruments. 
 Petersen (2009) recommends that year dummies and clustered (Roger) standard errors be used 
to avoid rejecting the null hypothesis too often when both potential time-series and cross-
sectional correlations exist in the panel data. Thus, all our panel-regression inferences are based 
on clustered standard errors as in Petersen (2009), and any subsequent references to weakly 
significant, significant and strongly significant are for statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 
and 0.01 levels, respectively. To preserve valuable journal space, the coefficients for the year 
dummies are suppressed in subsequent tables that present results based on the panel regression 
estimations.  
3.4. RELATION BETWEEN FUND EXPENSE RATIOS, BOARD CHARACTERISTICS 
AND CONTROL VARIABLES 
To study the relationships with board characteristics, we estimate the following generic 
panel regression where  is either the fees or returns (see section 3.5) for CEF i for year t 
discussed earlier:  
                                                          
48 The R-squared for system-GMM regression is calculated herein as the squared correlation coefficient between 
actual and fitted values.   
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 (3.3) 
 Beside the board characteristic variables discussed above in section 3.2 and further defined in 
the appendix, the panel regressions include various control variables.  is the fund’s total 
NAV, and  is the family’s total NAV where both are in billions of dollars. These two 
variables are included to control for the effect of economies of scale from fund and family size 
on fund fees, respectively.  and  are measured as the natural 
logarithms of the age of a CEF in years and annual turnover, respectively.  is the 
annual expense ratio of the CEF.  is a dummy variable which take the value of one 
if the fund belongs to the bond or municipal bond fund types and zero otherwise.  is a 
dummy variable which takes the value of one if the fund is registered outside the U.S. and zero 
otherwise. 
One of the responsibilities of CEF boards is to negotiate and approve the fund fees proposed 
by fund sponsors and paid directly from fund assets. Since higher fees reduce the NAVPS (net-
of-fees) returns to shareholders and may enrich management companies, the magnitude of fees 
(such as the expense ratios) provides further evidence on the existence of agency conflicts and 
reflect the degree of alignment of the interests of CEF boards with both their shareholders and 
the fund management companies. In this section, we examine the association of CEF expense 
ratios with board characteristics, such as the percentages of independent directors on the boards, 
board sizes, director ownerships, and director compensations, percentages of female directors, 
numbers of board meetings and director tenures. 
To examine the relationship between fund expense ratios and board characteristics, we 
estimate panel regressions (3) without the expense ratio ( ) variable using annual 
data. Summary results for the panel regressions for the 2002-2013 and 1994-2013 periods are 
reported in Table 3.4. Overall, our results show that some board characteristics are associated 
with CEF expense ratios for both time periods. Consistent with our first alternative hypothesis 
( ), the percentages of independent directors ( ) have a weakly significant and 
negative relationship with the CEF expense ratios for both time periods. This is consistent with 
53 
 
the findings of Sevick and Tufano (1997) and Del Guercio et al. (2003) for OEFs. Our results 
show that a one standard deviation increase in the percentage of independent directors 
( ) implies a 0.16 [i.e., 0.02 times 0.08 (standard deviation)] percentage decrease in 
the expense ratio for the 2002-2013 period.  
[Please place Table 3.4 about here.] 
We find a negative and strongly significant relation between board sizes ( ) and 
CEF expense ratios for both time periods based on the system-GMM regressions (Table 3.4, 
columns 7 and 8). This is consistent with the notion that restrictions on board size do not 
necessarily enhance entity value (Coles et al., 2008). Our results show that a one standard 
deviation increase in board size ( ) implies a 25.5 percentage [i.e., 0.1 times 2.55 
(standard deviation)] decrease in the expense ratio for the 2002-2013 period. We find no 
significant relationship between unexplained compensations ( ) and CEF 
expense ratios based on our system-GMM regressions.  
Consistent with Meschke (2007) for OEFs and our third alternative hypothesis ( ), we 
find that boards with a larger fraction of independent directors who hold more than $50,000 in 
fund assets, 
, have lower expense ratios based on OLS, fixed effects and system-GMM 
regressions. This supports the notion that boards with higher levels of ownership by directors are 
more effective in negotiating in favor of shareholders’ interests (Chen et al., 2008; Ding and 
Wermers, 2012). Our results show that a one standard deviation increase in board ownership 
( ) implies a 1.9 [i.e., 0.1 times 0.19 (standard deviation)] percentage 
decrease in the expense ratio for the 2002-2013 period (i.e., the full sample period with 
ownership data). We find no significant relation between CEF expense ratios and the percentages 
of female directors ( ) and board meeting frequencies ( ) for 
the 2002-2013 period.  
Table 3.4 also reports the estimates for a number of control variables. We find that the 
relation between CEF expense ratios is negative and significant with CEF sizes ( ) and 
positive but not significant with family sizes ( ). Deli (2002) finds that the relation 
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between advisory rates is negative and significant with both of these measures of scale 
economies for a sample of 92% OEMs and 8% CEFs during 1997.  Consistent with Deli (2002) 
and Mescke (2007), we also find that fixed-income CEFs have significantly lower fees compared 
to their equity counterparts.49 The insignificant test statistics of second-order auto correlation 
(AR(2)) and Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions reported in Table 3.4 indicate that 
the system-GMM specification is well fitted.  
To summarize, our panel regression results confirm that CEF expense ratios are related with 
some board characteristics. Funds with greater board independence and director ownerships 
charge significantly lower fees.  
 
3.5. RELATION BETWEEN CEF BENCHMARK-ADJUSTED RETURNS AND BOARD 
CHARACTERISTICS  
Another duty of a CEF board is to oversee fund performance and to hire talented portfolio 
managers (indirect effect). Before explaining the results of regressions between a fund’s 
performance and its governance, we need to discuss the endogeneity concerns noted in this 
literature. Many empirical studies document the (positive/negative) effect of board structure on 
firm performance (Baysinger and Butler, 1985; Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Dahya et al., 2007; 
Ferris and Yan, 2007; and Paul, 2007). Hermalin and Weisbach (1998) argue that board structure 
also can be affected by the bargaining process between managers and boards of directors. 
Wintoki et al. (2012) find empirical support for a simultaneous relation between board structure 
and firm performance. Thus, we once again rely on the system-GMM method to deal with 
potential endogeneity concerns (reverse causality, unobserved heterogeneity and simultaneity) in 
this section of the paper.   
To examine the effects of board characteristics on fund performances, we estimate system-
GMM panels using regression (3.3) with benchmark-adjusted share excess returns 
(  as the dependent variable, and the addition of its one- and two-year lags (i.e., 
                                                          
49 We also interact the fixed-income dummy with four governance variables (board size, independence, gender 
diversity and ownership of directors) to check further the effect of fund type on the relationship between CEF fees 
and fund governance. Based on untabulated results, we find that all of the coefficients for these interaction variables 
are not significant at conventional levels.  
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 and , respectively) to absorb any information in the past 
returns of CEFs. The results when we use share returns  or NAVPS returns 
(NAVPS  as the dependent variable is reported later in section 3.8.  
Consistent with our first hypothesis ( ) and based on the system-GMM specification, we 
find a negative and significant relation between the percentages of independent directors 
( ) and benchmark-adjusted share returns  in Table 3.5. This might 
be related (at least partly) to the belief that interested directors cannot add more value in firm 
functions such as asset management that are subject to a high degree of information asymmetry, 
uncertainty, and actions which require specialised knowledge (Duchin et al., 2010).   A one 
standard deviation increase in the percentage of independent directors ( ) implies a 
0.96 [i.e., 0.12 times 0.08 (standard deviation)] percentage decrease in the CEF benchmark-
adjusted share return. Using a system-GMM specification (Table 3.5, columns 7 and 8) and 
consistent with Meschke (2007), we find a negative and significant relationship between board 
sizes  and benchmark-adjusted share returns. A one standard deviation increase in 
the CEF board size ( ) implies a 5.1 [i.e., 0.02 times 2.55 (standard deviation)] 
percentage decrease in the CEF benchmark-adjusted share return. 
[Please place Table 3.5 about here.] 
 Our results in Table 3.5 also show that there is a significant and positive relationship 
between director ownerships  and the CEF benchmark-adjusted share 
returns. This relationship is robust using all other model specifications except the fixed-effects 
specification. These results are consistent with our third alternative hypothesis ( ). This 
supports the notion that more director ownership, either based on personal investment or CEF 
compensation plans, appears to reduce the agency issues between shareholders and advisers. 
Cremers et al. (2009) find that funds significantly underperform when the ownership levels of 
directors are low. A one standard deviation increase in the percentage of director ownership 
) implies a 2.85 [i.e., 0.15 times 0.19 (standard deviation)] percentage 
increase in the CEF benchmark-adjusted share return.  
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 Based on the system-GMM specification, we find a positive and significant relation between 
the CEF benchmark-adjusted share returns and the percentages of female directors on the boards 
( ) and the logarithms of the average ages of the independent directors 
( ). We find no relationship between CEF benchmark-adjusted share 
returns and the numbers of board meetings  and the tenures of the directors 
( .  
Table 3.5 also reports the coefficient estimates for a number of control variables. The first 
control variable is for the effect, if any, of mutual fund fees on fund returns. The literature on the 
nature of the relation between mutual fund fees and benchmark-adjusted returns is mixed. For 
samples of OEFs, Chen et al. (2004) find no relation while Carhart (1997) and Gil-Bazo and 
Ruiz-Verdu (2009) find a negative relation based on benchmark-adjusted returns using net and 
gross returns, respectively. For our sample of CEFs, we find no robust relation between expense 
ratios and CEF share returns for the various model specifications. The signs and significances of 
the estimated coefficients depend on the model specification and time period examined. 
Consistent with Ferreira et al. (2013) and Chen et al. (2004), we observe a negative and 
significant relationship between CEF sizes ( ) and benchmark-adjusted share returns.50 
Once again, the insignificant test statistics of second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) and for 
Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions reported in Table 3.5 indicate that the system-
GMM specification is well fitted.  
Overall, our results imply that board independence, size, gender diversity and ownership of 
directors have significant effects on CEF benchmark-adjusted share returns. CEFs with higher 
board ownerships are associated with higher benchmark-adjusted share returns, which we believe 
is most likely due to a better alignment of the interests of their boards with their investors.  
 
                                                          
50 We also use the interaction of the fixed-effect dummy with the four governance variables (board size, 
independence, gender diversity and ownership of the directors) to examine the effect of fund type on the relationship 
between CEF benchmark-adjusted returns and the governance variables. Based on untabulated results, we find that 
all of the coefficients for the interaction variables are not significant at conventional levels.  
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3.6. RELATION BETWEEN CEF PREMIUMS AND GOVERNANCE 
CHARACTERISTICS  
CEF premiums (discounts) have been studied over a long time period. 51 The first study 
appears to be by Pratt (1966) who attributes the existence of discounts to a lack of sales effort 
and lack of public understanding. Different theories exist to explain negative premiums.52  Some 
studies attribute such pricing differences to time-varying investor sentiment due to CEF traders 
being predominantly small investors who exhibit irrational optimistic or pessimistic behaviors 
(e.g., Lee, Shleifer and Thaler, 1991; Pontiff, 1997; Kumar and Lee, 2006; Hwang, 2011). In 
turn, this leads to an additional risk premium to compensate investors for bearing undiversifiable 
sentiment risk. Other studies attribute CEF premiums to managerial fees and abilities (e.g., 
Boudreaux, 1973; Ingersoll, 1976; Cherkes, 2001; Gemmill & Thomas, 2006). Boudreaux, 
(1973) argues that if managers provide no value or not enough added value, then the CEF should 
trade at a negative premium. Gemmill and Thomas (2002) find support that CEF premiums 
depend on expense ratios in the long run. Our system-GMM regression specification deals with 
endogeneity since expense ratios may be lowered in response to high negative CEF premiums 
(Cherkes, 2012). We estimate the following regression using various estimation specifications to 
examine the relation between CEF premiums and board governance using annual data:  
  
 (3.4) 
Following Pontiff (1996), Gemmill and Thomas (2006) and Bradley et al. (2010), we use 
various control variables in equation (3.4).  The logarithms of CEF market capitalizations 
( , share prices  and the logarithms of share turnovers 
( ) are used to proxy for transaction costs, which make arbitrage more costly. 
                                                          
51 The term discount refers to a negative premium value.  
52 See Cherkes (2012) and Aboulamer and Kryzanowski (2015) for more on the CEF discount literature. 
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We use the residual standard deviation of the CEF’s NAV return  to proxy for the 
difficulty of replicating the CEF portfolio (Bradley et al., 2010).53 If the CEF’s underlying 
portfolio is hard to replicate, it is harder to execute arbitrage activities. Dividend yield 
 is added to equation (3.4) based on the argument by Pontiff (1996, 2006) that higher 
payouts make it easier to execute the arbitrages and therefore increase the premiums. Elton et al. 
(2013) find that CEF investors benefit when their fixed-income investments are leveraged at low 
borrowing rates, and that this benefit is reflected in CEFs’ premiums. Thus, we also control for 
the effect of leverage in equation (3.4).  
 To examine the relationship between board characteristics and CEF premiums, we estimate 
panel regression (3.3) using OLS, fixed effects, Fama-MacBeth, and system-GMM specifications 
and annual data. Based on the system-GMM specification, our results reported in Table 3.6 show 
that the percentages of independent directors ( ) and CEF premiums are negatively 
but not significantly related for the 2002-2013 period. Based on the system-GMM specification, 
we observe negative and weakly significant relationships between CEF premiums and 
unexplained compensations ( ) and the percentages of female directors 
( ), and no relationship between CEF premiums and CEF board sizes 
( ). We also find a significant negative relation between the frequency of board 
meetings ( ) and CEF premiums for both periods using the system-GMM 
specification (Table 3.6, columns 7 and 8). Our results show no significant relationships between 
CEF premiums and either director ownerships ( ) or director tenures 
( ) for the 2002-2013 period.  
[Please place Table 3.6 about here.] 
Table 3.6 also reports the estimates for a number of control variables. As expected the 
logarithms of CEF share prices , which measure transaction costs, are positively 
and significantly related to CEF premiums for both periods using the system-GMM and fixed-
effects specifications. Consistent with Pontiff (1996) and Bradley et al. (2010), we find a 
                                                          
53 Following Bradley et al. (2010), the residuals are calculated from regressing the excess NAVPS returns for a CEF 
against the relevant factors discussed in section 3.3.3 (i.e., five factors for equity CEF, seven factors  for bond CEFs, 
and 12 factors for allocation CEFs).  
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significant and positive relationship between CEF premiums and dividend yields ( ) for 
all model specifications. We find a positive and significant relation between CEF leverages and 
premiums for only the 2002-2013 period when we use the system-GMM specification and for 
both periods when we use the fixed-effects specification. We find no significant relation between 
CEF premiums and expense ratios . Our results show that older funds 
( ) have significant and positive relations with CEF premiums for both periods based 
on the system-GMM, OLS and fixed-effects specifications. As expected, we find that fixed-
income and foreign CEFs have lower premiums on average compared to equity and domestic 
CEFs, respectively.54 Once again, the insignificant test statistics for second-order autocorrelation 
(AR(2)) and the Hansen J-statistics of over-identifying restrictions reported in Table 3.6 indicate 
that the system-GMM specification is well fitted.  
3.7. BOARD COMPENSATION AND GOVERNANCE CHARACTERISTICS  
Board compensation has been one of the important aspects of corporate governance. In this 
section, we examine whether board characteristics like board independence, board size, and 
ownership have an effect on CEF board compensations. Our dependent variable is the median 
dollar compensation of the independent directors ( ) on a CEF board for a 
given year. Again, we rely on a system-GMM specification to estimate equation (3.4), and OLS, 
fixed-effects and Fama-MacBeth specifications as tests of robustness. Since the compensations 
paid to directors can affect the board structure (Hermalin and Weisbach, 1998; Villalonga and 
Amit, 2006), we once again use the system-GMM specification to deal with endogeneity 
concerns. The specific model estimated is given by: 
                                                          
54 We also use the interaction of the fixed-effect dummy with the four governance variables (board size, 
independence, gender diversity and ownership of the directors) to examine the effect of fund type on the relationship 
between CEF premiums and the governance variables. Based on untabulated results, we find that all of the 
coefficients for the interaction variables are not significant at conventional levels. 
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 + 
 (3.5) 
Table 3.7 reports the estimated relationships between the median compensations of directors 
and board characteristics. Based on the system-GMM specification, we find no significant 
relationships between the median compensations of independent directors with the percentages 
of independent directors ( ), which is consistent with Ryan and Wiggins (2004) and 
Adam and Ferreira (2009).55 Consistent with our third alternative hypothesis ( ), we find that 
the ownerships of directors ( ) is positively and significantly associated 
with the median compensation of the independent directors. This positive relationship reflects 
the strong possibility that director ownership could be part of a CEF’s compensation plan for 
board members. Using a system-GMM specification, we find no significant relationship between 
the median compensations of independent directors and the percentages of female directors. 
Consistent with Hempel and Fay (1994) and Brick et al. (2006), we find that the numbers of 
board meetings ( ) and director compensations are positively and significantly 
related for both periods, and that this finding is robust to the use of the various statistical 
specifications. Consistent with their argument that independent directors make their decisions at 
board meetings, Linn and Park (2005) find a positive relationship between board meetings and 
the compensations of independent directors. 
[Please place Table 3.7 about here.] 
Our results reported in Table 3.7 suggest that independent directors are willing to accept less 
compensation from a CEF if they sit on many other boards for the same fund family. 
Specifically, using a system-GMM specification, we find a significant negative relationship 
between the logarithms of the numbers of other boards an independent director serves on as a 
director ( ) and the median compensations of the independent 
directors ( ). Linn and Park (2005) argue that, ceteris paribus, larger firms 
pay more to independent directors since those firms have more total resources, and that the total 
value created by independent directors is greater for larger firms. Consistent with Ryan and 
                                                          
55 The relationship is positive and significant for only the fixed-effects specification and only for the 1994-2013 
period. 
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Wiggins (2004), Brick et al. (2006) and Adam and Ferreira (2009), we find a positive and 
significant relationship between fund sizes  and the median compensations of 
independent directors (Table 3.7, column 7).  We also find a negative but not significant 
relationship between family sizes  and the median compensations of independent 
directors. Using a system-GMM specification, we find no significant relation between past share 
returns and the median compensations of independent directors. Once again, 
the insignificant test statistics for second-order autocorrelation (AR(2)) and for Hansen J-
statistics of over-identifying restrictions reported in Table 3.7 indicate that the system-GMM 
specification is well fitted.  
  Overall, we find that the numbers of boards a director serves on in the CEF family, board 
meeting frequencies, director ownerships and fund sizes have a significant relationship with the 
median compensations of independent directors.  
 
3.8. ROBUSTNESS TESTS 
In this section, we examine if our previously reported results for benchmark-adjusted returns 
differ when they are replaced by CEF NAVPS (net-of-fees) returns   in 
equation (3.3). Based on the system-GMM specification, we find a negative and significant 
relationship between the percentages of independent directors  and CEF NAVPS 
returns.56 Our untabulated results show that the ownerships of directors have a highly significant 
and positive relationship with the CEF NAVPS returns which is robust for the different model 
specifications. 
We also check the robustness of our previous results using CEF share returns 
as the CEF performance measure in equation (3.3). Consistent with our results 
in section 3.5 and based on the system-GMM specification, we find that CEF share returns are 
significantly and negatively associated with the percentages of independent directors in CEF 
boards . Based on the system-GMM specification and untabulated results,57 we 
                                                          
56 These untabulated results are available from the authors upon request. 
57 These untabulated results are available from the authors upon request. 
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find that director ownerships  and share returns are significantly and 
positively related.  
We also use the sum of the compensations of independent directors on a CEF board 
( ) as a robustness check using equation (3.5). Based on untabulated 
results58 and consistent with our findings reported in Table 3.7, the number of boards a director 
serves on in the CEF family , the numbers of board meetings 
 and fund sizes  have significant relationships with the sum of 
the board compensations of the independent directors ( ).  
3.9. CONCLUSION 
Using a novel dataset that combines data on closed-end funds (CEFs) from SEC disclosure 
documents (semi-annual reports and annual proxy statements) and the Morningstar Direct 
database, this study examines the relationship between board characteristics (i.e. board 
independence, director ownership and director compensation) and various fund performance 
measures (expense ratios, share and NAVPS returns, and market premiums) and the median 
compensations of independent directors from a CEF board. Our dataset covers the data from all 
CEFs that submitted their annual proxy statements to the SEC over the period from 1994 through 
2013. 
We find that boards with higher percentages of independent directors are associated with 
lower fees (expense ratios). Since these results suggest that the independent directors of U.S. 
CEFs have some success in minimizing expenses, this is probably one of the reasons that U.S. 
mutual funds have the lowest fees around the globe (Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano, 2009). We 
also find negative and significant relations between CEF benchmark-adjusted returns and the 
numbers of independent directors. Consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature, we 
argue that board effectiveness in monitoring measures of CEF performance depend on the 
complexity of the measures, associated degrees of information asymmetry and uncertainty, and 
the specialised knowledge required for that entity activity (Duchin et al., 2010). The yearly 
negotiations with fund advisers that essentially determine fund fees require only publicly-
                                                          
58 These untabulated results are available from the authors upon request. 
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available information about what the competition is charging and paying for services and the 
funds relative performance to its competitors. In contrast, monitoring and influencing CEF 
returns and premiums requires specialised abilities to process public and private (but legal) 
information about asset management. While independent directors can replace poorly-
performing managers or management companies, the cost and uncertainty of finding better 
replacements makes such events relatively rare (Kuhnen, 2004). We find no significant 
relationship between the percentages of independent directors and CEF premiums. 
We also find that CEF board sizes are negatively related to CEF fees and benchmark-
adjusted returns. The negative relationship between board sizes and benchmark-adjusted returns 
is consistent with the notion that larger boards are less effective in monitoring due to more 
complex coordination and free riding issues (Lipton and Lorsch, 1992; Jensen, 1993).  
Consistent with previous studies (Chen et al. 2008), we find that more ownership by directors 
is associated with lower fund fees (expense ratios) and higher CEF returns. The positive 
relationships between the ownerships of directors and CEF returns are robust to the use of 
different measures of CEF returns (e.g. benchmark-adjusted share returns, share returns, NAVPS 
returns). This is consistent with the notion that directors with more ownership of fund assets are 
more aligned with the interests of shareholders. Therefore, our results have implications for the 
design of compensation schemes for directors. Increasing the percentage of compensation 
received as ownership in the CEF’s shares may result in reducing any agency issues between 
fund managers and shareholders.   
We find that larger funds and funds with higher board meeting frequencies and higher levels 
of ownership by directors pay more to their independent directors. Independent directors who 
expect to sit on more funds within the fund family accept lower compensations from each fund 
but receive more in the aggregate. We conjecture that independent directors accept lower 
compensation on a per-fund basis when they expect to increase their total compensation from the 
fund family by sitting on more boards. 
There are several extensions to the previous essays that create the possibilities for future 
research papers. CEFs are an ideal laboratory to answer the following questions in corporate 
finance. Does board governance affect the conversion of CEFs to OEFs? How does board 
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governance affect CEF decisions to engage in mergers and acquisitions? What is the optimal 
structure of a board in the mutual fund industry? How does board governance affect CEF payout 
policies? 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
IMPACT OF SPONSORSHIP ON FIXED-INCOME FUND PERFORMANCE 
4.1. INTRODUCTION 
 Individual investors face a multitude of possibilities when deciding on which mutual funds to 
invest in to maximize their individual utilities. According to Massa (2003), a typical investor first 
selects a mutual fund sponsor (family) that may provide low cost or free-switching options 
among their funds and then chooses a within-family mutual fund that best fits the investor’s 
investment goals. Since fund sponsors belong to different parent industry affiliations, such as 
banks, insurers, financial cooperatives, and independents, they represent different transparencies 
(public or private), ownership structures (stock or mutual), agency issues, advisory-contract 
strategies, prudence concerns, affiliations (stand-alone or conglomerate with potential cost- or 
risk-sharing possibilities), access to information (e.g., through lending or security-issuance 
activities by a fund-family affiliate), brand reputational values, distribution or servicing channels 
(internal, external or some proportion of each), prospective investor bases, investor vigilance 
levels and governance oversights (fund boards or no boards and their effects on delegated 
monitoring). 
 The literature dealing with these sponsor characteristics, which is reviewed in section three, 
deals primarily with U.S. equity funds and sponsors. Exceptions include Ferris and Yan (2009) 
for both U.S. equity and debt fund families, Golez and Marin (2015) for the equity investments 
of bank-affiliated Spanish mutual funds, and Sialm and Tham (2015) for the reputational brand 
values of sponsors of U.S. equity and bond mutual funds. With few exceptions (e.g., Chugh and 
Meador, 2006), this literature deals essentially with sponsors or funds with undifferentiated or 
stock ownership structures. Furthermore, this literature has not examined the performance of 
funds whose sponsors are member-based financial entities (such as credit unions) or associations 
of professionals (such as dentists). Thus, the primary objectives of this paper are: 
 First, to examine the effect on the fees and benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross and net 
returns of Canadian fixed-income mutual funds of some sponsor characteristics for a 
richer set of sponsor types that includes member-based financial entities and associations 
of professionals. 
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 Second, to be the first to introduce and use quasi-gross returns (i.e., net returns plus fund 
expenses other than management fees), to test if fund managers earn sufficient 
benchmark-adjusted returns to cover their management fees. 
 Third, to use a rigorous estimation model (correlated random effects model) that 
simultaneously captures the correlation effects from both observable and unobservable 
variables, and includes variables that are common to all funds, variables that account for 
time-invariant variables, variables that change both across funds or fund sponsors and 
over time, and a term to capture unobserved heterogeneity. 
 The Canadian fund environment provides an especially conducive and sufficiently different 
laboratory to address these primary objectives since it exhibits many institutional similarities and 
differences from the U.S. The existence of boards at the sponsor but not fund levels in Canada is 
one of the many differences which are discussed more fully in section 4.2.59 Given that other 
studies only examine funds with boards (e.g., Chou, Ng and Wang, 2011), the absence of fund 
boards in Canada allows for a type of placebo test of the effects of fund governance through their 
boards on fund performance. The Canadian fund environment also has richness in sponsor types. 
This includes not only the Banks (all with public stock ownership), Insurers (primarily public 
stock ownership) and Independents (mixed public/private stock/mutual ownership) but also two 
major types of member-owned or directed or owner-operated sponsors (all with private mutual 
ownership) whose relative performance remains untested; namely, Member-Fins or member-
based providers of financial services such as the Desjardins Group and Provincial Credit Union 
Centrals, and Member-Prof or associations of professionals such as the Canadian Dental 
Association, Independent Order of Foresters, and Fonds Des Professionnels Inc. 
 The Canadian fund environment also provides for an indirect test of market power given the 
increasing dominance of its increasingly concentrated banking involvement in the mutual fund 
industry.60 The six major Canadian banks also lead nationally in the lending and credit-creation 
and underwriting markets, have mutual fund and investment dealer subsidiaries, and have 85% 
of the total financial assets owned by banks in Canada (Brean et al., 2011). This dominance is 
driven to a large extent by their large (nation-wide) networks of branches that are able to market 
                                                          
59 Directors on the board of sponsors who are associations of professionals generally include representatives of the 
association. 
60 Due to the breadth of their internal distribution networks through their nation-wide network of branches, Canadian 
banks have at least 28% of total assets under management in the Canadian fund market in 2011 (CSA, 2012). 
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mutual funds with reduced trailer fees due to a lower reliance on external distributors, their high 
brand reputational values, their abilities to invest heavily in their asset management and financial 
advice operations due to their stellar financial performances,61 their greater informedness about 
the (especially debt) securities of the firms in which they invest through their lending and 
underwriting activities, and the diversification provided when wealth management is combined 
with other bank activities such as credit granting and trading (Kiladze, 2013). To further 
illustration one of these advantages, then commissioner Stromberg (1995, p. 25) in her report for 
the Ontario Securities Commission on the lack of mutual fund regulation in Canada stated that 
“… all aspects of the investment fund industry are being driven by distribution and competition 
for distribution.” The fees paid to external fund distributors are referred to as trailer fees in 
Canada and 12b-1 fees in U.S., and they are banned in Australia and United Kingdom (Gage, 
2014). While 12b-1 fees used to pay marketing and distribution expenses (not shareholder 
service expenses) are capped at an annual 0.75 percent of a fund’s average net assets in the U.S. 
under FINRA rules, no such cap exists for trailer fees in Canada.62 Since trailer commissions 
paid to external fund distributors account for about half of total mutual fund management fees in 
Canada (CSA, 2012), the internal distribution networks of the Canadian banks result in their 
relatively low trailer fees as a percentage of net asset value (NAV) compared to independent 
sponsors with their greater reliance on external distributors. 
 To perform our tests, we build a dataset over the 2000-2011 period using information from 
two data vendors (Fundata and Morningstar) augmented by a substantial amount of hand-
collected data on fund characteristics (such as fund size, fund fees and fund terminations and 
mergers) from the financial media, and from the annual reports and other filings deposited by the 
funds at SEDAR. We estimate the benchmark-adjusted returns of Canadian bond mutual funds 
using the five-factor model used by Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011). Our choice of instruments 
for the conditional version of this model is based on bond manager behavior.63 If the risk 
exposure of a managed portfolio varies predictably with, e.g., the business cycle and the manager 
                                                          
61 Moody identified the Canadian banks as being top performers using standard debt rating criteria (with the 
exception of government support) among 94 countries (Greenwood, 2009; Brean, Kryzanowski and Roberts, 2011). 
62 SEC, Mutual Fund Fees and Expenses, at: http://www.sec.gov/answers/mffees.htm#distribution 
63 Since the return performance of funds should be conditioned on ex-ante economic states, Ferson, Henry and 
Kisgen (2006) provide an alternative rationale for the use of instruments such as TERM and DEF as conditioning 
variables. Specifically, they note that the term structure models specify the variables on which to condition, which of 
course vary for default-free and defaultable bonds. 
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has no superior investment ability, Ferson and Schadt (1996) show that an unconditional 
assessment of benchmark-adjusted returns will confuse common variation in a fund’s factor risk 
exposures and expected factor returns with abnormal investment ability.64 Thus, the choice of the 
slope of the term structure (TERM) and the default premium (DEF) as conditioning variables for 
our purposes is consistent with the strategies that active bond managers undertake to generate 
excess returns and manage risks by taking advantage of expectations of interest rate movements, 
or hedging against the potential adverse effects of rate moves, or capitalizing on changes in 
yield-spread relationships. Thus, the conditional models used herein accommodate the unique 
features of fixed-income funds, which include non-stationary returns, use of derivatives for 
hedging and speculation, and the time-variation in their expected returns and risks. As is the case 
for other studies, the frameworks used herein are suitable to perform evaluations of fixed-weight 
and dynamic strategies if no fund trading occurs within the return measurement interval (e.g., 
Ferson and Khang, 2002). 
 Unlike other studies, our primary estimates for the relations between fund fees (or 
benchmark-adjusted returns) with fund and sponsor types and various control variables allow for 
a combination of fixed and random effects while simultaneously capturing the correlation effects 
from both observable and unobservable variables. For this purpose, we believe that we are the 
first to use the correlated random effects model proposed by Wooldridge (2009) that treats 
variables that are common to all funds, variables that account for time-invariant variables, 
variables that change both across funds or fund sponsors and over time, and a term to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 Our paper makes a number of contributions to the literature. First, we provide evidence that 
the industry affiliation of mutual fund sponsors affects the relative fees and benchmark-adjusted 
returns of mutual funds due to the different characteristics of their fund sponsors. The greater 
number of combinations of ownership features in the Canadian mutual fund market allows us to 
study not only the funds sponsored by insurers (mostly public with share ownership) and banks 
(all public with share ownership), financial cooperatives (all private with mutual ownership), 
professional associations (all private with mutual ownership) and independents (various 
ownership mixes). 
                                                          
64 Also, see Kryzanowski, Lalancette and To (1994) for the sensitive of performance inferences to conditioning. 
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 Second, we contribute to the sparse amount of academic research on bond fund performance 
when compared against the economic importance of bonds (Ferson, Henry and Kisgen, 2006). 
Also, examining the effect of sponsorship on the bond fund market is more informative in this 
context since it is cheaper and easier for individual equity investors to diversity their portfolio 
risk through Exchange Traded Funds (ETFs). Unlike equity ETFs, bond ETFs are recently 
introduced to the market and are relatively more expensive.65 
 Third, we introduce a new level of fund returns that we argue provides for a more precise 
evaluation of whether fund managers generate sufficient returns to cover their costs. We refer to 
this return level as being Quasi-gross. We obtain this return as a fund’s net return plus its 
management expense ratio (MER) minus its management fee (MgmtFee), and we subsequently 
refer to (MER – MgmtFee) as a TrailerFee due to the relatively high importance of trailer fees in 
the Canadian context. We argue that tests using quasi-gross returns better conform to a basic 
tenet of performance evaluation that only the benefits and costs directly attributable to the 
activities of the portfolio managers should be considered when assessing their performance. 
 Fourth, we show the important role that fees play in mutual fund benchmark-adjusted net 
return performance. This contributes to the ongoing public policy debate in Canada that the 
trailing commissions embedded in ongoing fund fees may create actual and perceived conflicts 
of interest both for mutual fund sponsors and advisors that are likely to differ by sponsor type 
due to differences in their reliance on external or affiliated parties to distribute their funds. 
Specifically, the Canadian Securities Administrators in a discussion paper (CSA, 2012) note that 
increased trailing commissions may be used to increase fund sales and fund assets and the 
management fees earned by fund sponsors and commissions earned by investment advisors, and 
that this may not be necessarily to the benefit of fund investors.66 
 Fifth, we provide a test of the generalizability of previous studies that concentrate on the U.S. 
and equity fund markets. Instead, we focus on Canadian fixed-income mutual funds given the 
findings of Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011) that the benchmark-adjusted returns for Canadian 
bond funds before (after) the reflection of MER are positive (negative) which differs from the 
                                                          
65 For example, the inception date for Claymore 1-5 Year Laddered Corporate Bond Index ETF is February 25, 
2009. Its MER was 0.27% for common units in both 2009 and 2010 and 0.90% and 0.77% for advisor units in 2009 
and 2010, respectively. This ETF was rebranded as I-Share after BlackRock Investments Canada Inc. acquisition of 
exchange-traded fund provider Claymore Investments Inc. in 2012. 
66 Unlike in the United States, there are no limits on the proportion of fund assets that can be used to pay trailing 
commissions in Canada. 
70 
 
common neutral (negative) findings for U.S. bond funds (e.g., Ferson et al., 2006). We also 
focus on Canadian fixed-income mutual funds given the many differences between such funds in 
Canada versus the U.S. and other countries that are developed further in the next section of this 
paper. For example, Canada is the only country out of 22 countries to get a failing grade, F, for 
its mutual fund fees in a report by Morningstar in 2011.67 
 We find that mutual funds under different sponsorship charge their investors different fees 
when providing their package of investment services to their investors. After controlling for 
various fund and two sponsor characteristics (subsequently referred to as ‘after-controls’), we 
find that fixed-income funds sponsored by Banks (all with public stock ownership) have the 
lowest after-controls MER and trailer fees. This is consistent with the notion that the nation-wide 
branch networks of Canadian banks give them an advantage over other sponsor types by 
reducing their distribution and servicing costs by minimizing their use of external distributors 
and client servicers. 
 We find that Canadian fixed-income funds sponsored by Banks, Insurers, Independents, and 
Member-Fins (member owned or controlled private financial entities) exhibit different after-
controls benchmark-adjusted quasi-gross and net returns. Consistent with the findings of Ferris 
and Yan (2009), we find that after-controls benchmark-adjusted returns for the funds of public 
sponsors are, on average, significantly lower than those for private ones. Our results also show 
that Canadian fixed-income mutual funds sponsored by Banks (all with public stock ownership) 
outperform funds sponsored by Independents, Insurers, and Member-Fins except for funds with a 
short-term investment objective. This outperformance for funds with a Canadian Bond and 
Canadian high-yield investment objective is consistent with such sponsored funds having better 
managerial effectiveness where superior information or skill matters the most. We also find that 
the funds with a Canadian Bond objective that have sponsors that are professional member-
owned or controlled entities have significantly better quasi-return and net return benchmark-
adjusted performances compared to their counterparts with other private sponsor types. This is 
consistent with lower agency issues with funds with professional member-owned or controlled 
sponsors. 
                                                          
67 http://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/banks-misleading-clients-on-mutual-funds-1.1415027 
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 The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. The next section presents some 
institutional details on Canadian mutual funds. The section 4.3 reviews the literature on the 
relationships between various fund and sponsor characteristics with fund fees and fund 
benchmark-adjusted returns.  In the section 4.4, we introduce the sample used in our analysis. 
Sections 4.5 and 4.6 present the hypotheses, methodology and results for the relations of fund 
fees and benchmark-adjusted returns, respectively, with sponsor-specific characteristics. Section 
4.7 contains some further robustness checks. Section 4.8 concludes the paper. 
 
4.2. INSTITUTIONAL SETTING FOR MUTUAL FUNDS IN CANADA 
 Fund sponsors are organized under stock- or mutual-ownership structures with the former 
being predominant in Canada, and are also either publicly or privately owned with the former 
being predominant in Canada. Canadian mutual funds are often registered as investment trusts. 
Unlike in most countries but like the U.S., competition is restricted by not permitting foreign-
domiciled funds to register for sale domestically. Like most countries but unlike the U.S., fund 
management services are subject to domestic consumption taxes in Canada and the Canadian 
distribution model uses financial advisors selling and servicing no-load funds (Alpert and 
Rekenthaler, 2011, p. 22).68 Canadian funds supposedly realize lower benefits from economies of 
scale compared to their U.S. counterparts due to both their sponsors and AUM being much 
smaller. As a result, Canadian funds are ranked as not only continuing to have the highest fees 
and expenses internationally but as having considerably higher fees compared to the U.S. and 
much of Europe (Alpert, Rekenthaler and Suh, 2013, p. 13). In the U.S., caps are imposed 
through a prohibition on FINRA-member advisors from offering or selling shares of any 
investment company if the sales charges (including trailing fees) described in the prospectus are 
excessive. Due to concerns about mutual fund fees in Canada, the Canadian Securities 
Administrators (2012) issued a discussion paper and a call for comments in December 2012 “to 
see whether there are investor protection or fairness issues, and to determine whether any 
                                                          
68 These taxes are also known as a Value Added Tax (VAT) or Goods and Services Tax (GST). Other countries 
without such taxes include China, Hong Kong, Italy, Norway, Spain and the United Kingdom (Alpert and 
Rekenthaler, 2011, p. 6). 
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regulatory responses are needed to address any issues we find”. Unlike in the U.S., no caps are 
imposed in Canada on commissions paid by mutual fund investors. 
 Unlike in the U.S. and most other countries,69 a mutual fund in Canada is not required to 
have a Board of Directors to represent the rights of shareholders in fund operating decisions. 
While fund companies in Canada are required since May 1, 2007 to establish an Independent 
Review Committee (IRC) composed entirely of independent members, an IRC only considers 
and provides recommendations to the fund manager on conflicts of interest to which the manager 
may be subject. While the shares or units of a mutual fund are owned by its investors, a trustee 
holds the title to the property of each fund (e.g. its cash and securities) on behalf of its 
unitholders. The property of a fund is managed by a fund sponsor (also known as the fund 
management company or fund family) in accordance with the fund’s investment objectives (fund 
type). Hiring and firing of the fund managers and other service providers to the fund are 
important means by which a fund sponsor discharges its responsibility to manage the fund in the 
best interests of the fund investors. However, this is likely to more favorably consider the 
interests of the sponsor over that of the fund investors when the fund itself does not have a board 
of directors. 
 Fund sponsors (but not their individual funds) typically have a Board of Directors in Canada, 
particularly if they are traded publicly or if the fund sponsor has a mutual-ownership structure.70 
Sponsor control is generally concentrated in one or two or a small group of owners when the 
entity is private (i.e., not publicly traded) and non-mutual. Managers and (sub)advisors are hired 
for each fund on fee-based contracts to manage or advise on the management of fund assets, 
operations, marketing and distribution. Since the revenue of each manager(s) and any 
(sub)advisor is generally a percentage of the net asset value (NAV) of a fund, the revenues 
partially depend on fund investment performance. A fund family or complex is a group of funds 
with the same brand name that are managed by the same fund sponsor who is often also the 
                                                          
69 Countries that require funds to have a Board of Directors with a minimum level of independence representing 
shareholders include India, Norway, Singapore and the United States (Alpert and Rekenthaler, 2011). In contrast, 
while mutual funds in the U.K. are required to have Boards, such Boards have no requirements for independent 
members and can consist of a single member including the corporate parent (Alpert and Rekenthaler, 2011, p. 135). 
70 This pre-empts a test using Canadian funds of the generalizability of findings that the structure of a fund’s Board 
of Directors (particularly, its size and independence) affects fund returns and investments in poorly governed firms 
(e.g., Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Khorana, Servaes and Wedge, 2007; Meschke, 2007; Chou, Ng and Wang, 2011). 
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trustee, distributor and promoter of the funds within the family.71 Although the registration of 
mutual funds and individuals selling any type of securities are the responsibility of provincial 
security commissions in Canada,72 no regulatory rules that are sponsor-specific are identified that 
could systematically and materially affect the findings reported herein. However, since the 
financial crisis wealth managers are required to implement better compliance systems that track 
the risk profiles of their client accounts. Banks as a sponsor may have additional scale economies 
since they can share the estimated costs of 15 to 20 million dollars for implementing better 
compliance systems with their large retail client banking arms (Kiladze, 2013). 
 
4.3. RELATED LITERATURE 
 Ferris and Yan (2009) find that fees are higher and returns are lower during the period 1992-
2004 for various undifferentiated fund types sponsored by public versus private fund families, 
which they attribute to the short-termism of public fund families. Agency theories predict that 
mutual ownership should have an agency advantage over stock ownership only when the 
underlying assets are easily valued and the threat of asset withdrawal by mutual unitholders is a 
credible disciplinary mechanism with low transaction costs and all other factors are held constant 
(Fama and Jensen, 1983a, 1983b). This appears to be the case for investor holdings in most open 
end mutual funds since such shares are generally easily redeemable. However, the threat of 
investor withdrawals from an open end mutual fund is lower when the sponsor is mutually and 
not stock-owned because the fund investor typically is also a member of the mutually owned 
sponsor. When the two conditions are not meet, higher levels of market monitoring should render 
stock-owned sponsors more efficient than their mutually owned counterparts.  The impact on 
fund fees and benchmark-adjusted returns of any differential agency problems for fund sponsors 
due to the stock/mutual ownership delineation may be altered further by the risk-sharing 
advantages of stock versus mutual ownership (Fama and Jensen, 1983b) or by greater access to 
                                                          
71 For example, Beutel Goodman Managed Funds Inc. is the trustee, manager, distributor and promoter of the funds 
in the family “Beutel Goodman Managed Funds” (Beutel Goodman Managed Funds, Simplified Prospectuses, 
August 17, 2004, p. 1 and July 6, 2011, p. 1). 
72 http://www.csa-acvm.ca/ 
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information obtained through lending or underwriting activities by fund-family affiliates or by 
the use of lower cost distributional or servicing channels or the vigilance of their fund investors. 
 Lamm-Tennant and Starks (1993) find that stock insurers take more risk than mutual 
insurers. Mester (1993) provides evidence that mutual savings and loans (S&Ls) are more 
efficient compared to stock S&Ls. Boose (1990) cannot refute the possibility that the differences 
in general insurance expenses between mutual and stock life insurers in the U.S. are due to sales 
force expenses rather than to differences in their managements. Chugh and Meador (2006) show 
that the managements of U.S. insurers increased the risk in their investment portfolios after 
demutualization. For a sample of 181 large banks from 15 European countries over the 1999-
2004 period and after controlling for bank characteristics, country and time effects, Iannotta, 
Nocera and Sironi (2007) find that mutual and government-owned banks exhibit a lower 
profitability (and cost) than privately owned banks, and that higher ownership concentration is 
associated with better loan quality, lower asset risk and lower insolvency risk but not different 
profitability. Based on the lower risk-adjusted returns and lower sensitivity of fund flows to poor 
performance of equity mutual funds actively managed by insurance companies during the 1990-
2002 period, Chen, Yao and Yu (2007) conjecture that the lower risk-adjusted returns are due to 
prudence concerns when the asset management subsidiaries of insurance firms simultaneously 
manage mutual funds and fiduciary assets for their parents and lower investor monitoring of 
performance for insurance mutual funds that are often cross-sold through their parents’ extensive 
broker/agent networks. 
 Many studies examine the relation between manager compensation and fund performance. 
For example, Ma, Tang and Gomez (2015) find that mutual fund managers with performance-
linked bonuses exhibit superior subsequent fund performance, while those with alternative 
compensation arrangements are not associated with superior performance. Furthermore, if the 
compensations of fund managers under mutual ownership structures are likely to be lower as 
Mayers and Smith (1992) report for life insurers, this provides their fund managers with lower 
performance incentives. 
 Unlike independent sponsors, funds sponsored by banks, insurers and financial cooperatives 
may have access to a larger pool of potential individual investors through their primary lines of 
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business like retail banking and the sale of insurance policies. Search costs are likely to be lower 
for potential fund investors who are already clients of the bank, insurer or financial cooperative. 
 The findings of Qian (2011) imply that fund clients are heterogeneous in the vigilances of 
their monitoring because funds attract and retain different clienteles. James and Karceski (2006) 
conclude that agency costs associated with the efficacy of delegated monitoring may lead to less 
monitoring and worse overall fund benchmark-adjusted return performance. Chou, Ng and Wang 
(2011) interpret their findings as suggesting a greater alignment of the interests of a fund with its 
investors with more quality fund governance, and that fund return performance is not adversely 
affected by the associated costs of monitoring their portfolio holdings. 
 Due to informational economies of scope and better access to firm-specific information 
associated with their lending activities,73 Massa and Rehman (2008) find that bank-sponsored 
equity funds and families during the 1993-2004 period increased their equity investments in 
within-family borrowers after such borrowings by far greater amounts than other unaffiliated 
funds and fund families. Hao and Yan (2011) offer strong evidence that investment bank-
affiliated U.S. mutual funds underperform their unaffiliated counterparts over the 1992-2004 
period, which they conclude is consistent with the idea that investment banks use affiliated funds 
to support underwriting business at the expense of fund shareholders. Ivashina and Sun (2011) 
find that institutions that participate in syndicated loan renegotiations (material amendments) 
subsequently trade the stock of these companies, and that these trades materially outperform 
those by other managers in the same stocks or trades in other stocks. While Berzins, Liu and 
Trzcinka (2013) report no performance differences by fund type, they find substantially lower 
risk-adjusted returns for funds operated by investment banks versus non-bank conglomerates, 
which is consistent with pervasive conflicts of interest in the asset management business owned 
by investment banks. Golez and Marin (2015) find that bank-affiliated Spanish mutual funds 
systematically increase their holdings in the controlling bank stock around seasoned equity 
issues, at the time of bad news about the controlling bank, before anticipated price drops, and 
after non-anticipated price drops. Based on a large sample of recommendations issued from 1995 
                                                          
73 Schenone (2004) finds substantially lower IPO underpricing for firms with than without pre-IPO banking 
relationships with the underwriters managing the firm’s IPO. Drucker and Puri (2005) identify efficiencies that 
benefit issuers and underwriters when a financial intermediary concurrently lends to and underwrites an issuer’s 
public securities offering. 
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through 2006, Mola and Guidolin (2009) find that sell-side analysts are likely to assign frequent 
and favorable ratings to a stock after stock investments by the analysts’ affiliated mutual funds. 
 Sialm and Tham (2015) show that reputational brand values of sponsors are important as the 
investment decisions of U.S. equity and bond mutual fund shareholders depend on the prior 
performances of both the mutual funds and their publicly traded management companies. 
Marketing, distribution and shareholder servicing costs, comprising loads and 12b-1 fees, are the 
largest observable component of non-management fees in the U.S. (Wahal and Wang, 2011). 
Khorana and Servaes (2012) find that loads and 12b-1 fees are positively associated with market 
share (consistent with their use for marketing and distribution), and that fund families with 
above-average initial fees gain market share by passing along economies of scale to investors or 
by lowering fees. However, Walsh (2004) shows that the primary benefits of fund growth accrue 
to fund sponsors and not in lower fees although fund shareholders incur the costs of such growth. 
Christoffersen, Evans and Musto (2013) report significant effects of the brokers’ shares of sales 
loads and other revenues on funds’ inflows, particularly for unaffiliated brokers, and that load 
but not revenue sharing helps to predict poor fund performance. Previous research reports mixed 
evidence as to whether independent directors help to mitigate the principal–agency problem 
inherent in mutual funds (e.g., Tufano and Sevick, 1997; Ferris and Yan, 2007; Qian, 2011). 
 Various authors (e.g., Davis, 2001; Chan, Chen and Lakonishok, 2002) find that different 
investment abilities and styles result in different mutual fund benchmark-adjusted returns. Frye 
(2001) provides evidence of little difference between the benchmark-adjusted performances of 
bank- and nonbank-managed mutual funds over the period from January 1991 through 
September 1999. However, she does not conduct any statistical tests of the performance 
differences that favor the bank- versus nonbank-managed bond funds in her samples. Various 
papers examine the effect of scale capacity effects, organizational complexity and conflicts of 
interest on fund performance (e.g., Wahal and Wang, 2011; Bessler, Kryzanowski, Kurmann and 
Lückoff, 2016). 
4.4. DATA, SAMPLE AND DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS 
 The sample of Canadian fixed-income funds is constructed by adjusting for mergers and name 
changes over the period 2000-2011 using information from Fundata and Morningstar Canada 
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augmented by hand-collected information from industry and individual fund reports, and specific 
fund news in the financial press, SEDAR and various websites.74 We use individual fund data 
(TNA-weighted averages of the share classes of each fund) in our tests since sponsor information 
and portfolio holdings are common across all fund classes and using share class data as 
independent observations can lead to errors in the interpretation of the results. The sample 
excludes institutional funds and consists of all 573 fixed-income funds (345 Canadian Bond or 
T1, 106 Short-term Canadian Bond or T2, and 122 High-yield Bond or T3 mutually exclusive 
funds) regardless of when they began and whether or not they are still active at period end to 
ensure no survivorship bias.75 Money market funds are excluded from our sample since the focus 
of our study is on the funds with longer-term investment objectives. Greater details on the 
numbers of funds and observations categorized by fund type, sponsor type and sponsor 
transparencies (public or private) are found in Panel C of Table 4.1.76 Fund sponsor types (S) are 
divided into S1 (“Independents”) or sponsors that are not categorized into one of the remaining 
groups; S2 (“Banks”) or sponsors that are chartered banks or their wholly owned securities firms; 
S3 (“Insurers”) or sponsors that are insurance companies; and S4 (“Member-Fins”) or sponsors 
that are member owned or controlled (either specific professional or fraternal groups or open to 
all) that are organized as financial institutions such as a caisse, credit union or other type of 
financial cooperative.77 
[Please place table 4.1 about here.] 
                                                          
74 We choose our beginning year due to the availability of data. For most of the funds, we have difficulty finding 
data related to fund characteristics like fund fees, and in some cases fund size, for the period before 2000. 
75 There are 28 funds that changed their sponsor transparency from private to publicly traded. Those funds are 
considered twice in our calculations in Table 4.1 Panel C. Therefore, the total number of funds without considering 
the effect of the changes in transparency structure is 545. 
76 The number of funds and the number of observations for private (mutualized) Insurers (S3) is lower than in 
previous periods because the period that we examine just follows a period of demutualization by Canadian life 
insurers such as Manulife, Mutual Life (CLARICA), Sun Life and Canada Life. Furthermore, Industrial Alliance 
completed its demutualization in February 2000. 
77 “Member” refers to fund sponsors that are owned or controlled by members (either specific professional or 
fraternal groups or open to all) and organized as an association (Member-Prof) or financial entity (Member-Fins). 
“Member-Prof” refers to Member fund sponsors that consist of members from specific professions such as 
engineers, lawyers, dentists, medical specialists, physicians, airline pilots, foresters, artists and public sector 
employees. Whether Member-sponsors are included in S1 (independents) or S4 (Member-Fins) depends on whether 
they are organized as an association or part of a financial entity. 
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 The total market value of the fixed-income funds in our sample is around $56 billion, and 
Canadian Bond, Short-term Canadian Bond, and High-yield Bond funds have 67% ($37.44 
billion), 21% ($11.88 billion), and 12% ($6.6 billion) of this aggregate value as of December 
2011, respectively. Thus, the largest and smallest market segments are Canadian Bond and High-
yield Bond funds, respectively (Panel B of Table 4.1). Each fund’s monthly return is given by 
the change in its net asset value per share (NAVPS) adjusted for all distributions. Fund size is 
proxied by total net assets (TNA). Panel A of Table 4.1 reports statistics on the cross-sectional 
distributions for the three major investment objectives (fund type) and for all 545 bond funds in 
our sample based on the time-series means of the individual funds. The time-series mean 
monthly returns not benchmark-adjusted for the individual funds over the 144 month period 
range from -1.035% to 1.235%, and have a cross-sectional mean of 0.315%. The time-series 
standard deviations of returns for the individual funds range from 0.012% to 5.160%. 
 Summary statistics for size-weighted (henceforth SW) portfolios of funds grouped by fund 
type (i.e., investment objective) and sponsor types are reported in Panel B of Table 4.1. For fund-
type groupings, the SW portfolio of Canadian Bond funds has the highest historical average 
monthly net return of 0.387%, and the portfolio of Short-term Canadian Bond funds has the 
lowest monthly net return volatility of 0.419%. The SW portfolios of funds sponsored by Banks 
and Independents exhibit the highest and lowest monthly mean net returns of 0.402% and 
0.322%, respectively. The SW portfolios sponsored by Insurers and Banks have the highest and 
lowest monthly volatilities of respectively 0.908% and 0.746%. Almost 50% of the funds (262) 
belong to Independents, 20% to Banks (98), 25% to Insurers (145) and 5% to Member-Fins (40). 
A comparison of two measures of mutual fund fees (i.e., their management expense ratios or 
MER and their management fees) shows that mutual funds with member-based financial 
sponsors (Member-Fins) charge more, on average, relative to other mutual funds during our 
study period, and have the highest average fees in the Canadian Bond category. 
 Based on untabulated results, the mean cross-sectional annual numbers of funds within each 
fund family based on the means of the time series of annual values for the individual funds is 6 
for Canadian Bond funds, 9 for Short-term Canadian Bond funds and 2 for High-yield Bond 
funds, respectively. Thus, each fund family, on average, controls more than one fund in each 
fund type. 
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4.5. ARE FUND FEES ASSOCIATED WITH FUND SPONSORSHIP? 
 In this section, we test the alternative hypothesis, : Fund fees ( , MgmtFee and 
TrailerFee) differ by sponsor and fund types. We expect funds with different sponsor types to 
have different fees due to their different charges for providing their different packages of fund 
services to investors (e.g. distribution fees) and agency-related differences. Specifically, we 
expect bank sponsors to have lower fees due to the reasons provided earlier. Since higher fees 
reduce the net returns to shareholders and may enrich management companies, the magnitude of 
fees provides initial evidence on a potential source of any differential benchmark-adjusted net 
return performance for funds differentiated by sponsor and fund types. 
4.5.1 Methodology 
 To examine whether funds differentiated by sponsor type charge their investors significantly 
different fees and given that fees exhibit some variability annually but little monthly, we estimate 
the following panel regression using a correlated random effects specification and annual data:78 
 
,(4.1) 
In (1),  represents the average fund fee after controlling for various fund and sponsor 
characteristics when the fund sponsor is a bank (captured using the dummy variable  in (1) 
when one of the other sponsor dummy variables is removed so that it is captured by the 
intercept), and   and  are sponsor dummy variables which take a value of 1 if the fund 
sponsor belongs to respectively the Independent, Insurer, and Member-Fins category and 0 
otherwise. 
  is the demeaned value of fund size to better examine if any scale (dis)economies 
are associated with fund size (Chen, Hong, Huang and Kubik, 2004; Pollet and Wilson, 2008; 
Grinblatt and Titman, 1994).79 
  is the natural logarithm of the number of funds managed by the fund sponsor.  
                                                          
78 We calculate the Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) of all variables in regression (1). All VIFs are below ten. 
79 Based on untabulated results, we also use a piece-wise approach to examine the effect of fund size which does not 
have any effect on the inferences based on the estimated coefficients of our variables of interest. 
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  is the natural logarithm of the age in months of a fund based on its launch date (e.g., 
Falkenstein, 1996; Chen et al., 2004; Barber, Odean and Zheng, 2005; Yan, 2008; Aggarwal and 
Jorion, 2010). 
  is fund flow given by , where Rt and 
TNAt are the yearly return and total net asset value of the fund at time t (Sirri and Tufano, 
1998).80 Thus, fund flow is the net growth in fund assets beyond reinvested investment returns. 
  is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for a public sponsor and zero for a 
private sponsor. 
  is a dummy variable which takes the value of one for a mutually-owned sponsor and 
zero for a stock-owned sponsor. 
  is the percentile ranking of each fund’s benchmark-adjusted return in each year 
for the funds with the same investment objective, and is included because higher fees may be 
justifiable for funds with superior realized performance (Ferris and Yan, 2009). 
 Based on the summary results reported in Panels D and E of Table 4.1, the cross-sectional 
means and medians of the time-series means and medians of the individual fund  and trailer 
fees for the same fund type are quite similar but differ somewhat across fund types and decrease 
somewhat as one moves from a more risky to a less risky fund type. To illustrate, the cross-
sectional means and standard deviations of the time-series means of the  (expressed 
annually) of the individual funds are respectively 1.950% and 0.086% for High-yield Bonds, 
1.766% and 0.071% for Canadian Bonds and 1.568% and 0.062% for Short-term Canadian 
Bonds, respectively.81 The cross-sectional means and standard deviations of the time-series 
means of the TrailerFee of the individual funds are 0.455% and 0.063% for High-yield Bonds, 
0.340% and 0.059% for Canadian Bonds and 0.330% and 0.067% for Short-term Canadian 
Bonds, respectively. Based on untabulated results, the typical fund in each fund type category is 
seasoned given that the mean and median ages are 13.2 and 10.3 years for Canadian Bond funds, 
14.3 and 11.3 years for Short-term Canadian Bond funds and 9.1 and 7.3 years for High-yield 
Bond funds, respectively. Based on untabulated results, the mean and median cross-sectional 
                                                          
80 According to Sirri and Tufano (1998), the flow measure is not sensitive to whether the TNA is measured at the 
end, beginning or over the period. 
81 The results are calculated for the Canadian Bond fund category after deleting the four years of MER data (2000-
2003) for the Trans-Canada Bond fund that was anomalous. 
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monthly fund flows based on the means of the time series of monthly flows for the individual 
funds are positive for each fund type. Specifically, the cross-sectional means and medians are 
5.362 and 0.409 million for Canadian Bond funds, 13.834 and 0.213 million for Short-term 
Canadian Bond funds and 1.45 and 0.434 million for High-yield Bond funds. 
 We examine the average after-controls fees and their differences for the individual funds by 
sponsor type and fund type (investment objective). We estimate all regressions first using a 
correlated random-effects (CRE) specification (Blundell and Powell, 2003; Altonji and Matzkin, 
2005; Wooldridge, 2009). This specification allows for a combination of fixed and random 
effects while simultaneously capturing the correlation effects from both observable and 
unobservable variables. Specifically, the correlated random effects characterization treats 
variables that are common to all funds, variables that account for time-invariant variables, 
variables that change both across funds or fund sponsors and over time, and a term to capture 
unobserved heterogeneity. 
 Our rationale for the choice of CRE estimation method follows. Based on the Breusch and 
Pagan (1979) multiplier test of a random-effects specification versus a pooled OLS specification, 
we reject the null that the pooled OLS specification should be used for all our samples. Thus, this 
test supports the use of a random-effects specification. Based on the Hausman (1978) 
specification test that compares the random- and fixed-effect estimators, we reject the null 
hypothesis, which is interpreted as supporting the adoption of the fixed- over the random-effects 
model. Although we control for different fund-specific characteristics in our regressions, a fixed-
effects specification is not appropriate for our testing purposes since it does not allow for the 
estimation of the effect of time-invariant variables (Baltagi, 2001; Wooldridge, 2002; Hsiao, 
2003; Baltagi, Bresson and Pirotte, 2003) and generates inefficient estimates of the effects of 
regressors that have very little within variance (Plümper and Troeger, 2007). The main variables 
(e.g., sponsor type) that we are testing are time-invariant or have very little time-series variation. 
For example, only a few funds sponsored by Independents migrate to other sponsor types over 
the time period examined herein. Other approaches that have been proposed to adjust the fixed-
effects specification for this severe limitation, such as the fixed-effects vector decomposition 
approach of Plümper and Troeger (2007), remain controversial (e.g., Greene, 2011). 
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 With regard to the choice of clustering, we conclude that our data have a fund effect based on 
the guidance proposed by Petersen (2009) for checking whether the data examined has fund 
and/or time effects. A fund (time) effect is present when the standard errors clustered by fund 
(time) are much (a number of times) larger than the White standard errors. The presence of both 
effects is indicated when standard errors clustered by fund and time are much larger than the 
standard errors clustered by only fund or time. As a test of robustness whose results are reported 
in section seven, we estimate equation (4.1) using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach. 
 Since we have four dummy variables in regression (4.1) and we need to compare all possible 
pairs of sponsor types, we run the panel regression (4.1) four times. One of the sponsor dummy 
variables is omitted each time to prevent the dummy variable multicollinearity trap and to 
facilitate interpretation by ensuring that the intercept represents the average fees related to that 
dummy variable after controlling for the fund and sponsor characteristics included in regression 
(4.1). We continue to refer to these fees as “after-controls fees”. The coefficients of the other 
dummies represent the average after-controls differences in fees compared to that for the dummy 
variable which is not included in the regression. To avoid complexity in our tables, we present 
the results when the dummy variable related to funds sponsored by Banks (S2) is dropped so that 
the after-controls fees for bank-sponsored funds are captured by the intercept term in equation 
(4.1). The reason for this choice will become obvious as we progress in presenting the regression 
findings. 
4.5.2 Fund Fee Determinants Based on Panel Regressions 
 The coefficient estimates for regression (4.1) for three different dependent fee variables, 
Management Expense Ratio ( ), Management fee ( ) and Trailer Fee 
( ), are reported in Table 4.2 when the bank-sponsored funds are used as the 
comparison benchmark.  These results allow us to examine if there are substantial differences in 
these fund fees after controlling for various fund and two sponsor characteristics that are 
captured by the Public and Mutual dummy variables. We expect to find differences in fund fees 
based on these two characteristics but also due to the differences in other sponsor characteristics 
discussed in section three. 
[Please place table 4.2 about here.] 
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 We first examine differences in these three fee metrics differentiated by sponsor but not fund 
type as reported in the three columns headed by “Undifferentiated” in Table 4.2. We observe that 
the average fund sponsored by the Banks (S2) has the lowest after-controls  and 
. The after-controls  differences are all significantly lower for the funds 
sponsored by the Banks (S2) compared to those sponsored by Independents (S1), Insurers (S3) 
and Member-Fins (S4). Similarly, the after-controls  differences are significantly 
lower for the funds sponsored by the Banks (S2) compared to those sponsored by the 
Independents (S1) and Member-Fins (S4) but not the Insurers (S3) who like the Banks have 
sizeable in-house sales forces for their products. We observe no significant differences in the 
after-controls  for funds differentiated by sponsor type. 
 We then examine the after-controls fee results differentiated by both sponsor and fund type. 
Based on the three columns headed by “Cdn” in Table 4.2, we observe that funds sponsored by 
Banks (S2) have the lowest average after-controls  and  that are significantly 
different except for the  comparison with Member-Fins (S4). Based on the three columns 
headed by “Short-term” in Table 4.2, we find that funds sponsored by Banks (S2) have lower 
average after-controls  and  than the funds sponsored by Independents (S1), 
Insurers (S3) and Member-Fins (S4), and that the differences are only significant (at 0.10 level) 
for the comparisons with Independents (S1). Based on the three columns headed by “High-yield” 
in Table 4.2, we find that the average after-controls  for the funds sponsored by the 
Banks (S2) is significantly higher than that charged by the Insurer-sponsored funds (S3), and that 
the average  for the funds sponsored by the Banks (S2) is significantly lower than that 
charged by the funds sponsored by the Independents (S1) and the Insurers (S3). While we find 
that funds with public sponsors have higher after-controls  and , only the 
average after-controls MER differentials are significant for funds not differentiated by their 
investment objectives (“Undifferentiated” in Table 4.2) and for funds with a short-term 
investment objective. These results are consistent with those reported in Ferris and Yan (2009). 
 In summary, we have clear evidence that funds sponsored by the Banks (S2) almost always 
have the lowest average after-controls  and  for funds not differentiated by fund 
type and for funds with a Canadian Bond investment objective. This is consistent with the notion 
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that Canadian banks with nation-wide networks of branches potentially have the ability to reduce 
trailer fees which account for almost half of fund fees in the Canadian fund market (CSA, 2012). 
 We now turn to a discussion of the estimated coefficients for the fund-specific control 
variables that are reported in Table 4.2. We find that MER is negatively related to fund size 
( ) for all fund types based on investment objectives. The relation is significant for 
funds not differentiated by their investment objectives (“Undifferentiated” in Table 4.2) and 
significant at the 0.10 level for funds with a Canadian bond investment objective (“Cdn” in Table 
4.2). This result weakly supports an economies-of-scale argument in mutual fund MER. The 
negative relation between  and  is only significant for funds not 
differentiated by fund type (“Undifferentiated” in Table 4.2). MgmtFee is not significantly 
related with  for any of the fund type categories. 
 We find a significantly positive relation between  (the natural logarithm of the 
number of funds managed by the sponsor) and both MER and  for the funds not 
differentiated by their investment objectives (“Undifferentiated” in Table 4.2) and for funds with 
a Canadian Bond investment objective (“Cdn” in Table 4.2). We also find a significant and 
positive relation between  and  for the other two fund types. 
 We observe a negative relation between MER and  and the natural logarithm of 
fund age that is only significant for  for all but the funds with a Canadian Bond 
investment objective. We find no significant relation between fund flows ( ) and the fund 
performance ranking ( ) with either  or MgmtFee or  for our various 
samples of individual funds. 
 
4.6. ARE BENCHMARK-ADJUSTED GROSS, QUASI-GROSS AND NET RETURNS 
ASSOCIATED WITH FUND SPONSORSHIP? 
 In this section, we test alternative hypothesis, : Fund benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-
gross and net returns differ by fund and sponsor types. We expect that funds with different 
sponsorships exhibit different benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross and net returns due to 
differences in fees (see section 4.5), other sponsor characteristics (see sections 4.2 and 4.3) and 
the abilities of their managers. 
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4.6.1 Methodology 
 The performances of individual funds are examined using a benchmark model with a multi-
factor structure. The use of gross and quasi-gross (in addition to net) returns allows for tests of 
whether bond fund managers possess skills to generate benchmark-adjusted returns that cover 
their costs, since all passive benchmark returns exclude investment-related expenses (such as 
brokerage costs) and taxes. We argue that quasi-gross returns, which are calculated by adding 
1/12th of a fund’s annual trailer fees ( ) to its net returns, are more suitable for 
measuring the managerial abilities of fund managers since this assigns only the costs incurred by 
managers to generate benchmark-adjusted returns from the managers’ skills and efforts. Trailer 
fees used to service, for example, commissions paid by the sponsor to its in-house sales 
representatives or its external fund distributors, are not under the control of the manager. 
Similarly, various advertisements decisions (when, where and for which funds) are taken at the 
family and not individual fund level. However, since advertisements can affect the fund flow-
performance sensitivity (Gallaher, Kaniel and Starks, 2015), it is important to control for fund 
flows as we subsequently do when evaluating fund performance. 
 Our empirical investigations use the five-factor model used by Ayadi and Kryzanowski 
(2011) which is similar to the Reg-6 model of Blake, Elton and Gruber (1993) but without a 
high-yield bond index due to this index’s absence or market thinness in Canada for much of the 
period evaluated herein.82 DEX fixed-income indices, which are obtained from Datastream, 
CANSIM, and CFMRC, are used as factors in the proposed benchmark model. Four bond indices 
are related to government and corporate bond issues with long- and medium-term maturity 
structures. The mortgage-backed securities overall bond index accounts for the performance of 
closed and open pools. The default premium (DEF) and the slope of the term structure (TERM) 
are used as conditioning variables. Table 4.3 shows that most of the bond indices exhibit 
symmetric patterns with fatter tails than are suggested by the normal distribution. 
[Please place table 4.3 about here.] 
                                                          
82 Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011) find that this model performs best for the categories of Canadian fixed-income 
funds examined herein. 
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 This model captures differences in maturities by including the intermediate and long-term 
DEX government bond indices, and differences in default risks by including the DEX 
intermediate and long-term corporate bond indices and the DEX mortgage-backed securities 
overall index. The full conditional version of this model is:83 
  (4.2) 
where  and  denote the returns in excess of those of one-month Treasury bills on fund i 
based on either gross or quasi-gross or net returns84 and on index k between t-1 and t, 
respectively.  is the average in-sample benchmark-adjusted return on fund i based on one of 
the three return types,  is the sensitivity of the excess return on fund i to the excess return on 
index k, and  is the error term or deviation in the average benchmark-adjusted return specific 
to fund i in month t. The least squares method is used to estimate benchmark-adjusted returns 
since all the benchmark models are linear and exactly identified.85 The time-varying component 
of the coefficients is captured using the conditional variables which are stochastically detrended 
by subtracting a moving average over a period of two months. Default premium (DEF) is used to 
condition the DEX Long-term Corporate Bond Index (DEXLTCORP), the DEX Medium-term 
Corporate Bond Index (DEXMTCORP) and the DEX Mortgage-backed Securities Overall Bond 
Index (DEXMBS). The slope of the term structure (TERM) is used to condition the DEX Long 
Term Government Bond Index (DEXLTGOV) and the DEX Medium-term Government Bond 
Index (DEXMTGOV). 
 We first compute the benchmark-adjusted monthly excess returns using the  for month t 
for each fund that are estimated using equation (4.2) and the returns for the previous 60 
months:86 
  (4.3) 
                                                          
83 The unconditional version of this model is obtained when all coefficients are time-invariant. 
84 Many papers use gross returns to assess the managerial skills of mutual fund managers. Examples include 
Grinblatt and Titman (1989, 1993), Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers (1995), Daniel, Grinblatt, Titman and Wermers 
(1997), Kacperczyk, Sialm and Zheng (2005), Cremers and Petajisto (2009) and Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011). 
85 We consider that 60 observations are required for a fund-by-fund or portfolio of funds analysis so that the 
saturation ratio is high enough so that dependable results are obtained when two instrumental variables are used to 
condition this model. Bekaert and Urias (1996) discuss the impact of saturation ratios on their results for closed-end 
funds. For greater details on saturation ratios, see Gallant and Tauchen (1991). 
86 Brennan, Chordia and Subrahmanyam (1998) argue that calculating benchmark-adjusted returns based on 
equation (4.3) eliminates any bias caused by errors in the estimation of factors loadings. 
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where all the terms are as previously defined. This method for calculating the benchmark-
adjusted returns is consistent with those used by Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu (2009) and Ferreira, 
Keswani, Miguel and Ramos (2013).  
 Some summary statistics for the various benchmark-adjusted monthly excess returns for the 
individual funds (not) differentiated by fund type and not controlling for sponsor type or other 
fund characteristics (such as size) are presented in Table 4.4. The estimates reported in the 
column labeled “Mean” in Panels A, B and C of Table 4.4 using gross, quasi-gross and net 
returns, respectively, are consistent with our expectation that managerial effectiveness is higher 
where superior information or skill can have a greater impact. At a summary level, we observe 
significant managerial ability before but not after costs for the sample undifferentiated by fund 
type and for the Canadian Bond sample; significant managerial ability before and after costs for 
the High-yield Bond sample; and neutral ability before and negative ability after costs for the 
Short-term Canadian Bond sample. At a more detailed level, the cross-sectional means and 
medians of the benchmark-adjusted returns are significantly positive using gross returns (Panel A 
of Table 4.4) and significantly negative using quasi-gross and net returns (Panels B and C of 
Table 4.4) for the individual funds in the total sample (All). The cross-sectional means and 
medians of the benchmark-adjusted returns are positive using gross, quasi-gross and net returns 
for the individual funds in the High-yield Bond sample, and only the median using net returns is 
not statistical significant at conventional levels. The cross-sectional median of the benchmark-
adjusted returns is significantly positive using gross returns (Panel A of Table 4.4) and both the 
cross-sectional means and medians of the benchmark-adjusted returns are significantly negative 
using quasi-gross and net returns (Panels B and C of Table 4.4) for the individual funds in the 
Canadian Bond sample. The cross-sectional means and medians of the benchmark-adjusted 
returns are insignificantly positive using gross returns (Panel A of Table 4.4) and significantly 
negative using quasi-gross and net returns (Panels B and C of Table 4.4) for the individual funds 
in the Short-term Canadian Bond sample.   
[Please place table 4.4 about here.] 
 To examine the effect of sponsor type on the benchmark-adjusted returns  of a 
fund, we estimate the following panel regression: 
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   (4.4) 
In (4),  represents the average benchmark-adjusted after-controls return (i.e., after controlling 
for various fund and sponsor characteristics included therein) when the fund sponsor is a Bank 
(captured using the dummy variable  in (4) when one of the other sponsor dummy variables is 
removed so that it is captured by the intercept), and   and  are sponsor dummy variables 
which take a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to respectively the Independent, Insurer, and 
Member-Fins categories and 0 otherwise. All the other variables are as previously defined. 
 We again use the correlated random-effects panel regression specification based on the 
rationale and tests discussed in section 4.5.2, and the Fama and MacBeth (1973) approach (the 
latter as a robustness check) to estimate equation (4.4). Consistent with our fees data, our 
benchmark-adjusted return data exhibit a fund effect based on the methodology proposed by 
Petersen (2009) that was discussed in section 4.5.2. 
4.6.2 Fund Benchmark-adjusted Gross, Quasi-gross and Net Return Determinants Based 
on Panel Regressions 
 Table 4.5 reports the coefficient estimates for panel regression (4.4) using the unconditional 
5-factor model over the whole period 2000-2011. When we consider all the funds irrespective of 
their investment objectives (three columns headed by “Undifferentiated” in Table 4.5), we find 
relative after-controls outperformance of funds sponsored by the Banks (S2) compared to that for 
funds sponsored by Independents (S1), Insurers (S3), and Member-Fin (S4) based on quasi-gross 
and net returns. These differences are weakly significant for S2 with either S1 or S4, and strongly 
significant for S2 with S3. Also, funds sponsored by Banks (S2) significantly outperform those 
sponsored by Insurers (S3) based on relative after-controls benchmark-adjusted gross returns. 
[Please place table 4.5 about here.] 
 To control for the effect of investment objectives (fund types), we run the same panel 
regressions separately for funds with the same investment objective. Considering the three 
columns headed by “Cdn” in Table 4.5, we find that funds sponsored by the Banks (S2) have 
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higher after-controls benchmark-adjusted performance compared to that for funds sponsored by 
Independents (S1), Insurers (S3), and Member-Fin (S4) based on both quasi-gross and net returns. 
The favorable difference in this metric for S2 over S1 is insignificant using quasi-gross returns 
and only weakly insignificant using net returns, and all of the favorable differences of S2 over S3 
and S4 are significant or strongly significant based on quasi-gross and net returns. All of the 
differences in after-controls benchmark-adjusted performance between S2 and S1, and between S3 
and S4 are not statistically significant. To determine if the average after-controls performance of 
the Independents (S1) is affected by the inclusion of the professional-member-based sponsored 
(Member-Prof) funds, we split S1 into Member-Prof and the remainder. We then run the same set 
of panel regressions for the Canadian Bond investment objective (T1) where the intercept 
captures the effect on all funds that are not sponsored by a Member-Prof. Based on untabulated 
results, we find no outperformance based on after-controls benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-
gross and net returns for funds sponsored by Member-Prof when compared to all of the others 
funds in fund type T1.87 However, when we re-estimate equation (4.4) without the Public 
dummy variable, we find that the funds with Member-Prof (all private) sponsors now have 
significantly higher after-controls benchmark-adjusted quasi-gross returns when compared to all 
of the others funds in fund type T1. 
 The results reported in the three columns headed by “Short-term” or fund type T2 in Table 4.5 
only show that funds sponsored by Banks (S2) significantly (weakly) outperform the funds 
sponsored by Independents (S1), and only based on the average after-controls benchmark-
adjusted net returns.  The results reported in the three columns headed by “High-yield” (T3) in 
Table 4.5 show that funds sponsored by Banks (S2) outperform the funds sponsored by Insurers 
(S3) and Member-Fin (S4) based on the average after-controls benchmark-adjusted quasi-gross 
and net returns. These differences are weakly significant except for the S2: S3 comparison for 
gross returns. 
 Table 4.6 reports the coefficient estimates over the whole period 2000-2011 for panel 
regression (4.4) using the conditional 5-factor model with the default premium and the term 
structure slope as the two information variables. When we consider all funds irrespective of their 
                                                          
87 The tabulated results are available from the authors (Table I.9 of our Internet Appendix). This is along with 
subsequent references to untabulated results that are available in our Internet Appendix are for the convenience of 
journal referees and will be later removed. 
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investment objectives (“Undifferentiated” in Table 4.6), we find relative after-controls 
outperformance of funds sponsored by Banks (S2) compared to that for funds sponsored by 
Independents (S1), Insurers (S3) and Member-Fins (S4). Only the outperformance of S2 over S1 is 
not significant at conventional levels based on average after-controls benchmark-adjusted gross 
returns. For funds with a Canadian Bond investment objective (based on the three columns 
headed by “Cdn” in Table 4.6), the underperformance of funds sponsored by Independents (S1), 
Insurers (S3) and Member-Fins (S4) compared to those sponsored by Banks (S2) remains 
significant based on average after-controls benchmark-adjusted quasi-gross and net returns. For 
funds with a Short-term Bond investment objective (based on the three columns headed by 
“Short-term” in Table 4.6), we find no significant performance differences for funds among the 
different sponsor types. For funds with a High-yield investment objective (based on the three 
columns headed by “High-yield” in Table 4.6), there is evidence that funds sponsored by Banks 
(S2) significantly outperform funds sponsored by Insurers (S3) and Member-Fins (S4) based on 
average after-controls benchmark-adjusted net, gross and quasi-gross returns. 
[Please place table 4.6 about here.] 
 Thus, the funds sponsored by Banks (S2) generally have, on average, higher after-controls 
benchmark-adjusted performances based on quasi-gross and net (and to a lesser extent gross) 
returns than the funds sponsored by Independents (S1), Insurers (S3) and Member-Fins (S4), for 
the undifferentiated, Canadian Bond and High-yield Bond fund types where superior information 
or skill matters the most compared to the short-term fund type. The outperformance of funds 
sponsored by Banks (S2) based on quasi-gross returns for all but the Short-term Bond fund type 
suggests that their managers have more skills in generating returns to cover manager-related fees. 
Their potential information advantage obtained through their lending and investment dealer 
affiliates might explain part of the manager superiority of bank-sponsored funds compared to 
their rivals in the Canadian fixed-income fund industry. 
 If we examine absolute and not relative after-controls benchmark-adjusted performances, we 
observe an insignificant shortfall of fund returns compared to management fees for all sponsor-
type categories with a Canadian Short-term investment objective. In contrast, we observe a 
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significant shortfall of fund returns compared to management fees for all sponsor-type categories 
for the other fund types. 
 We now examine the, on average, impact of having a publicly-traded or a mutually-owned 
sponsor on benchmark-adjusted fund performance. Based on Table 4.5, having a publicly-traded 
sponsor significantly lowers, on average, the unconditional benchmark-adjusted quasi-gross and 
net returns for funds with a Canadian Bond investment objective, which accounts for 80 percent 
of the Canadian fixed-income market, and for funds undifferentiated by fund type. Based on 
Table 4.6, having a publicly-traded sponsor significantly lowers, on average, the conditional 
benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross and net returns for funds in three of the four fund types 
(exception is High-yield). Similarly, we find that the average impact of having a mutually-owned 
sponsor becomes significant more often when the benchmark model becomes conditional. Based 
on Table 4.5, having a mutually-owned sponsor significantly lowers, on average, the 
unconditional benchmark-adjusted quasi-gross and net returns for funds with a Canadian Short-
term investment objective, and significantly increases, on average, the unconditional benchmark-
adjusted gross, quasi-gross and net returns for funds with a High-yield investment objective. 
Based on Table 4.6, having a mutually-owned sponsor significantly increases (decreases), on 
average, the conditional benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross and net returns for funds with a 
High-yield (Canadian Short-term) investment objective, and increases, on average, the 
conditional benchmark-adjusted gross returns for funds undifferentiated by investment objective 
and those with a Canadian Bond investment objective. 
 Regression (4.4) includes a number of control variables whose estimates are reported in 
Tables 5 and 6. In general, the empirical evidence on the relation between MER and benchmark-
adjusted returns is mixed. Chen et al. (2004) find no relation between the two for a sample of 
U.S. funds. Other researchers find a negative relation using benchmark-adjusted net returns (e.g., 
Carhart, 1997) and benchmark-adjusted gross returns (e.g., Gil-Bazo and Ruiz-Verdu, 2009). 
Based on Tables 5 and 6, we find, with one exception, an insignificant relation between MER 
and benchmark-adjusted returns. 
 Earlier studies (e.g., Grinblatt and Titman, 1989, 1994) find mixed empirical results for the 
relation between fund size ( ) and benchmark-adjusted returns. More recent studies 
report a negative relation, particularly for U.S. equity funds, which they attribute to 
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diseconomies of scale due to illiquidity, trade costs and/or organizational issues (e.g., Chen et al., 
2004; Yan, 2008). Consistent with Chen et al. (2004) and Yan (2008), we find a negative relation 
between fund size (  and unconditional benchmark-adjusted returns with the exception 
of those funds with a High-yield investment objective (see Table 4.5). For the conditional 
benchmark-adjusted returns (Table 4.6), this relation is significant only for funds with a Short-
term investment objective for all three types of returns and for funds with a Canadian Bond 
investment objective for only gross returns. 
 Fund age ( ) is included to capture the effect of a fund’s longevity and experience. If 
older funds are more experienced and face lower costs, we would expect them to have better 
benchmark-adjusted returns. In contrast, if young funds devote more effort to outperform and 
grow in size and face less organizational problems, then we would expect them to have better 
benchmark-adjusted returns. Thus, the effect of age on fund benchmark-adjusted returns can only 
be determined empirically. Based on Tables 5 and 6, we find a significantly positive relation 
between the natural logarithm of fund age and fund benchmark-adjusted returns for all three 
return types except for the funds with a Short-term investment objective. 
 Fund flows ( ) are included to capture the finding by Goetzmann, Massa and 
Rouwenhorst (2000) that suggests that asset class flow factors (as proxies for behavioral factors 
often referred to as the smart or dumb money effect) are instruments to help explain the cross-
sectional variation in realized returns not captured by benchmark models.88 Furthermore, since 
open-ended mutual funds are extremely reliant on outside and immediately demandable capital 
to fund their investment opportunities, their fund flows based on past performance (especially if 
it is poor) are likely to affect their performance (Coval and Stafford, 2007). Based on Tables 5 
and 6, we find a positive relation between flows and benchmark-adjusted returns whose 
significance at conventional levels occurs more often using the conditional benchmark model. 
Thus, a significantly positive relation between flows and conditional benchmark-adjusted gross, 
quasi-gross and net returns is found for funds undifferentiated by fund type and for fund types 
Canadian Bond and High-yield. 
                                                          
88 Frazzini and Lamont (2008) find only weak evidence of a smart money effect of short-term fund flows positively 
predicting short-term returns and that individuals as a whole are hurt by their reallocations to funds when the 
aggregate holdings of mutual funds by all individuals are examined. 
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4.7. SOME FURTHER TESTS 
 In this section, we conduct additional tests to check the robustness of our results. 
4.7.1 Tests of Fees and Benchmark-adjusted Performance of Member-Profs 
 We begin with a test using a sample of funds confined to those with private sponsors. Since 
we are interested in the relative performance of Member-Prof whose fund sponsors are 
professional member-owned or controlled non-financial entities (all mutual), we split the funds 
with private sponsors in the Independent (S1) category into two groups; namely, Member-Prof 
and Private_S1. Since the Banks are all public and given our interest at this point in the funds in 
the Member-Prof category, we set up the dummy variables in regression (4.1) for fees and (4.4) 
for benchmark-adjusted returns so that the after-controls effects for the funds in the Member-
Prof category are captured by their intercepts. 
 Panel A of Table 4.7 reports the results for the determinants of the management expense 
ratios (MER), management fees (MgmtFee) and trailer fees (TrailerFee) for funds with a 
Canadian bond investment objective that are sponsored by Member-Prof (all private and mutual) 
versus private (mixed share/mutual) Independent (Private_S1) excluding Member-Prof, private 
(all mutual) Insurers (Private_S3) and Member-Fins (all private and mutual) (S4). We observe 
that the after-controls MER and TrailerFee are significantly higher only for the funds with 
Independent sponsors excluding the Member-Prof (Private_S1). However, based on untabulated 
results when we do not include the Mutual dummy variable, we find that the after-controls MER 
and TrailerFee are also significantly higher for funds with private Insurer (Private_S3) sponsors 
and for MER for funds with Member-Fins (S4) sponsors. 
[Please place table 4.7 about here.] 
 Panel B of Table 4.7 reports the results for the determinants of the dependent variable 
FundRTN, which is the conditional benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross or net return for 
month t using the conditional five-factor model of Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011), for the same 
sponsor type groupings. We observe that funds with Member-Prof sponsors have significantly 
negative after-controls conditional benchmark-adjusted quasi-gross and net returns. 
Nevertheless, these values are significantly better than those for the funds with private sponsors 
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in the other three private sponsor type groupings. Furthermore, the after-controls conditional 
benchmark-adjusted gross returns for the funds with Member-Prof sponsors are significantly 
better than those for funds with private Insurer (Private_S3) and Member-Fins (S4) sponsors. 
Based on untabulated results, these inferences remain unchanged with one exception if the 
Mutual dummy variable is not included in regression (4.4).89 Thus, the funds with private and 
mutually owned sponsors that are professional member-owned or controlled entities have 
significantly better quasi-return and net return benchmark-adjusted performances compared to 
their counterparts with private sponsors. This is consistent with lower agency issues associated 
with funds with professional member-owned or controlled sponsors. 
4.7.2 Sensitivity to Calculation of Benchmark-adjusted Returns and Clustering of 
Standard Errors 
 We calculate our benchmark-adjusted returns using the prior 36 and the prior 48 months 
instead of the prior 60 months using the unconditional and the conditional models with(out) a 
conditional intercept. Our untabulated results show similar results to those reported in Tables 5 
and 6. Since the sponsor ownership structure is identical within mutual fund families, we now 
run regressions (4.3) and (4.4) when the standard errors are clustered at the fund family (sponsor) 
level. Generally, these untabulated results are consistent with those reported earlier in Tables 5 
and 6. 
4.7.3 Tests of Active Risk Differences 
 Amihud and Goyenko (2013) use one minus a fund’s R-square value calculated by regressing 
a fund’s returns on the returns of a single or multifactor benchmark model to predict future fund 
performance. Since R-square by definition reflects the proportion of a fund’s return variance that 
is explained by the variation in the benchmark factors (i.e., passive systematic risk factor 
exposures), a lower R-square implies that the fund follows the benchmark less closely and has 
been exposed to greater active risk from active security selection and/or active systematic risk-
factor timing. Since the sponsor-differentiated differences in benchmark-adjusted returns may be 
                                                          
89 The after-controls conditional benchmark-adjusted gross returns for the funds with Member-Prof sponsors are no 
longer significantly better than those for funds with private Insurer (Private_S3) sponsors. 
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due to differences in active risk taking, we examine if the R-square values of the funds 
differentiated by fund sponsor type differ. 
 To do so, we use the R-square estimate for each fund for each month based on the previously 
conducted regressions of a fund’s past 60-month returns on the returns of the benchmark. Our 
untabulated results show that funds sponsored by Banks (S2) have significantly higher R-square 
values compared to funds sponsored by Independents (S1) for all fund types based on investment 
objectives.90 Except for short-term bond funds, funds sponsored by the Banks (S2) have 
insignificantly higher R-square values compared to funds sponsored by Insurers (S3). Thus, the 
superior benchmark-adjusted returns of the bank- versus independent-sponsored bond funds 
occur even though the former bear less active risk. 
4.7.4 Robustness Based on Fama-MacBeth Regressions 
 We examine robustness further using Fama-MacBeth regressions. We first estimate regression 
(4.1) using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach using yearly values of the three types of fees. 
We adjust the Fama-MacBeth estimates using standard errors that are robust to serial correlation 
and conditional heteroskedasticity as proposed by Newey and West (1987).91 Generally, the 
untabulated results using the Fama-MacBeth regressions confirm the earlier panel regression 
results.92 Funds sponsored by Banks (S2) have the lowest average after-controls . These 
differences are strongly significant even after we control for fund type. 
 We then estimate regression (4.4) using the Fama-MacBeth (1973) approach for the 
benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross and net returns. We obtain the adjusted versions of the 
coefficient estimates and their standard errors by regressing the time-series of the parameter 
estimates on an intercept term where the residuals are modeled as a sixth-order autoregressive 
process. This method was first used by Pontiff (1996) and subsequently used by Cornett, Marcus 
and Tehranian (2008), Irvine and Pontiff (2009), amongst others. According to Pontiff (1996), 
the standard error of the intercept yields a standard error for that coefficient that is not biased by 
serial or cross-sectional correlation provided that the sixth-order autoregressive process captures 
all of the serial dependence in the residuals. 
                                                          
90 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Table I.10 of our Internet Appendix). 
91 We use this approach due to the number of years of data available and the lower level of autocorrelation in the 
yearly fees. 
92 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Table I.2 in our Internet Appendix). 
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 The untabulated results from the Fama-MacBeth regressions based on the conditional 
benchmark-adjusted returns generally are consistent with the previously reported panel 
regression results.93 When our sample includes all funds not differentiated by their investment 
objectives, funds sponsored by Banks (S2) significantly outperform the funds with other sponsor 
types, on average, based on benchmark-adjusted net returns. For Canadian Bond funds, funds 
sponsored by the Banks (S2), on average, outperform the funds with different sponsor types. This 
outperformance is strongly significant for benchmark-adjusted net returns compared to funds 
with all other sponsor types.94 For funds with a Canadian Short-term investment objective, the 
funds sponsored by Banks (S2) strongly (weakly) and significantly outperform the funds 
sponsored by Insurers (Member-Fins). For funds with a Canadian High-yield investment 
objective, the funds sponsored by the Banks (S2) strongly and significantly outperform the funds 
sponsored by Insurers (S3). The benchmark-adjusted return differences with the other two 
sponsor types are not significant at conventional levels. 
4.7.5 Effect of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC) 
 Since our sample time period covers the global financial crisis (GFC), we check whether it 
has an effect on our results. Ait-Sahalia, Andritzky, Jobst, Nowak and Tamirisa (2012) use a 
Markov-Switching vector autoregression analysis on bond market data to identify the onset and 
end of the GFC period as June 2007 and April 2009, respectively. We use two different 
approaches to deal with this issue. First, we consider the pre-GFC period (January 2000 to June 
2007) to check whether our results are robust within the period before the onset of the GFC. We 
also estimate regressions (4.1) and (4.4) when they include a dummy variable which takes a 
value of 1 if our data are in the GFC period and 0 otherwise. 
 The untabulated results from the pre-GFC period for the benchmark-adjusted returns are 
qualitatively similar to the results over the entire period examined previously for both the panel 
and Fama-MacBeth regressions.95 The untabulated results of the panel and Fama-MacBeth 
                                                          
93 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Table I.1 of our Internet Appendix). 
94 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Table I.1 of our Internet Appendix). 
95 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Tables I.3 and I.4, respectively, in our Internet Appendix). 
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regressions for all types of fees over the pre-GFC period are almost the same as those over the 
entire period examined previously.96 
 We then examine the untabulated results when we use dummy variables in our panel 
regressions to control for the potential differential effects of the GFC on fund benchmark-
adjusted returns and fees for different fund and sponsor types.97 As expected, the sponsor type 
results are similar to those obtained earlier without a GFC dummy variable (see the earlier 
Tables 5 and 6). Since the coefficient of the GFC dummy variable is negative and significant 
when MER is the dependent variable,98 this supports the conjecture that Canadian fixed-income 
funds reduced their fees during the GFC period to bolster the competitive position of their 
mutual funds during the crisis. This suggests that funds adjust their  somewhat to reflect the 
level of competition given current economic and market conditions. 
4.8. CONCLUSION 
 We find that the funds sponsored by Banks outperform, on average, the funds sponsored by 
the other three sponsor types based on after-controls benchmark-adjusted net and quasi-gross 
returns for all fund categories based on investment objective (fund type) in the Canadian fixed-
income fund market except for funds with Short-term investment objectives which account for 
almost 15% of the market. Funds sponsored by Banks also have the lowest average after-controls 
 and  for almost all investment objective categories (fund types). These results 
are consistent with Gruber (1996) who finds that funds with high fees are associated with inferior 
performance and that the return differences between the best and worst performing funds exceed 
the differences in fees. The gross after-controls benchmark-adjusted returns finding is consistent 
with the notion that mutual fund performances based on after-controls benchmark-adjusted gross 
returns will be superior for funds with managers with higher investment abilities. These results 
support the conjecture that banks have higher performances (after-controls returns and fees) due 
to their large nation-wide networks of branches that reduce trailer fees, higher information 
advantages through their lending and underwriting businesses with issuers of publicly issued 
                                                          
96 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Tables I.5 and I.6, respectively, in our Internet Appendix). 
97 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Tables I.7 and I.8, respectively, in our Internet Appendix). 
98 The untabulated results are available from the authors (Tables I.7 and I.8, respectively, in our Internet Appendix). 
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bonds, greater risk-sharing alternatives and/or market power, and that funds with mutually-
owned sponsors have higher operation costs because of their lack of market monitoring by their 
investors and/or the higher cost of capital for their fund sponsors. We also find that the funds 
with private and mutually owned sponsors that are professional member-owned or controlled 
entities have significantly better quasi-return and net return benchmark-adjusted performances 
compared to their counterparts with other private sponsor types. 
 Why do investors continue to invest in the funds sponsored by Independents, Insurers and 
Member-Fins given that they generally have lower average after-controls benchmark-adjusted 
returns and higher average after-controls costs compared to funds sponsored by Banks? Given 
the small differences in the average monthly net returns across the funds by sponsor type, we 
argue that unsophisticated investors most likely cannot distinguish between these funds based on 
simple return measures, and that the higher average fees most likely are used to compensate 
advisors and others for marketing the funds. These conjectures are supported by studies that find 
that investors do not use the most appropriate measures for assessing fund performance and that 
they ignore the costs that they are charged for investment advisory and marketing services (Choi, 
Laibson and Madrian, 2010; Capon, Fitzsimons and Prince, 1996). Another possibility that is 
consistent with our findings is that the funds categorized by sponsor type are catering to client 
markets that differ by, for example, the size of their average fund investments. These are not 
issues that we can address precisely using the data that are publicly available for our sample of 
funds. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
CONCLUSION 
In my first essay, using a large database of equity and fixed-income U.S. CEFs during 
1994-2013, we examine the effect of the 2004 SEC information disclosure requirements on 
advisory rates and their changes. Our results show that CEFs with higher percentages of 
independent directors are associated with lower advisory rates for the period after the 2004 SEC 
amendments. When we consider the changes in advisory rates, our results show that advisory-
rate decreases are significantly more likely for a CEF with a higher percentage of independent 
directors for the period after but not before the 2004 SEC amendments. Our results are robust to 
the effect of changes in board independence. Using a sub-sample of CEFs with no change in 
their percentage of independent directors, we find that CEFs with higher percentages of 
independent directors are associated with lower advisory rates and a higher probability of 
advisory rate decreases for the period after but not before the 2004 SEC amendments. Overall, 
our results support the idea that the 2004 SEC amendments have been successful in encouraging 
independent directors to act more independently in questioning and negotiating advisory fees 
with fund advisors after their adoption.  
 This study, to the extent of our knowledge, is the first study which examines the 
transparency effects of board decision making on board effectiveness in the mutual fund industry 
and provides evidence on the effects of the 2004 SEC amendments requiring greater 
transparency in the decision-making process behind advisory contracts. Also, it contributes to the 
literature on the value to investors of information disclosure. 
In my second essay, using the same governance data, we examined the relationship between 
board characteristics (i.e. board independence, director ownership and director compensation) 
and various fund performance measures (expense ratios, share and NAVPS returns, and market 
premiums) and the median compensations of independent directors from a CEF board. Using a 
dynamic panel two-step system generalized method of moments estimator, our results are robust 
in the presence of endogeneity concerns (reverse causality, unobserved heterogeneity and 
simultaneity). We find that boards with higher percentages of independent directors are 
associated with lower fees (expense ratios). These results are consistent with the notion that the 
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independent directors of U.S. CEFs have some success in minimizing expenses and this is 
probably one of the reasons that U.S. mutual funds have the lowest fees around the globe 
(Khorana, Servaes, and Tufano, 2009). Our results also show negative and significant relations 
between CEF benchmark-adjusted returns and the percentage of independent directors. 
Consistent with the theoretical and empirical literature, we argue that board effectiveness in 
monitoring measures of CEF performance depend on the complexity of the measures, associated 
degrees of information asymmetry and uncertainty, and the specialised knowledge required for 
that entity activity (Duchin et al., 2010). Unlike monitoring and influencing CEF returns and 
premiums which requires specialised abilities to process public and private (but legal) 
information about asset management, the yearly fund fees negotiations with fund advisers 
require only publicly-available information about what the market is charging and paying for 
services and the funds relative performance to its competitors. Our results show no significant 
relationship between the percentages of independent directors and CEF premiums.  
We find that more ownership by directors is associated with lower fund fees (expense ratios) 
and higher CEF returns which support previous studies (Chen et al. 2008). The positive 
relationships between the ownerships of directors and CEF returns are robust to the use of 
different measures of CEF returns (e.g. benchmark-adjusted share returns, share returns, NAVPS 
returns). This supports the idea that directors with more ownership of fund assets are more 
aligned with the interests of shareholders. Thus, our results have implications for the design of 
compensation schemes for directors. Increasing the percentage of compensation received as 
ownership in the CEF’s shares may result in reducing any agency issues between fund managers 
and shareholders.   
Our results show that independent directors receive more compensation with higher levels of 
ownership and in larger funds and funds with higher board meeting frequencies. Independent 
directors who expect to sit on more funds within the fund family accept lower compensations 
from each fund but receive more in the aggregate. We conjecture that to increase their total 
compensation from the fund families by sitting on more boards, independent directors accept 
lower compensation on a per-fund basis when they expect to increase their total compensation from 
the fund family by sitting on more boards. 
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 In my third essay, we find that the funds sponsored by Banks outperform, on average, the 
funds sponsored by Insurers, Member-Fins and Independents based on after-controls benchmark-
adjusted net and quasi-gross returns for all fund categories based on investment objective (fund 
type) in the Canadian fixed-income fund market except for funds with Short-term investment 
objectives which account for almost 15% of the market. Funds sponsored by Banks also have the 
lowest average after-controls  and  for almost all investment objective categories 
(fund types). These findings support those of Gruber (1996) who finds a negative relationship 
between high fund fees and performance and that the return differences between the best and 
worst performing funds exceed the differences in fees. Our finding regarding gross after-controls 
benchmark-adjusted returns is consistent with the idea that funds with managers with higher 
investment abilities show superior performance based on after-controls benchmark-adjusted 
gross returns. These results support the conjecture that banks have higher performances (after-
controls returns and fees) due to their large nation-wide networks of branches that reduce trailer 
fees, higher information advantages through their lending and underwriting businesses with 
issuers of publicly issued bonds, greater risk-sharing alternatives and/or market power, and that 
funds with mutually-owned sponsors have higher operation costs because of their lack of market 
monitoring by their investors and/or the higher cost of capital for their fund sponsors. 
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FIGURES 
 
Figure 2.1. Number of advisory fee decreases 
Above graph shows the number of advisory fee decreases for 1994-2013 period. The change in advisory 
rates for concave contracts is any change in the breakpoints between current and previous NSAR filings. 
To ensure that the changes in advisory rates are attributable to a contract change and not to the effect of 
fund asset growth we use the current period NAV for both current and previous contracts.  
 
 
Figure 2.2. Number of advisory fee increases 
Above graph shows the number of advisory fee increases for 1994-2013 period. The change in advisory 
rates for concave contracts is any change in the breakpoints between current and previous NSAR filings. 
To ensure that the changes in advisory rates are attributable to a contract change and not to the effect of 
fund asset growth we use the current period NAV for both current and previous contracts. 
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TABLES 
Table 2.1. Summary statistics for the sample of closed-end funds and the characteristics of their 
boards  
This table reports summary statistics for fund and board characteristics for the 20 year period from 
January 1994 through 2013. Panel A provides the number of funds having each investment objective for a 
cross-section every two years. Panel B reports the means and medians of the individual fund 
characteristics that are defined in the appendix. Panel C provides the means and medians of the board 
characteristics that are defined in the appendix. Panel D reports the means, medians and standard 
deviation (SD) of advisory rates (marginal compensation rates) for each investment objective for cross-
sections where each covers two years. 
Panel A: Number of CEFs 
Fund Objective Year 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Equity 0 9 13 14 14 16 35 43 36 29 
International Equity 0 54 62 53 49 40 48 60 62 62 
Bond 7 85 89 87 91 101 115 120 115 121 
Municipal Bond 33 172 174 195 195 262 173 157 149 141 
Allocation 1 12 12 14 14 20 27 37 38 37 
Specialty 1 10 8 10 11 21 40 46 40 49 
Total 42 342 358 373 374 460 438 463 440 439 
Panel B: Advisory Rate (Marginal Compensation Rate) Characteristics 
Fund type Statistics Year Total 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
Equity 
Mean 0.82 0.81 0.79 0.83 0.85 0.87 0.89 0.89 0.85 0.88 0.86 
Median 0.80 0.82 0.85 0.93 0.85 0.85 0.90 0.94 0.99 0.98 0.90 
SD 0.11 0.24 0.28 0.25 0.24 0.19 0.17 0.17 0.24 0.20 0.21 
International 
Equity 
Mean 0.96 0.98 1.00 0.98 0.99 0.95 0.91 0.97 0.94 0.93 0.96 
Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.90 1.00 0.95 0.95 1.00 
SD 0.34 0.32 0.30 0.33 0.27 0.30 0.29 0.24 0.26 0.25 0.29 
Bond 
Mean 0.65 0.62 0.63 0.66 0.68 0.70 0.70 0.72 0.74 0.75 0.69 
Median 0.65 0.60 0.63 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.74 0.75 0.75 0.70 
SD 0.21 0.21 0.21 0.22 0.22 0.20 0.18 0.19 0.21 0.21 0.21 
Municipal 
Bond 
Mean 0.55 0.57 0.57 0.57 0.58 0.55 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.53 0.55 
Median 0.50 0.61 0.60 0.61 0.61 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 0.55 
SD 0.20 0.18 0.17 0.16 0.15 0.12 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.13 0.15 
Allocation 
Mean 0.72 0.79 0.76 0.71 0.79 0.77 0.80 0.83 0.84 0.83 0.80 
Median 0.6 0.75 0.75 0.65 0.75 0.75 0.75 0.80 0.85 0.85 0.75 
SD 0.25 0.27 0.23 0.26 0.24 0.23 0.22 0.20 0.21 0.22 0.23 
Specialty 
Mean 0.91 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.78 0.78 0.87 0.94 0.98 1.00 0.91 
Median 0.93 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.80 0.86 1.00 1.00 1.00 0.95 
SD 0.18 0.22 0.21 0.20 0.22 0.17 0.19 0.19 0.22 0.22 0.22 
Total 
Mean 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.67 0.68 0.70 0.74 0.74 0.76 0.70 
Median 0.65 0.65 0.64 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.65 0.70 0.70 0.71 0.65 
SD 0.27 0.27 0.26 0.26 0.23 0.23 0.23 0.24 0.26 0.26 0.25 
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Panel C: Average Advisory Rates Around 2004 
 
Fund type 
Full Sample 
Sub-sample 
(no change in board 
independence) 
Mean Mean 
Difference 
Mean Mean 
Differenc
e 
2002-2004 2005-
2007 
2002-
2004 
2005-
2007 
Equity 0.86 0.88 -0.01 0.90 0.90 0.00 
International 
Equity 0.98 0.92 0.06
*** 1.00 0.92 0.07*** 
Bond 0.69 0.70 -0.01** 0.77 0.73 0.04*** 
Municipal Bond 0.57 0.53 0.04*** 0.56 0.53 0.03*** 
Allocation 0.77 0.79 -0.02*** 0.74 0.70 0.04** 
Specialty 0.78 0.86 -0.08*** 0.79 0.84 -0.05 
Panel D: Board Characteristics 
Variables Statistics 
Year Total 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
%IndDirFnd Mean 0.72 0.72 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.82 0.83 0.85 0.85 0.85 0.81 Median 0.72 0.71 0.75 0.75 0.78 0.82 0.86 0.86 0.85 0.86 0.82 
BdSize Mean 7.90 7.80 8.10 8.00 8.20 8.90 8.30 9.10 9.00 9.10 8.60 Median 6.00 8.00 8.00 7.00 8.00 8.00 8.00 9.00 9.00 10.00 8.00 
AveIndDirCompFnd Mean 4091 11164 11959 12528 7707 10224 7718 8106 8291 9689 9445 Median 4500 4450 4500 3089 3161 3465 3414 2751 3574 4206 3678 
AveIndDirCompFam 
(000s) 
Mean 27.3 118.6 123.2 142.0 70.9 149.6 64.2 95.5 108.6 105.4 106.2 
Median 12.7 31.5 23.2 23.7 27.7 28.5 55.2 68.9 101.5 91.1 38.0 
%IndDirOwn 
>50K 
Mean NA NA NA 0.09 0.07 0.07 0.09 0.06 0.09 0.11 0.08 
Median NA NA NA 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
%DirFemaleFnd Mean 0.06 0.13 0.10 0.11 0.13 0.14 0.13 0.17 0.19 0.21 0.15 Median 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.13 0.17 0.13 0.18 0.22 0.22 0.14 
AveTenIndDirFnd 
(Years) 
Mean 2.40 4.20 5.20 6.10 6.80 6.70 5.90 5.80 6.90 7.70 6.20 
Median 2.00 3.70 4.80 5.80 6.80 6.50 5.60 6.00 7.00 7.80 5.90 
AveIndDirAgeFnd 
(Years) 
Mean 60.00 61.00 62.00 63.00 63.00 64.00 63.00 63.00 64.00 65.00 63.00 
Median 60.00 62.00 61.00 62.00 64.00 65.00 62.00 62.00 63.00 65.00 63.00 
 
121 
 
Panel E: Fund Characteristics 
 
Variables Statistics Year Total 1994 1996 1998 2000 2002 2004 2006 2008 2010 2012 
#Advisors Mean 1.00 1.10 1.20 1.10 1.10 1.30 1.40 1.60 2.00 2.10 1.50 Median 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 2.00 2.00 2.00 1.00 
#Services Mean 6.20 6.00 5.80 6.30 6.40 6.50 6.80 6.60 6.90 6.90 6.50 Median 5.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 6.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 7.00 
ShareReturn Mean -0.15 0.11 0.04 0.13 0.04 0.08 0.17 -0.32 0.12 0.15 0.09 Median -0.15 0.09 0.08 0.15 0.07 0.06 0.13 -0.30 0.09 0.14 0.09 
ReturnAlpha Mean -0.06 0.01 -0.01 0.14 0.03 -0.02 0.00 -0.03 -0.00 -0.00 0.00 Median -0.05 0.03 0.01 0.05 -0.01 -0.03 -0.00 -0.02 -0.01 -0.01 -0.01 
Premium Mean -0.11 -0.07 -0.03 -0.10 -0.04 -0.03 -0.01 -0.09 -0.02 -0.01 -0.04 Median -0.10 -0.07 -0.03 -0.09 -0.04 -0.04 -0.03 -0.11 -0.02 -0.01 -0.05 
ExpenseRatio Mean 0.85 1.20 1.20 1.30 1.40 1.20 1.20 1.30 1.30 1.30 1.28 Median 0.82 1.10 1.10 1.20 1.30 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.20 1.18 
FndSize($Bi) Mean 0.20 0.26 0.26 0.25 0.23 0.28 0.36 0.26 0.34 0.38 0.30 Median 0.13 0.15 0.15 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.22 0.16 0.21 0.26 0.18 
FamSize($Bi) Mean 2.70 4.60 5.30 6.10 6.40 9.70 12.10 13.40 14.10 15.30 10.33 Median 4.10 3.30 2.90 3.50 3.30 6.90 7.60 7.30 10.00 11.00 4.82 
FndTurnover Mean 41.00 40.00 38.00 35.00 38.00 38.00 38.00 42.00 42.00 45.00 40.63 Median 22.00 17.00 19.00 18.00 18.00 20.00 21.00 24.00 24.00 24.00 21.00 
AveIndDirAgeFnd Mean 3.20 6.60 8.70 10.00 12.00 11.00 11.00 11.00 13.00 14.00 11.33 Median 2.00 4.00 6.00 8.00 10.00 11.00 12.00 9.00 11.00 11.00 9.00 
DivYield Mean 5.90 6.00 5.50 6.60 5.80 5.90 5.30 7.30 5.60 5.50 5.90 Median 6.90 6.40 5.70 6.70 6.00 6.40 5.40 6.00 5.90 5.70 6.00 
Leverage Mean 22.60 19.30 17.80 19.10 22.50 26.10 26.50 27.50 24.30 23.10 23.50 Median 33.40 23.30 19.20 19.80 30.70 33.00 33.40 35.10 30.20 29.30 30.50 
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Table 2.2. Spearman Rank Correlations 
 
This table reports Spearman Rank Correlations for Margrt, EffAdvRt, EffAdvRt_Other, Premium, NAVPSReturn, %IndDirFnd, BdSize, 
UnexpCompIndDir, %IndDirOwn>50K, %DirFemaleFnd, AveIndDirAgeFnd and AveTenIndDirFnd that are defined in the appendix.  
 
Variable Margrt EffAdvRt 
EffAdvRt_ 
Other Premium 
NAVPS 
Return 
%IndDir 
Fnd 
#IndDir 
Fnd 
UnexpComp 
IndDir 
%IndDir 
Own>50K 
%Dir 
FemaleFnd 
AveTen 
IndDirFnd 
AveIndDir 
AgeFnd 
Margrt 1.00                       
EffAdvRt 0.41*** 1.00                     
EffAdvRt_Other 0.28*** 0.46*** 1.00                   
Premium -0.08*** -0.15*** -0.04*** 1.00                 
NAVPSReturn 0.14*** 0.12*** 0.07*** 0.21*** 1.00               
%IndDirFnd -0.04*** -0.15*** -0.04*** 0.04*** -0.05*** 1.00             
BdSize -0.20*** -0.35*** -0.27*** 0.00 -0.03*** 0.14*** 1.00           
UnexpCompIndDir 0.00 -0.11*** -0.08*** 0.07*** -0.01 -0.02 -0.06*** 1.00         
%IndDirOwn>50K 0.15*** 0.35*** 0.23*** -0.08*** 0.08*** -0.08*** -0.28*** 0.06*** 1.00       
%DirFemaleFnd -0.21*** -0.27*** -0.20*** 0.10*** -0.02 0.29*** 0.38*** -0.15*** -0.17*** 1.00     
AveTenIndDirFnd -0.08*** 0.10*** 0.07*** -0.04*** 0.01 0.06*** -0.01 -0.19*** 0.17*** -0.00 1.00   
AveIndDirAgeFnd -0.02* 0.01 0.00*** 0.07*** 0.04*** 0.11*** 0.08*** 0.17*** 0.03** -0.18*** 0.23*** 1.00 
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Table 2.3. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationship between current board 
characteristics and past CEF advisory rates 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of OLS panel regressions to examine the relationship between 
the values and changes in values of some regressors from equation (1) like board dependence, size and 
CEF size and past CEF advisory rates with their t-values in parentheses for the 2002-2013 and 1994-2013 
periods for all available individual U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs). In Panel A, the dependent variables are 
the current values of board independence (%IndDirFnd), board size (BdSize) and CEF size (FndSize). In 
panel B, the dependent variables are the one-year changes in board independence ( %IndDirFnd), board 
size ( BdSize) and CEF size ( FndSize). The independent variables are defined in the appendix. ***, ** 
and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Level dependent variable at time t 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables %IndDirFnd BdSize FndSize 
Sample Period 1994- 2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
Margrt t-2 
-0.0258** -0.0438*** 0.3529 -0.9102*** -0.2767*** -0.2836*** 
(-2.41) (-4.97) (1.49) (-3.79) (-5.63) (-4.52) 
%IndDirFndt-2 
  2.0864*** -3.4339*** -0.2465*** -0.5063*** 
  (7.03) (-11.72) (-4.73) (-8.58) 
BdSize t-2 
-0.0022*** -0.0013***   0.0107*** -0.0039 
(-2.97) (-2.75)   (3.93) (-1.62) 
UnexpCompIndDir t-2 
0.0493*** -0.0217*** 0.4126*** -1.1709*** -0.0152 -0.0611** 
(10.59) (-3.90) (4.31) (-8.22) (-0.85) (-2.12) 
%IndDirOwn>50K t-2 
 -0.0017  -0.3618**  0.2914*** 
 (-0.28)  (-2.29)  (9.10) 
%DirFemaleFnd t-2 
0.0811*** -0.0006 3.1874*** 1.5258*** 0.0977** 0.1533** 
(6.33) (-0.05) (12.19) (5.21) (2.03) (2.42) 
AveTenIndDirFnd t-2 
0.0009 -0.0003 -0.0896*** -0.1538*** 0.0018 0.0009 
(1.15) (-0.84) (-6.05) (-16.74) (0.62) (0.46) 
AveIndDirAgeFnd t-2 
0.0257 0.0912*** 2.1972*** 3.3062*** 0.0269 0.6987*** 
(0.95) (4.34) (3.97) (6.06) (0.27) (5.91) 
FndSize t-2 
-0.0028 -0.0092*** 0.1222* -0.0313   
(-0.98) (-4.83) (1.89) (-0.62)   
FamSize t-2 
0.0100*** 0.0106*** 0.1512*** 0.5400*** 0.0886*** 0.0674*** 
(5.75) (8.44) (3.87) (16.05) (10.29) (8.49) 
LnFndAge t-2 
0.0436*** 0.0074*** 1.0561*** 0.9163*** -0.1142*** -0.1760*** 
(11.98) (3.49) (14.17) (16.95) (-7.61) (-14.24) 
Constant 0.4354
*** 0.4219*** -10.2997*** -14.2267*** 17.1695*** 15.6254*** 
(3.58) (4.50) (-4.02) (-5.79) (39.21) (30.14) 
Observations 5,767 7,153 5,767 7,153 5,980 7,165 
R-squared 0.060 0.046 0.047 0.282 0.050 0.036 
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Panel B: Change of dependent variable from t-2 to t where t-2 is one year or two six-month periods earlier 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables    
Sample Period 1994- 2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
Margrt t-4 
0.0123** -0.0017 0.0182 -0.3423** -0.0126 0.0810*** 
(2.35) (-0.51) (0.18) (-2.44) (-0.66) (5.20) 
%IndDirFndt-4 
  -0.1647 1.1451*** 0.0403 -0.0906** 
  (-0.64) (3.84) (1.00) (-2.22) 
BdSize t-4 
0.0001 0.0005*   -0.0054*** 0.0032** 
(0.16) (1.80)   (-2.84) (2.24) 
UnexpCompIndDir t-4 
-0.0070** -0.0078* -0.1752*** 0.2512* 0.0279** 0.0245 
(-2.26) (-1.73) (-2.82) (1.68) (2.51) (1.15) 
%IndDirOwn>50K t-4 
 -0.0054  -0.1266  -0.0641*** 
 (-1.25)  (-0.80)  (-3.22) 
%DirFemaleFnd t-4 
0.0354*** -0.0225*** 0.6945*** -0.6741*** 0.0792** 0.1149*** 
(3.99) (-3.51) (3.92) (-2.77) (2.51) (3.70) 
AveTenIndDirFnd t-4 
0.0004 0.0001 0.0897*** 0.0249*** -0.0042** -0.0038*** 
(0.67) (0.49) (7.12) (2.71) (-2.03) (-3.17) 
AveIndDirAgeFnd t-4 
-0.0301 -0.0204* 0.2224 0.5292 0.0596 0.1841*** 
(-1.61) (-1.80) (0.58) (1.20) (0.92) (3.39) 
FndSize t-4 
0.0009 -0.0012* -0.0659** 0.0751**   
(0.68) (-1.65) (-2.41) (2.41)   
FamSize t-4 
0.0009 -0.0019*** 0.1261*** -0.0711*** 0.0032 -0.0065** 
(1.10) (-3.52) (7.41) (-3.28) (1.07) (-2.54) 
LnFndAge t-4 
0.0000 -0.0031*** -0.2024*** -0.2072*** 0.0300*** 0.0453*** 
(0.01) (-2.63) (-3.41) (-4.75) (3.11) (8.10) 
Constant 
0.0849 0.1609*** -2.2878 -2.3405 -0.3602 -0.7298*** 
(1.09) (3.36) (-1.44) (-1.25) (-1.36) (-3.26) 
Observations 4,630 6,826 4,630 6,826 4,948 6,934 
R-square 0.012 0.007 0.031 0.004 0.008 0.019 
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Table 2.4. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationship between CEF advisory rates with 
board characteristics 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of panel regressions to examine the relationship between CEF 
board characteristics and CEF advisory rates using OLS, fixed-effects and system-GMM estimators and 
their t-values in parentheses for the period of 2002-2013 and extended period of 1994-2013 for all 
available individual U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs). The dependent variable is Margrt or the advisory 
rates. The independent variables are defined in the appendix. Each t is a 6-month period. The year 
dummies are supressed for brevity. AR(1) and AR(2) are first-order and second-order, respectively, tests 
for no serial correlation in the first differenced standard errors. Hansen J-stat is the test of over-
identification under the null that all instruments are valid. The R-square values are also reported. The 
standard errors are clustered. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS Fixed-effect System-GMM 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
%IndDirFndt-1 
-0.0372 -0.0528** -0.0410 -0.0583** 0.0081 -0.0334** 
(-1.06) (-2.08) (-1.12) (-2.07) (0.34) (-1.98) 
BdSizet-1 
0.0002 0.0002 0.0004 0.0004 0.0005 -0.0010 
(0.09) (0.27) (0.14) (0.40) (0.65) (-0.92) 
UnexpCompIndDirt-1  
-0.0056 -0.0002 0.0022 -0.0011 -0.0109 -0.0038 
(-0.90) (-0.02) (0.35) (-0.10) (-1.54) (-0.55) 
%IndDirOwn>50Kt-1 
 -0.0211  -0.0224  -0.0063 
 (-1.28)  (-1.31)  (-0.57) 
%DirFemaleFndt-1 
-0.0503** 0.0058 -0.0479* -0.0014 -0.0094 -0.0144 
(-2.19) (0.25) (-1.73) (-0.05) (-0.64) (-0.59) 
AveTenIndDirFndt-1 
0.0001 0.0004 0.0011 0.0004 -0.0001 -0.0006 
(0.06) (0.35) (0.46) (0.36) (-0.08) (-0.98) 
AveIndDirAgeFndt-1 
-0.0411 -0.0156 -0.0852 -0.0358 0.0255 0.0179 
(-0.47) (-0.15) (-0.94) (-0.32) (1.04) (0.52) 
Start-1 
0.0018 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0006 0.0060 0.0024 
(0.39) (-0.25) (0.29) (-0.23) (0.67) (0.37) 
StarFamt-1 
0.0057** -0.0006 0.0062** -0.0004 0.0013 -0.0023 
(2.19) (-0.32) (2.23) (-0.22) (0.73) (-0.81) 
ReturnAlphat-1 
0.0013 0.0023 0.0030 0.0057 0.0029 0.0234** 
(0.32) (0.30) (0.01) (0.71) (0.36) (1.99) 
FixedIncome -0.2711
*** -0.2757*** -0.3032* -0.3275* 0.0109 -0.0417* 
(-3.76) (-12.05) (-1.84) (-1.92) (0.59) (-1.95) 
Foreign 0.0629
** 0.0161* 0.0183 -0.0043 0.0433** 0.0009 
(2.28) (1.82) (0.71) (-0.72) (2.15) (0.09) 
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Table 2.4. Cont’d 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LnFndSize -0.0666
*** -0.0264*** -0.0766*** -0.0326*** 0.0018 0.0011 
(-3.85) (-3.03) (-3.60) (-3.38) (0.40) (0.36) 
LnFamSize 0.0159
** -0.0019 0.0191** -0.0020 -0.0013 0.0030 
(2.22) (-0.35) (2.33) (-0.30) (-0.53) (1.49) 
TopFndMrktShr -0.0231 -0.0185 -0.0215 -0.0176 -0.0134 -0.0013 (-1.32) (-1.37) (-1.26) (-1.29) (-0.81) (-0.08) 
TopFamMrktShr 0.0457 0.0372
*** 0.0438 0.0372*** -0.0188 -0.0037 
(1.10) (3.89) (1.04) (3.58) (-0.91) (-0.50) 
LnFndAge -0.0187 -0.0187
*** -0.0592 -0.0217 -0.0039 0.0043 
(-1.03) (-2.90) (-1.59) (-1.43) (-0.62) (0.96) 
#Advisors 0.0212 0.0037
** 0.0205 0.0036** 0.0059 0.0030** 
(1.49) (2.43) (1.48) (2.32) (1.16) (2.53) 
#Services -0.0038
* 0.0017 -0.0041* 0.0015 -0.0010 0.0022* 
(-1.89) (1.04) (-1.85) (0.92) (-0.75) (1.71) 
OutSourced -0.0284
** 0.0038 0.0162 0.0059 -0.0086 0.0082 
(-2.04) (0.49) (1.21) (0.66) (-1.16) (1.14) 
HighLeverage -0.0024 -0.0007 -0.0042 -0.0005 0.0084
* -0.0014 
(-0.71) (-0.27) (-1.21) (-0.21) (1.81) (-0.36) 
HighDivYield 0.0010 -0.0017 -0.0005 -0.0020 0.0050 -0.0050 (0.56) (-0.80) (-0.25) (-0.95) (0.89) (-1.02) 
HighPremium -0.0002 -0.0014 0.0003 -0.0018 0.0067 -0.0015 (-0.07) (-0.55) (0.11) (-0.70) (1.60) (-0.58) 
LnFndTurnover 0.0035
** 0.0036*** 0.0026 0.0032*** 0.0018** 0.0013* 
(2.07) (3.29) (1.43) (2.90) (2.10) (1.86) 
Margrtt-1 
    0.6222*** 0.9004*** 
    (8.74) (9.59) 
Margrtt-2 
    0.3172*** 0.0188 
    (4.56) (0.17) 
Constant 2.0052
*** 1.5570*** 2.3940*** 1.5876*** -0.1006 -0.0634 
(4.55) (3.56) (4.39) (3.18) (-0.84) (-0.42) 
AR(1) test (p-value)     0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (p-value)     0.16 0.61 
Hansen J-stat (p-
value) 
    0.74 0.51 
Observations 4,549 5,347 4,549 5,347 4,613 5,185 
R-squared 0.096 0.129 0.127 0.061 0.931 0.912 
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Table 2.5. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationship between CEF advisory rates with 
board characteristics of a sub-sample with no change in board independence around 2004 SEC amendments 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of panel regressions to examine the relationship between CEF 
board characteristics and CEF advisory rates using OLS, fixed-effects and system-GMM estimators and 
their t-values in parentheses for the period of 2002-2013 and extended period of 1994-2013 for a sub-
sample of U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs) with no change in board independence around 2004 SEC 
amendments. The dependent variable is Margrt or the advisory rates. The independent variables are 
defined in the appendix. Each t is a 6-month period. The year dummies are supressed for brevity. AR(1) 
and AR(2) are first-order and second-order, respectively, tests for no serial correlation in the first 
differenced standard errors. Hansen J-stat is the test of over-identification under the null that all 
instruments are valid. The R-square values are also reported. The standard errors are clustered. ***, ** and 
* indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
OLS Fixed-effect System-GMM 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
%IndDirFndt-1 
-0.0564 -0.0789* -0.0552 -0.0934** 0.0045 -0.1299* 
(-1.52) (-1.87) (-1.34) (-2.14) (0.17) (-1.81) 
BdSizet-1 
-0.0033 0.0018 -0.0036 0.0016 0.0023* 0.0035 
(-1.31) (1.19) (-1.37) (0.92) (1.84) (0.99) 
UnexpCompIndDirt-1  
0.0024 0.0192 0.0101 0.0176 -0.0195 -0.0075 
(0.32) (1.07) (1.26) (1.08) (-1.59) (-0.36) 
%IndDirOwn>50Kt-1 
 -0.0246  -0.0270  0.0179 
 (-1.01)  (-1.11)  (0.56) 
%DirFemaleFndt-1 
-0.0901** 0.0289 -0.0787 0.0132 -0.0280 -0.1789** 
(-1.97) (0.80) (-1.51) (0.30) (-1.11) (-2.60) 
AveTenIndDirFndt-1 
0.0003 0.0007 0.0009 0.0007 0.0000 -0.0034* 
(0.13) (0.55) (0.37) (0.55) (0.01) (-1.95) 
AveIndDirAgeFndt-1 
-0.0550 0.1341 -0.0770 0.0950 0.0380 0.0495 
(-0.62) (1.22) (-0.84) (0.84) (0.94) (0.54) 
Start-1 
-0.0038 0.0066** -0.0032 0.0065** -0.0036 0.0228 
(-0.89) (2.03) (-0.69) (2.12) (-0.38) (0.91) 
StarFamt-1 
0.0058 -0.0020 0.0070* -0.0026 -0.0011 0.0132 
(1.64) (-0.82) (1.86) (-0.97) (-0.19) (1.15) 
ReturnAlphat-1 
0.0141 0.0071 0.0131 0.0090 -0.0080 -0.0589 
(0.95) (0.51) (0.81) (0.66) (-0.65) (-1.21) 
FixedIncome -0.2922
** -0.2606*** -0.3120 -0.2312 -0.0039 0.0469 
(-2.32) (-5.43) (-1.57) (-1.28) (-0.18) (1.50) 
Foreign 0.0413 -0.0012 -0.0070 -0.0226
* 0.0195 0.0264 
(1.22) (-0.07) (-0.44) (-1.86) (0.88) (1.17) 
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Table 2.5. Cont’d 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
LnFndSize -0.0576
** -0.0507*** -0.0641** -0.0529*** 0.0050 -0.0068 
(-2.31) (-3.71) (-2.20) (-3.40) (0.74) (-1.02) 
LnFamSize 0.0260
* 0.0007 0.0303* 0.0015 -0.0038 -0.0079 
(1.70) (0.11) (1.77) (0.20) (-0.87) (-1.02) 
TopFndMrktShr -0.0231 -0.0109 -0.0186 -0.0081 -0.0269 0.0674
** 
(-1.29) (-0.84) (-1.08) (-0.64) (-0.89) (2.17) 
TopFamMrktShr 0.0353 0.0287
* 0.0284 0.0271* -0.0162 -0.0231 
(1.63) (1.74) (1.42) (1.66) (-0.89) (-1.60) 
LnFndAge 0.0006 -0.0521
*** -0.0272 -0.1285** -0.0088 0.0156 
(0.03) (-2.71) (-0.64) (-2.33) (-0.90) (0.71) 
#Advisors 0.0032 0.0037
* 0.0157 0.0136* 0.0009 -0.0008 
(1.33) (1.79) (0.93) (1.72) (0.50) (-0.25) 
#Services 0.0168 0.0130 0.0027 0.0034 -0.0066 -0.0001 (0.96) (1.64) (0.90) (1.58) (-0.96) (-0.01) 
OutSourced -0.0374
* 0.0200 0.0084 0.0240 -0.0110 0.0244 
(-1.87) (1.40) (0.47) (1.63) (-0.98) (1.19) 
HighLeverage -0.0061
* 0.0028 -0.0069* 0.0022 0.0048 0.0098 
(-1.96) (0.62) (-1.96) (0.49) (0.97) (0.82) 
HighDivYield 0.0011 -0.0010 -0.0013 -0.0018 0.0002 0.0096 (0.34) (-0.34) (-0.39) (-0.61) (0.06) (0.94) 
HighPremium -0.0008 -0.0057 -0.0009 -0.0062 0.0112
* 0.0241** 
(-0.24) (-1.49) (-0.27) (-1.63) (1.70) (2.01) 
LnFndTurnover 0.0024 0.0046
** 0.0022 0.0045* 0.0011 0.0018 
(1.04) (1.99) (0.91) (1.96) (0.73) (0.65) 
Margrtt-1 
    0.6172*** 0.7039*** 
    (8.22) (5.14) 
Margrtt-2 
    0.3241*** 0.3257*** 
    (3.43) (2.83) 
Constant 1.7006
*** 1.4092*** 1.8655*** 1.6543*** -0.1425 0.1018 
(3.22) (2.71) (2.86) (2.65) (-0.80) (0.29) 
AR(1) test (p-value)     0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (p-value)     0.12 0.14 
Hansen J-stat (p-
value) 
    0.32 0.89 
Observations 2,238 2,131 2,238 2,131 2,218 2,080 
R-squared 0.270 0.265 0.174 0.094 0.82 0.91 
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Table 2.6. Summary statistics for the sample of closed-end funds and the characteristics of their 
boards  
This table reports summary statistics for fund advisory rate change ( ) and board characteristics 
for the 20 year period from 1994 through 2013. Panel A provides the number of positive (>0), negative 
(<0) and negative or positive (<0 or >0) advisory rate change within our sample period for all the years in 
our sample. Panel B reports the means and medians of the fund board characteristics that have positive, 
negative, positive or negative and no change in advisory rates. All variables are defined in appendix. 
Panel A: Number of advisory-rate changes 
 
Year 
T
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<0 6 4 9 11 12 9 17 28 9 20 13 48 18 6 9 13 15 20 18 15 300 
>0 3 4 6 4 7 5 5 7 7 5 8 2 9 7 9 9 4 3 6 14 124 
<0 or >0 9 8 15 15 19 14 22 35 16 25 21 50 27 13 18 22 19 23 24 29 424 
 
 
Panel B: Board characteristics for different categories of advisory rate change 
 
Variables 
 
Advisory rate 
increase 
(  >0) 
(N=124) 
 
Advisory rate 
decrease 
(  <0) 
(N=300) 
Advisory rate 
change 
(  <0 or 
>0) 
(N=424) 
No Change in 
Advisory rate 
(  =0) 
(N=14,548) 
 
 
Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
Margrt 0.90 0.90 0.66 0.63 0.73 0.69 0.70 0.65 
Margrt 0.24 0.20 -0.13 -0.10 -0.02 -0.05 0.00 0.00 
%IndDirFnd 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.80 0.83 0.80 0.80 
BdSize 8.60 8.00 8.50 8.00 8.50 8.00 8.50 8.00 
AveTenIndDirFnd 6.10 5.00 6.40 6.70 6.30 6.20 5.80 5.30 
AveIndDirAgeFnd 64 64 63 63 64 64 63 63 
%DirFemaleFnd 0.10 0.00 0.14 0.10 0.13 0.09 0.14 0.14 
AveIndDirCompFnd 10211 7000 8352 4127 8865 5258 9771 4182 
AveIndDirCompFam 41425 17900 62776 32845 56716 27500 112967 35298 
%IndDirOwn>50K 0.12 0.00 0.07 0.00 0.08 0.00 0.08 0.00 
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Table 2.7. Summary results for regression analysis of advisory rate changes and board characteristics 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of probit regressions for examining the effect of CEF board 
characteristics on the likelihood of advisory rate increase ( >0) and decrease (  <0). The 
dependent variables for advisory rate increase (decrease) is a dummy variable which equals one when the 
change in advisory rate is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. We use ordered logit regression to 
examine the effect of board characteristics on the likelihood of advisory rate changes (  <0 or >0). 
The dependent variable for ordered logit regression equals one (minus one) when the change in advisory 
rate is positive (negative) and zero when there is no change in advisory rate. We also use a time fixed-
effects specification to examine the magnitude of advisory-rate changes. The dependent variable is the 
advisory-rate change ( ). The independent variables are defined in the appendix. Each t is a 6-
month period. The year dummies are supressed for brevity. The R-square values are also reported. The 
standard errors are clustered. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Probit Probit Ordered Logit OLS 
 >0  <0  <0 or >0  
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
%IndDirFndt-1 
-0.2484 -0.0116 -0.1941 3.5392*** 0.6999 -4.4602*** -0.0084 -0.0141*** 
(-0.38) (-0.01) (-0.42) (4.37) (0.69) (-3.86) (-1.19) (-2.93) 
BdSizet-1 
-0.0115 0.0741*** -0.0192 0.0188 0.0399 0.0825** 0.0004** 0.0002 
(-0.45) (2.91) (-0.89) (0.85) (1.08) (2.56) (2.06) (1.08) 
UnexpCompIndDirt-1  
0.0015 -5.3766*** -0.1860 -6.0105*** 0.2231 5.9755*** -0.0000 0.0103*** 
(0.01) (-3.09) (-1.02) (-7.01) (1.33) (6.27) (-0.03) (2.79) 
%IndDirOwn>50Kt-1 
 0.6214**  0.2398  0.1983  0.0016 
 (1.98)  (0.85)  (0.36)  (0.75) 
%DirFemaleFndt-1 
-0.7327 -0.9081 -1.8903*** 0.3994 2.8130*** -1.7293* 0.0063* -0.0017 
(-1.30) (-1.46) (-3.68) (0.95) (4.27) (-1.91) (1.77) (-0.53) 
AveTenIndDirFndt-1 
-0.0178 -0.0871*** 0.0120 -0.0513*** -0.0412 -0.0177 0.0002 -0.0001 
(-0.61) (-3.95) (0.65) (-2.84) (-1.11) (-0.59) (0.70) (-0.52) 
AveIndDirAgeFndt-1 
0.7137 1.5307 -1.3199* -0.0227 2.8696* 1.6428 0.0124 0.0017 
(0.80) (1.32) (-1.73) (-0.02) (1.93) (0.92) (1.47) (0.22) 
Start-1 
0.3008 -0.2961 -0.0418 -0.0807 1.1837*** 0.0073 0.0050* -0.0011 
(1.16) (-0.78) (-0.21) (-0.36) (3.63) (0.02) (1.83) (-0.61) 
StarFamt-1 
-0.1068 0.0504 -0.3569*** 0.0059 0.6635*** -0.1579 0.0013 -0.0016 
(-0.61) (0.33) (-2.82) (0.05) (2.93) (-0.62) (1.12) (-1.64) 
ReturnAlphat-1 
-0.0403 -0.6416 0.0035 -0.1019 -0.0685 -0.0920 -0.0012 -0.0007 
(-0.31) (-1.27) (0.05) (-0.29) (-0.64) (-0.13) (-0.60) (-0.27) 
HighAdvRtt-1 
-0.3777*** -0.1806 0.3649*** 0.5639*** -0.9199*** -1.0455*** -0.0050*** -0.0030*** 
(-3.04) (-1.24) (3.39) (5.22) (-4.89) (-4.49) (-3.52) (-3.33) 
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Table 2.7. Cont’d 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LnFndSizet-2 
0.0064 0.1541 -0.0641 -0.0953 0.1140 0.2545** 0.0001 0.0004 
(0.07) (1.19) (-1.17) (-1.45) (1.20) (2.52) (0.20) (0.82) 
LnFamSizet-2 
-0.0335 -0.1304* 0.0725* 0.1106* -0.1735** -0.3178*** -0.0000 -0.0006 
(-0.64) (-1.83) (1.77) (1.84) (-2.41) (-3.78) (-0.02) (-0.92) 
TopFndMrktShrt-2 
0.0765 0.2541 0.2113 -0.1077 -0.2003 0.4793 -0.0010 0.0020 
(0.28) (0.75) (1.08) (-0.53) (-0.50) (0.82) (-0.32) (1.22) 
TopFamMrktShrt-2 
-0.0867 -0.5904 -0.6300** -0.9869*** 0.7671* 1.0162* 0.0038 0.0034** 
(-0.34) (-1.39) (-2.47) (-3.16) (1.71) (1.65) (0.80) (2.17) 
HighGrwthFndt-1 
-0.2002 -0.0686 0.0200 0.1951 -0.0785 -0.3625 0.0023 -0.0021* 
(-0.81) (-0.27) (0.12) (1.23) (-0.21) (-1.07) (0.88) (-1.71) 
HighGrwthFamt-1 
-0.0488  -0.0236 0.0589 0.0022 -0.3938 0.0004 -0.0024 
(-0.13)  (-0.11) (0.22) (0.00) (-0.99) (0.12) (-1.13) 
#Advisors 0.1264 0.0277 -0.5373
*** -0.2268 0.8005 0.2938*** 0.0111 -0.0003 
(0.37) (0.39) (-2.95) (-1.26) (1.30) (2.64) (0.99) (-0.51) 
#Service 0.1946
** -0.0045 0.0059 -0.0874 0.1093 0.1411 -0.0001 -0.0004 
(2.28) (-0.08) (0.07) (-1.53) (0.61) (1.39) (-0.16) (-0.47) 
FndTurnover -0.0002 0.0021 -0.0010 -0.0013 0.0021 0.0028
* 0.0000 0.0000 
(-0.20) (1.41) (-1.42) (-1.60) (1.27) (1.79) (1.22) (1.37) 
HighLeveraget-1 
-0.2875** -0.1686 0.0581 -0.0137 -0.2470 -0.0895 -0.0003 -0.0001 
(-2.13) (-1.33) (0.60) (-0.13) (-1.46) (-0.47) (-0.21) (-0.21) 
HighDivYieldt-1 
0.2573 0.1146 0.0016 0.0166 0.0904 0.1731 0.0006 0.0008 
(1.59) (0.74) (0.02) (0.17) (0.58) (0.94) (0.81) (1.11) 
HighPremiumt-1 
0.0701 0.2143 -0.1347 -0.1469 0.3049* 0.3281* 0.0023* 0.0022** 
(0.51) (1.25) (-1.46) (-1.38) (1.86) (1.66) (1.68) (2.29) 
Acquirer 0.4097 -0.1210 0.4505
*** 0.2201 -0.8568* -0.0095 -0.0070* 0.0031 
(1.15) (-0.40) (2.58) (0.92) (-1.71) (-0.02) (-1.80) (1.12) 
Target   0.4950  -0.9238 0.2849 -0.0095 0.0003   (1.03)  (-0.91) (0.75) (-0.93) (0.25) 
FixedIncome -0.4937
** -0.1302 -0.2195 -0.4817*** -0.0318 0.5572 0.0017 0.0036** 
(-2.04) (-0.66) (-1.40) (-2.91) (-0.10) (1.44) (0.60) (2.51) 
Constant -3.8848 -8.4497
* 3.8777 -5.6315 -7.4685 3.9904 0.0372 0.0101 
(-1.04) (-1.66) (1.33) (-1.10) (-1.29) (0.52) (0.72) (0.36) 
Unconditional 
probability 
1.4% 1.5% 2.9% 3.0% 4.0% 4.2%   
(61/4, 
218) 
(63/4, 
019) 
(138/4, 
651) 
(162/5, 
327) 
(199/4, 
861) 
(225/5, 
342) 
  
Observations 4,218 4,019 4,651 5,327 4,861 5,342 4,861 5,342 
R-square 0.147 0.173 0.161 0.218 0.109 0.141 0.012 0.021 
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Table 2.8. Summary results for regression analysis of advisory rate changes and board characteristics for a 
sub-sample with no change in board independence around 2004 SEC amendments 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of probit regressions for examining the effect of CEF board 
characteristics on the likelihood of advisory rate increase ( >0) and decrease (  <0) for a 
sub-sample with no change in board independence around 2004 SEC amendments. The dependent 
variables for advisory rate increase (decrease) is a dummy variable which equals one when the change in 
advisory rate is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. We use ordered logit regression to examine the 
effect of board characteristics on the likelihood of advisory rate changes (  <0 or >0). The 
dependent variable for ordered logit regression equals one (minus one) when the change in advisory rate 
is positive (negative) and zero when there is no change in advisory rate. We also use a time fixed-effects 
specification to examine the magnitude of advisory-rate changes. The dependent variable is the advisory-
rate change ( ). The independent variables are defined in the appendix. Each t is a 6-month 
period. The year dummies are supressed for brevity. The R-square values are also reported. The standard 
errors are clustered. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, 
respectively. 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Probit Probit Ordered Logit OLS 
 >0  <0  <0 or >0  
1994-
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994-
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
%IndDirFndt-1 
-3.4062** 0.2529 -0.0622 2.8896** -2.1470 -3.2064* -0.0166 -0.0117 
(-2.44) (0.19) (-0.06) (2.36) (-0.82) (-1.68) (-1.63) (-1.56) 
BdSizet-1 
-0.0410 0.1546*** -0.1080** 0.0993** 0.1499** 0.0334 0.0008*** 0.0005 
(-1.04) (3.06) (-2.03) (2.32) (2.20) (0.63) (3.06) (0.97) 
UnexpCompIndDirt-1  
0.0190 -11.9974*** -0.3766 -1.4828 0.1865 0.1437 -0.0002 -0.0036 
(0.10) (-3.89) (-1.02) (-0.91) (0.67) (0.10) (-0.19) (-0.69) 
%IndDirOwn>50Kt-1 
 1.7779***  -0.1718  0.9099  0.0024 
 (3.97)  (-0.45)  (1.30)  (0.86) 
%DirFemaleFndt-1 
-1.0339 -1.2254 -3.4562*** -1.7419 3.6020*** 0.7119 0.0091 0.0032 
(-1.06) (-1.53) (-4.03) (-1.55) (3.20) (0.53) (1.60) (0.46) 
AveTenIndDirFndt-1 
0.0269 -0.1968*** 0.0245 -0.0671** 0.0115 -0.0302 0.0006* -0.0004 
(0.85) (-4.53) (0.93) (-2.53) (0.16) (-0.71) (1.74) (-1.18) 
AveIndDirAgeFndt-1 
0.6026 5.1194** -1.9027** -0.1729 4.2472* 4.0394 0.0070 0.0217 
(0.49) (2.16) (-2.00) (-0.10) (1.89) (1.06) (0.74) (1.22) 
start-1 
0.3299   -0.0541 1.1097 -0.1502 0.0020 0.0100 
(0.78)   (-0.14) (1.48) (-0.33) (1.35) (0.97) 
StarFamt-1 
-0.0150 -0.1482 0.3127 -0.1268 -0.3201 0.0556 0.0010 -0.0020 
(-0.05) (-0.51) (1.13) (-0.68) (-0.58) (0.12) (0.52) (-1.01) 
ReturnAlphat-1 
0.3196 -0.8044 0.3638* -0.3834 -0.5346 0.1912 -0.0109 0.0004 
(1.03) (-0.86) (1.84) (-0.73) (-1.45) (0.18) (-1.12) (0.06) 
HighAdvRtt-1 
-0.7190*** -0.7073*** 0.0350 0.1493 -0.8221* -0.5795 -0.0044*** -0.0043* 
(-3.03) (-3.09) (0.16) (0.69) (-1.92) (-1.54) (-2.74) (-1.80) 
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Table 2.8. Cont’d 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LnFndSizet-2 
0.0953 -0.2377** 0.2071* 0.0382 -0.1277 -0.1563 -0.0003 -0.0006 
(0.77) (-2.21) (1.84) (0.33) (-0.72) (-1.22) (-0.36) (-1.37) 
LnFamSizet-2 
-0.0004 0.0819 -0.0556 -0.0402 0.0826 -0.0847 0.0007 -0.0008 
(-0.01) (0.99) (-0.72) (-0.46) (0.64) (-0.84) (1.07) (-0.64) 
TopFndMrktShrt-2 
0.2596 -0.0136 0.2040 0.0631 -0.3151 0.2685 -0.0053 0.0025 
(0.57) (-0.04) (0.68) (0.24) (-0.41) (0.55) (-1.46) (1.14) 
TopFamMrktShrt-2 
-0.3059 -0.3958 -0.6943* -0.7567 0.5262 0.7935* -0.0004 0.0028 
(-0.84) (-0.99) (-1.81) (-1.62) (0.56) (1.75) (-0.08) (1.44) 
HighGrwthFndt-1 
-0.5206 0.0218 -0.1308 0.4355** -0.1501 -0.7525 0.0012 -0.0034* 
(-1.30) (0.07) (-0.47) (2.18) (-0.25) (-1.51) (0.36) (-1.66) 
HighGrwthFamt-1 
  0.3786 0.9077** -0.6265 -1.8790*** -0.0007 -0.0092 
  (0.76) (2.77) (-0.81) (-2.82) (-0.21) (-1.58) 
#Advisors 0.0670 -0.0802 -0.2385
** -0.3024** 0.8904 0.3771 0.0116 0.0013 
(0.15) (-0.39) (-2.13) (-2.13) (0.79) (0.74) (0.70) (0.64) 
#Service 0.1055 0.2109 0.1660 -0.0970 -0.2164 0.1504 -0.0008 -0.0017 (1.26) (1.47) (1.37) (-0.81) (-0.90) (0.57) (-0.68) (-0.63) 
FndTurnover -0.0010 0.0084
*** -0.0006 -0.0028* 0.0008 0.0046* 0.0000 0.0000 
(-0.97) (3.29) (-0.49) (-1.77) (0.20) (1.90) (0.66) (0.78) 
HighLeveraget-1 
0.1364 -0.3217 0.0628 -0.0939 0.0354 -0.0075 0.0007 -0.0001 
(0.65) (-1.47) (0.39) (-0.57) (0.13) (-0.03) (0.51) (-0.05) 
HighDivYieldt-1 
0.2829 0.2725 -0.2013 0.0209 0.4787 0.0770 0.0023* 0.0008 
(1.32) (1.06) (-1.16) (0.11) (1.30) (0.26) (1.73) (0.65) 
HighPremiumt-1 
0.1353 0.1136 -0.0490 -0.0710 0.1357 0.2155 0.0023 0.0020 
(0.67) (0.54) (-0.24) (-0.47) (0.38) (0.80) (0.90) (1.33) 
Acquirer 0.5228  0.3878  -0.4396 0.4917 -0.0083 0.0020 (1.46)  (1.14)  (-0.28) (1.46) (-1.13) (1.36) 
Target      0.2636  0.0038      (0.37)  (0.96) 
FixedIncome -0.2522 -0.4689 -0.2836 -0.7259
** 0.2161 0.8861** -0.0025 0.0034 
(-0.75) (-1.59) (-1.06) (-2.14) (0.33) (2.04) (-0.68) (1.37) 
Constant -3.7471 -20.6369
** 3.9300 -3.0283 -12.1437 -4.0241 -0.0389 -0.0542 
(-0.73) (-1.99) (1.08) (-0.37) (-1.42) (-0.24) (-0.93) (-0.79) 
Unconditional 
probability 
1.5% 1.8% 2.3% 2.4% 4.3% 4.5%   
(22/1, 
461) 
(22/1, 
168) 
(38/1, 
642) 
(35/1, 
418) 
(100/2, 
321) 
(97/2, 
133) 
  
Observations 1,461 1,168 1,642 1,418 2,321 2,133 2,321 2,133 
R-square 0.212 0.312 0.222 0.185 0.077 0.132 0.020 0.025 
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Table 2.9. Summary results for regression analysis of the change in board characteristics and advisory rate 
changes  
This table reports the coefficient estimates of probit regressions for examining the effect of the change in 
CEF board characteristics on the likelihood of advisory-rate increase (  >0) and decrease 
(  <0). The dependent variables for advisory rate increase (decrease) is a dummy variable which 
equals one when the change in advisory rate is positive (negative) and zero otherwise. We use an ordered 
logit regression to examine the effect of the change in board characteristics on the likelihood of advisory 
rate changes (  <0 or >0). The dependent variable for ordered logit regression is equals one (minus 
one) when the change in advisory rate is positive (negative) and zero when there is no change in the 
advisory rate. We also use an OLS specification to examine the magnitude of the effect of the change in 
board characteristics on advisory-rate changes. The dependent variable is the advisory-rate change 
( ). The independent variables are defined in the appendix. Each t is a 6-month period. The year 
dummies are supressed for brevity. The R-square values are also reported. The standard errors are 
clustered. ***, ** and * indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variables 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
Probit Probit Ordered-Logit OLS 
 >0  <0  <0 or >0  
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
1994- 
2004 
2005- 
2013 
%IndDirFnd  
-0.9422** 2.1240*** -0.6550 2.3289*** 0.9319 -2.7355*** -0.0047 -0.0045 
(-2.16) (3.51) (-1.16) (4.16) (0.93) (-2.63) (-0.49) (-0.65) 
BdSize  
0.0057 0.0720 -0.0750** -0.0502** 0.1491** 0.1174*** 0.0006* 0.0004 
(0.11) (1.59) (-2.45) (-2.03) (2.40) (3.10) (1.76) (1.47) 
UnexpCompIndDir -0.2594 0.1767 -0.2182 -0.2654 0.1337 0.6124
* 0.0035 0.0015 
(-0.77) (0.27) (-0.94) (-0.90) (0.54) (1.67) (1.63) (1.10) 
%IndDirOwn>50K  -0.0575  -0.5034  0.4554  -0.0064  (-0.18)  (-1.58)  (0.56)  (-0.62) 
%DirFemaleFnd  
0.6258 0.3635 0.7254 0.6203 -0.8412 -1.4933 -0.0038 0.0071 
(0.84) (0.40) (1.47) (1.17) (-0.71) (-1.56) (-0.82) (1.07) 
AveTenIndDirFnd -0.0058 -0.0413
* -0.0631** -0.0679*** 0.1007 0.0755* 0.0007* -0.0004 
(-0.11) (-1.75) (-1.97) (-2.80) (1.57) (1.66) (1.80) (-0.92) 
AveIndDirAgeFnd -0.1893 3.2354
** 0.0357 2.1515 0.2182 -1.2674 -0.0083 0.0213 
(-0.15) (2.18) (0.03) (1.37) (0.09) (-0.38) (-0.51) (1.08) 
start-1 
0.1125 -0.1832 -0.1735 -0.2461 1.0782*** 0.3035 0.0027*** 0.0010 
(0.35) (-0.53) (-1.31) (-1.09) (2.97) (0.86) (3.43) (1.54) 
StarFamt-1 
-0.0186 0.0163 -0.3640** -0.0519 0.6470** 0.0048 0.0018 -0.0008 
(-0.11) (0.11) (-2.45) (-0.39) (2.41) (0.02) (1.60) (-0.90) 
ReturnAlphat-1 
0.0428 -0.7800 0.0205 -0.0658 -0.0132 -0.1753 -0.0011 -0.0009 
(0.91) (-1.46) (0.33) (-0.18) (-0.07) (-0.26) (-0.59) (-0.30) 
HighAdvRtt-1 
-0.4271*** -0.1132 0.4486*** 0.5162*** -1.1348*** -0.9290*** -0.0053*** -0.0020*** 
(-2.74) (-0.74) (3.28) (4.96) (-4.27) (-4.19) (-4.08) (-3.23) 
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Table 2.9. Cont’d 
LnFndSizet-2 
0.0746 0.1905 -0.1040* -0.0881 0.2106** 0.2385** 0.0006 0.0001 
(0.74) (1.44) (-1.79) (-1.30) (2.01) (2.19) (1.03) (0.40) 
LnFamSizet-2 
-0.1141** -0.1505* 0.0429 0.1252** -0.1204 -0.2707** 0.0001 -0.0007 
(-2.13) (-1.83) (1.03) (2.27) (-1.47) (-2.78) (0.26) (-1.00) 
TopFndMrktShrt-2 
-0.1372 0.2588 -0.3468 0.0156 0.5119 0.3975 0.0045 0.0022 
(-0.47) (0.75) (-1.18) (0.08) (1.13) (0.65) (1.39) (1.37) 
TopFamMrktShrt-2 
0.1352 -0.3581 -0.5544* -0.4676 0.7505 0.5441 -0.0003 0.0029 
(0.50) (-0.85) (-1.87) (-1.61) (1.52) (1.01) (-0.07) (1.46) 
HighGrwthFndt-1 
-0.1652 -0.0306 0.0589 0.1607 -0.0790 -0.3416 0.0009 -0.0017 
(-0.58) (-0.12) (0.27) (1.06) (-0.19) (-1.01) (0.35) (-1.37) 
HighGrwthFamt-1 
0.1035   0.1696 1.0771** -0.5247 0.0065* -0.0030 
(0.26)   (0.60) (2.23) (-1.13) (1.77) (-1.26) 
#Advisors 0.0911 0.0607 -0.5248
*** -0.3343* 0.5672 0.2509** 0.0101 -0.0004 
(0.25) (0.93) (-2.70) (-1.95) (0.76) (2.36) (0.76) (-0.59) 
#Service 0.1540 -0.0089 -0.1547
* -0.0537 0.3499** 0.1004 0.0012* -0.0003 
(1.56) (-0.15) (-1.66) (-0.94) (2.30) (1.01) (1.87) (-0.40) 
FndTurnover -0.0000 0.0018 -0.0009 -0.0011 0.0019 0.0029
** 0.0000 0.0000 
(-0.01) (1.44) (-0.98) (-1.62) (0.91) (2.10) (0.94) (1.56) 
HighLeveraget-1 
-0.2641* -0.1064 0.1569 -0.0585 -0.4427** -0.0180 -0.0002 0.0006 
(-1.78) (-0.82) (1.52) (-0.60) (-2.24) (-0.10) (-0.17) (0.93) 
HighDivYieldt-1 
0.2893* 0.2103 -0.0666 0.0354 0.2414 0.1232 0.0005 0.0004 
(1.84) (1.18) (-0.57) (0.39) (1.31) (0.61) (0.76) (0.53) 
HighPremiumt-1 
0.0652 0.1629 -0.2095* -0.1256 0.4975** 0.3304 0.0018 0.0020** 
(0.43) (0.82) (-1.85) (-1.21) (2.22) (1.60) (1.07) (2.03) 
Acquirer 0.4560  0.5530
** 0.2460 -1.0909* -0.6376 -0.0095** -0.0005 
(1.33)  (2.50) (1.14) (-1.71) (-1.64) (-2.07) (-0.37) 
Target   0.6922  -1.4380 0.1608 -0.0113 0.0004   (1.29)  (-1.36) (0.45) (-0.92) (0.32) 
FixedIncome -0.3984 -0.0312 -0.3277
** -0.1750 0.1353 0.2212 0.0006 0.0024* 
(-1.61) (-0.15) (-2.02) (-0.89) (0.34) (0.64) (0.16) (1.67) 
Constant -1.0491 -2.6474 -0.5877 -3.4652
** 2.3400 6.7000*** 0.0371 0.0144 
(-0.60) (-1.24) (-0.51) (-2.28) (1.11) (2.82) (1.31) (1.03) 
Unconditional 
probability 
0.9% 
(31/3, 
237) 
1.3% 
(49/3, 
698) 
2.5% 
(81/3, 
170) 
2.8% 
(141/5, 
028) 
6.1% 
(220/3, 
581) 
4.8% 
(245/5, 
043) 
  
Observations 3,237 3,698 3,170 5,028 3,581 5,043 3,581 5,043 
R-square 0.143 0.109 0.166 0.158 0.118 0.117 0.016 0.014 
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Table 3.1. Summary statistics for the sample of closed-end funds and the characteristics of their 
boards  
This table reports summary statistics for fund and board characteristics for the 20 year period from 1994 
through 2013. Panel A provides the number of funds having each investment objective for a cross-section 
every 5 years. Panel B reports the means and medians of the individual fund characteristics that are 
defined in the appendix. Panel C provides the means and medians of the board characteristics that are 
defined in the appendix.  
Panel A: Number of CEFs 
Fund Objective year 1995 year 1998 year 2003 year 2008 year 2013 
Equity 5 24 24 57 45 
International Equity 20 65 46 62 64 
Bond 43 113 103 137 148 
Municipal Bond 117 183 249 255 201 
Allocation 5 15 18 43 44 
Specialty 1 10 19 52 57 
Total 191 410 459 606 559 
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Panel B: Fund Characteristics 
Variables year 1995 year 1998 year 2003 year 2008 year 2013 Total Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
ShareReturn 0.195 0.215 0.044 0.084 0.244 0.132 -0.325 -0.301 0.015 -0.036 0.093 0.092 
ReturnAlpha -0.026 -0.008 -0.009 0.018 0.010 -0.034 -0.036 -0.029 -0.062 -0.064 0.000 -0.017 
NAVPSReturn 0.184 0.194 0.029 0.056 0.189 0.090 -0.300 -0.272 0.054 0.008 0.079 0.070 
Premium -0.072 -0.080 -0.030 -0.034 -0.021 -0.034 -0.077 -0.093 -0.046 -0.058 -0.043 -0.053 
FndSize ($bi) 0.257 0.163 0.261 0.155 0.245 0.151 0.255 0.159 0.404 0.263 0.304 0.180 
FamSize ($bi) 4.447 3.941 5.294 2.916 8.126 4.266 11.986 7.325 14.872 11.955 10.336 4.826 
ExpenseRatio 1.165 0.970 1.235 1.050 1.322 1.210 1.344 1.200 1.278 1.190 1.282 1.180 
FndAge 5.105 4.000 8.710 6.000 11.205 11.000 11.195 9.000 14.750 11.000 11.330 9.000 
FndTurnover 40.914 18.000 37.607 19.000 40.430 19.000 41.701 24.000 46.203 23.500 40.635 21.000 
 
Panel C: Boards Characteristics 
 
Variables year 1995 year 1998 year 2003 year 2008 year 2013 Total Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median Mean Median 
#IndDirFnd 8.08 8.00 8.07 8.00 8.63 8.00 9.08 9.00 9.00 10.00 8.70 8.00 
%IndDirFnd 0.73 0.73 0.74 0.75 0.79 0.80 0.85 0.86 0.84 0.86 0.80 0.82 
AveTenIndDirFnd 3.37 2.80 5.23 4.75 6.81 7.33 5.79 6.00 8.22 8.11 6.30 6.00 
AveIndDirAgeFnd 60.96 62.17 61.90 61.43 63.63 63.67 62.70 62.18 65.76 66.22 63.37 63.50 
DirFemaleFnd 0.10 0.00 0.10 0.00 0.15 0.14 0.17 0.18 0.21 0.22 0.16 0.18 
AveIndDirCompFnd 4,459 3,765 11,958 4,500 7,447 2,673 8,105 2,750 9,798 3,937 8,735 3,600 
AveIndDirCompFam 31,607 21,600 123,226 23,233 102,582 21,933 95,513 68,933 94,447 85,509 96,312 39,600 
%IndDirOwn>50K NA NA NA NA 0.080 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.109 0.000 0.087 0.000 
%IndDirOwn_1 NA NA NA NA 0.671 0.833 0.696 0.889 0.637 0.750 0.673 0.833 
%IndDirOwn_2 NA NA NA NA 0.163 0.000 0.108 0.000 0.113 0.000 0.126 0.000 
%IndDirOwn_3 NA NA NA NA 0.083 0.000 0.101 0.000 0.133 0.000 0.105 0.000 
%IndDirOwn_4 NA NA NA NA 0.028 0.000 0.032 0.000 0.045 0.000 0.034 0.000 
%IndDirOwn_5 NA NA NA NA 0.055 0.000 0.063 0.000 0.073 0.000 0.062 0.000 
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Table 3.2. Spearman Rank Correlations 
 
This table reports Spearman Rank Correlations for ExpenseRatio, ShareReturn, ReturnAlpha, Premium, %IndDirFnd, #IndDirFnd, 
UnexpCompIndDir, AveTenIndDirFnd, and %DirFemaleFnd that are defined in the appendix. For equity, international equity, and specialty funds, 
ReturnAlpha is the annualized intercept from regressing monthly share excess returns of each fund over the Carhart four-factors and a liquidity 
factor. For bond and municipal bond funds, it is the annualized intercept from regressing monthly excess returns of each fund over 7 Barclays 
bond indices (Barclays Aggregate Bond Index, Barclays U.S. Treasury Long, Barclays U.S. Treasury Intermediate, Barclays U.S. Mortgage 
Backed Securities, Barclays U.S. Corp Investment Grade, Barclays Municipal Bond and Barclays U.S. Corp High Yield Bond). a, b and c indicate 
statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Variables ExpenseRatio ShareReturn ReturnAlpha Premium %IndDirFnd #IndDirFnd 
UnexpComp 
IndDir 
AveTen 
IndDirFnd %DirFemaleFnd 
ExpenseRatio 1.00         
ShareReturn 0.06 a 1.00        
ReturnAlpha -0.04 a 0.45 a 1.00       
Premium -0.05 a 0.00 -0.01 1.00      
%IndDirFnd -0.15 a -0.07 a -0.13 a 0.06 a 1.00     
#IndDirFnd -0.13 a -0.03 a -0.08 a -0.01 0.19 a 1.00    
UnexpComp 
IndDir 0.08 a 0.01 -0.04 a -0.03 a 0.07 a 0.05 1.00   
AveTen 
IndDirFnd -0.01 0.00 -0.04 a -0.03 a 0.21 a -0.00 a -0.06 a 1.00  
%DirFemaleFnd -0.19 a -0.03 a -0.08 a 0.15 a 0.34 a 0.33 a -0.14 a 0.06 a 1.00 
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Table 3.3. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationship between current board 
characteristics and past CEF characteristics 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of OLS panel regressions to examine the relationship between the 
values and changes in values of some regressors from equation (2) like board independence, size and CEF size 
and past CEF characteristics with their t-values in parentheses for the 2002-2013 and 1994-2013 periods for all 
available individual U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs). In Panel A, the dependent variables are the current values 
of board independence (%IndDirFnd), board size (#IndDirFnd) and CEF size (FndSize). In panel B, the 
dependent variables are the one-year changes in board independence ( %IndDirFnd), board size 
( #IndDirFnd) and CEF size ( FndSize). The independent variables are defined in the appendix. a, b and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
Panel A: Level dependent variable at time t 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables %IndDirFnd #IndDirFnd FndSize 
Sample Period 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 
ReturnAlphat-1 
-0.0053 -0.0024 0.3197 c 0.2910 c 0.0399 b 0.0277 c 
(-0.64) (-0.32) (1.68) (1.74) (2.46) (1.84) 
ExpenseRatiot-1 
-0.0183 a -0.0116 a -0.2582 a -0.0763 -0.0215 a -0.0348 a 
(-5.64) (-3.60) (-3.14) (-1.03) (-3.07) (-4.91) 
Premiumt-1 
-0.0207 -0.0126 -0.0493 -0.4198 0.1082 a 0.0964 a 
(-1.61) (-1.03) (-0.16) (-1.56) (4.29) (4.00) 
MedIndDirCompFndt-1 
-0.3914 a 0.0429 -28.2142 a -9.0533 a 1.1765 a 0.6071 a 
(-3.06) (0.56) (-8.98) (-5.41) (4.61) (4.02) 
%IndDirFndt-1 
  -2.3694 a -1.1324 a -0.0911 a -0.0971 a 
  (-5.92) (-3.37) (-2.80) (-3.15) 
#IndDirFndt-1 
-0.0020 a -0.0000   0.0010 0.0007 
(-3.20) (-0.07)   (0.71) (0.53) 
%DirFemaleFndt-1 
0.0638 a 0.0218 c 2.0894 a 1.5066 a 0.0007 -0.0311 
(4.81) (1.89) (6.24) (5.76) (0.03) (-1.27) 
AveTenIndDirFndt-1 
0.0004 0.0015 a -0.1420 a -0.1547 a 0.0023 b 0.0034 a 
(0.83) (3.01) (-12.08) (-14.51) (2.22) (3.22) 
#BoardMtngFndt-1 
0.0023 a 0.0026 a 0.0221 a 0.0341 a -0.0017 a -0.0025 a 
(6.89) (7.59) (2.73) (4.51) (-2.70) (-3.69) 
%IndDirOwn>50Kt-1 
-0.0080  -0.2249  0.0487 b  
(-0.87)  (-0.97)  (2.51)  
LnFndAget-1 
0.0204 a 0.0461 a 1.0785 a 1.2767 a 0.0335 a 0.0295 a 
(5.85) (14.26) (12.14) (16.48) (3.65) (3.49) 
FndSizet-1 
-0.0015 -0.0055 0.2547 0.2251   
(-0.25) (-1.00) (1.63) (1.61)   
FamSizet-1 
0.0004 b 0.0009 a 0.0658 a 0.0850 a -0.0001 0.0005 
(2.13) (5.07) (13.95) (19.69) (-0.25) (1.10) 
LnFndTurnovert-1 
-0.0003 0.0007 0.0106 -0.0017 0.0007 0.0030 c 
(-0.31) (0.73) (0.48) (-0.09) (0.38) (1.70) 
DivYieldt-1 
-0.0009 c -0.0008 -0.0146 -0.0030 0.0034 a 0.0024 b 
(-1.74) (-1.58) (-1.16) (-0.27) (3.21) (2.35) 
Leveraget-1 
0.0002 c 0.0005 a 0.0078 b 0.0063 b -0.0017 a -0.0010 a 
(1.66) (3.81) (2.13) (2.08) (-4.66) (-3.18) 
Constant 0.8034
 a 0.6917 a 8.2921 a 6.2064 a 0.3414 a 0.3602 a 
(74.48) (72.53) (21.24) (20.74) (10.02) (12.11) 
Observations 3,939 4,643 3,939 4,643 3,879 4,571 
R-squared 0.038 0.166 0.210 0.296 0.050 0.036 
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Panel B: Change of dependent variable from t-1 to t 
Column (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
Dependent variables    
Sample Period 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 
ReturnAlphat-2 
-0.0148 c -0.0171 b 0.4469 c 0.3061 c -0.0102 -0.0250 b 
(-1.90) (-2.50) (1.92) (1.66) (-0.68) (-2.03) 
ExpenseRatiot-2 
-0.0019 -0.0032 c -0.1302 b -0.1154 b 0.0075 c 0.0062 c 
(-0.93) (-1.72) (-2.15) (-2.29) (1.91) (1.83) 
Premiumt-2 
-0.0055 0.0102 0.1825 -0.1020 -0.0180 0.0089 
(-0.56) (1.10) (0.62) (-0.41) (-0.95) (0.53) 
MedIndDirCompFndt-2 
-0.1002 -0.0914 c 0.3669 -1.7761 0.0918 0.0833 
(-1.04) (-1.74) (0.13) (-1.25) (0.49) (0.89) 
%IndDirFndt-2 
-0.1258 a -0.1473 a 0.5147 0.4610 -0.0036 0.0154 
(-10.65) (-13.96) (1.46) (1.62) (-0.16) (0.81) 
#IndDirFndt-2 
-0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0792 a -0.0784 a 0.0012 0.0006 
(-0.51) (-0.25) (-6.33) (-7.38) (1.48) (0.77) 
%DirFemaleFndt-2 
0.0083 0.0209 a 0.4769 c 0.3980 b 0.0101 0.0076 
(0.95) (2.82) (1.83) (1.99) (0.60) (0.57) 
AveTenIndDirFndt-2 
0.0007 b 0.0006 c 0.0171 c 0.0178 b 0.0004 0.0006 
(2.18) (1.67) (1.69) (1.98) (0.54) (1.05) 
#BoardMtngFndt-2 
-0.0000 0.0001 0.0006 0.0039 0.0009 c 0.0008 
(-0.09) (0.45) (0.07) (0.53) (1.74) (1.63) 
%IndDirOwn>50Kt-2 
-0.0022  -0.2701  0.0178  
(-0.38)  (-1.54)  (1.58)  
LnFndAget-2 
-0.0030 -0.0023 -0.0571 -0.0779 -0.0060 -0.0052 
(-1.56) (-1.22) (-1.00) (-1.53) (-1.64) (-1.52) 
FndSizet-2 
0.0006 0.0026 0.0174 0.0431 0.0015 -0.0167 a 
(0.23) (1.09) (0.22) (0.67) (0.29) (-3.92) 
FamSizet-2 
0.0000 0.0001 0.0022 0.0018 0.0000 0.0000 
(0.44) (0.83) (0.77) (0.68) (0.13) (0.11) 
LnFndTurnovert-2 
-0.0007 -0.0011 0.0044 0.0061 0.0006 -0.0001 
(-0.93) (-1.58) (0.21) (0.33) (0.42) (-0.11) 
DivYieldt-2 
0.0003 0.0001 -0.0069 0.0025 -0.0005 -0.0007 
(0.99) (0.32) (-0.72) (0.30) (-0.88) (-1.24) 
Leveraget-2 
-0.0000 -0.0000 0.0039 c 0.0028 -0.0000 0.0000 
(-0.45) (-0.76) (1.82) (1.60) (-0.24) (0.16) 
Constant 0.1149
 a 0.1319 a 0.3777 0.3712 -0.0087 -0.0120 
(10.11) (13.98) (1.11) (1.46) (-0.40) (-0.71) 
Observations 3,412 4,102 3,412 4,102 3,319 3,993 
R-squared 0.055 0.067 0.018 0.021 0.001 0.020 
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Table 3.4. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationships between CEF expense ratios with various board characteristics 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of panel regressions to examine the relationship between CEF board characteristics and CEF expense 
ratios using OLS, fixed-effects, Fama-MacBeth and system-GMM specifications and their t-values in parentheses for the 2002-2013 and 1994-
2013 periods for all available individual U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs). The dependent variable is ExpenseRatio or the annual CEF expense ratio. 
The independent variables are defined in the appendix. The CEF governance variables are lagged one-year in all models except for the system-
GMM. The year dummies are supressed for brevity. AR(1) and AR(2) are first-order and second-order, respectively, tests for no serial correlation 
in the first differenced standard errors. Hansen J-stat is the test of over-identification under the null that all instruments are valid. The R-square 
values are also reported. The fixed-effect and system-GMM models control for the fixed-effects. The standard errors are clustered. a, b and c 
indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
Independent Variables 
/ Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS Fixed Effect Fama-MacBeth Dynamic Panel 
2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 
%IndDirFnd -0.3882
 a -0.2249 a -0.2583 b -0.1730 b -0.6782 a -0.7800 a -0.5244 b -0.4219 b 
(-4.75) (-3.21) (-2.57) (-2.31) (-10.21) (-10.85) (-2.53) (-2.15) 
#IndDirFnd -0.0019 0.0010 -0.0007 -0.0008 -0.0319
 a -0.0176 b -0.0293 a -0.0181 b 
(-0.61) (0.35) (-0.20) (-0.23) (-6.98) (-2.48) (-4.04) (-2.44) 
UnexpCompIndDir -0.0832
  0.0047 0.0138 0.0427 b -0.0618 0.5241 -0.1114 0.0268 
(-1.39) (0.28) (0.35) (2.50) (-0.68) (0.97) (-1.60) (0.99) 
%IndDirOwn>50K -0.1969
 a  -0.2082 a  0.0667  -0.4778 a  
(-3.47)  (-3.29)  (1.59)  (-3.23)  
%DirFemaleFnd 0.0252 -0.2042
 a 0.1033 -0.1251 b -0.0185 -0.0811 0.0155 0.0115 
(0.38) (-3.68) (1.47) (-1.98) (-0.21) (-1.34) (0.11) (0.10) 
#BoardMtngFnd 0.0027
 b 0.0027 b 0.0041 a 0.0018 0.0073 0.0141 b -0.0031 0.0044 
(2.18) (2.06) (3.31) (1.31) (1.31) (2.36) (-0.80) (1.14) 
AveTenIndDirFnd -0.0060 -0.0039 -0.0009 -0.0016 -0.0100
 a -0.0132 a 0.0043 0.0023 
(-1.62) (-1.23) (-0.23) (-0.47) (-4.00) (-2.93) (0.75) (0.43) 
AveIndDirAgeFnd -0.7603
 a -0.5510 a -0.6932 a -0.5536 a -0.0404 -0.1183 0.0571 0.0221 
(-3.94) (-3.65) (-2.88) (-3.19) (-0.36) (-1.20) (0.30) (0.14) 
FndSize -0.2773
 a -0.3261 a -0.2212 a -0.2942 a -0.2067 a -0.2350 a -0.2889 b -0.1775 
(-6.79) (-6.80) (-4.41) (-4.85) (-10.95) (-11.70) (-2.24) (-1.48) 
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Table 3.4. Cont’d 
Independent Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FamSize -0.0044
 a 0.0019 b 0.0013 0.0072 a -0.0077 a -0.0100 a 0.0024 0.0024 
(-5.73) (2.31) (0.96) (6.24) (-9.53) (-4.88) (1.17) (1.23) 
LnFndAge 0.0794
 a 0.0792 a 0.1818 a 0.0836 a -0.0633 c -0.0772 b 0.0329 -0.0094 
(3.98) (4.41) (4.83) (2.61) (-1.82) (-2.54) (1.18) (-0.40) 
LnFndTurnover 0.0014 0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0007 0.0125
 a 0.0027 -0.0308 -0.0425 b 
(0.35) (0.07) (-0.29) (-0.19) (3.48) (0.51) (-1.53) (-2.32) 
FixedIncome -0.3421
 a -0.3779 a -0.7472 a -0.4071 a -0.1859 a -0.2071 a -0.3638 a -0.2638 b 
(-8.61) (-10.51) (-9.06) (-3.51) (-5.38) (-4.76) (-2.85) (-2.53) 
Foreign 0.1183
 b 0.1599 a 0.1356 0.1369 b 0.1349 a 0.1589 a -0.0516 0.0757 
(2.29) (3.73) (1.57) (1.99) (3.23) (3.47) (-0.51) (0.90) 
ExpenseRatiot-1 
      0.5865 a 0.6013 a 
      (15.02) (15.03) 
ExpenseRatiot-2 
      0.0682 b 0.0839 a 
      (2.17) (3.08) 
Constant 5.0271
 a 3.9410 a 4.6103 a 3.7976 a 2.7138 a 2.9566 a 1.2169 1.0679 c 
(6.21) (6.24) (4.42) (5.12) (5.73) (8.10) (1.62) (1.76) 
AR(1) test (p-value)       0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (p-value)       0.76 0.58 
Hansen J-stat (p-value)       0.26 0.11 
Observations 5,693 7,689 5,693 7,689 5,721 7,747 5,049 6,431 
R-squared 0.066 0.059 0.109 0.101 0.279 0.354 0.629 0.710 
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Table 3.5. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationships between benchmark-adjusted share excess returns and board 
characteristics 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of panel regressions to examine the relationships between CEF board characteristics and CEF 
benchmark-adjusted share returns using OLS, fixed-effects, Fama-MacBeth and system-GMM specifications and their t-values in parentheses for 
the 2001-2013 and 1994-2013 periods for all available individual U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs). The dependent variable is the CEF benchmark-
adjusted share excess returns (ReturnAlpha) which are calculated as explained in section 3.3 of the paper. The independent variables are defined in 
the appendix. The CEF governance variables are lagged one-year in all models except for the system-GMM. AR(1) and AR(2) are first-order and 
second-order, respectively, tests for  no serial correlation in the first differenced standard errors. Hansen J-stat is the test of over-identification 
under the null that all instruments are valid. The R-square values are also reported. The fixed-effects and system-GMM models control for the 
fixed-effects. The standard errors are clustered. The year dummies are supressed for brevity. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Independent 
Variables / Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS Fixed Effect Fama-MacBeth Dynamic Panel 
2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 
%IndDirFnd -0.1056
 a -0.0851 b -0.0126 0.0472 -0.0379 1.1893 -0.3470 a -0.3168 a 
(-2.97) (-2.52) (-0.22) (0.99) (-1.62) (1.01) (-2.63) (-2.80) 
#IndDirFnd 0.0013 0.0002 0.0037
 c -0.0003 0.0015 0.0062 -0.0104 b -0.0106 b 
(1.06) (0.12) (1.72) (-0.11) (0.84) (1.51) (-2.07) (-2.07) 
UnexpCompIndDir -0.0017 -0.0142
 b 0.0081 -0.0083 0.0600 b 0.0998 c 0.0176 0.0056 
(-0.13) (-2.22) (0.29) (-0.93) (2.32) (1.81) (0.56) (0.26) 
%IndDirOwn>50K 0.0341
 b  0.0310  0.0355 b  0.1863 b  
(2.43)  (0.84)  (2.48)  (2.01)  
%DirFemaleFnd 0.0062 -0.0404
 c 0.0743 c 0.0570 -0.0093 -0.2088 0.1588 c 0.1266 
(0.23) (-1.65) (1.79) (1.59) (-0.43) (-0.98) (1.83) (1.39) 
#BoardMtngFnd 0.0013
 b 0.0003 0.0028 a 0.0020 a 0.0009 b 0.0649 0.0021 0.0044 c 
(2.23) (0.59) (3.47) (2.86) (2.38) (0.98) (0.94) (1.81) 
AveTenIndDirFnd -0.0020
 b -0.0032 a -0.0021 -0.0035 b -0.0005 -0.0776 -0.0036 -0.0039 
(-2.49) (-3.46) (-1.41) (-2.44) (-0.42) (-1.02) (-1.19) (-1.23) 
AveIndDirAgeFnd -0.0139 0.1068
 c 0.2008 c 0.2269 b -0.0581 0.2934 0.2098 b 0.2138 c 
(-0.27) (1.70) (1.76) (2.47) (-0.84) (1.20) (1.99) (1.75) 
FndSize 0.0031 0.0089 -0.0679 -0.0288 0.0028 -0.4202 -0.1542
 b -0.0312 
(0.73) (0.81) (-0.94) (-0.45) (0.53) (-0.97) (-2.12) (-0.41) 
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Table 3.5. Cont’d 
Independent 
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
FamSize -0.0005
 a -0.0007 a 0.0021 b 0.0023 a -0.0003 -0.0083 0.0021 c 0.0018 c 
(-2.72) (-3.40) (2.30) (2.61) (-0.74) (-1.05) (1.96) (1.71) 
LnFndAge -0.0028 -0.0105 -0.1011
 c -0.0145 0.0032 0.5134 0.0155 0.0389 b 
(-0.33) (-0.94) (-1.68) (-0.26) (0.83) (0.99) (0.83) (2.18) 
LnFndTurnover -0.0031 -0.0039 -0.0027 -0.0016 -0.0025
 c -0.0110 0.0055 0.0137 
(-1.43) (-1.53) (-0.76) (-0.56) (-1.64) (-1.01) (0.41) (1.06) 
ExpenseRatio 0.0045 0.0080 0.0532
 a 0.0141 -0.0021 -0.3411 0.0455 0.0403 
(0.68) (1.04) (3.45) (1.26) (-0.48) (-1.00) (1.02) (1.02) 
FixedIncome -0.0113
 c -0.0072 0.6114 b 0.2562 -0.0120 0.4394 -0.1006 -0.0921 
(-1.89) (-0.69) (2.25) (1.00) (-0.98) (0.95) (-1.41) (-1.62) 
Foreign 0.0533
 a 0.0381 a 0.0652 c 0.0655b 0.0453 -0.1362 -0.0042 0.1257 c 
(5.32) (3.02) (1.83) (2.20) (1.16) (-0.75) (-0.06) (1.80) 
ReturnAlphat-1 
      0.1044 a 0.0978 b 
      (2.61) (2.04) 
ReturnAlphat-2 
      0.0423 0.0192 
      (1.48) (0.53) 
Constant 0.1360 -0.3258 -1.1175b -1.1282
 a 0.2461 -3.2832 -0.5090 -0.7779 
(0.66) (-1.32) (-2.23) (-2.80) (0.90) (-1.10) (-1.20) (-1.55) 
AR(1) test (p-value)       0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (p-value)       0.15 0.33 
Hansen J-stat (p-value)       0.30 0.11 
Observations 3,979 5,471 3,979 5,471 4,298 6,035 3,688 4,516 
R-squared 0.016 0.014 0.078 0.076 0.177 0.226 0.057 0.069 
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Table 3.6. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationships between the CEF premiums with various board characteristics 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of panel regressions to examine the relationship between CEF board characteristics and CEF premiums 
using OLS, fixed-effects, Fama-MacBeth and system-GMM specifications and their t-values in parentheses over the 2002-2013 and 1994-2013 
periods for all available individual U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs). The dependent variable is Premium that is calculated annually as [(share price-
net asset value)/net asset value]. The independent variables are defined in the appendix. The CEF governance variables are lagged one-year in all 
models except for the system-GMM. AR(1) and AR(2) are first-order and second-order, respectively, tests for  no serial correlation in the first 
differenced standard errors. Hansen J-stat is the test of over-identification under the null that all instruments are valid. The R-square values are 
also reported. The fixed-effects and system-GMM models control for the fixed-effects. The standard errors are clustered. The year dummies are 
supressed for brevity. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Independent 
Variables / Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS Fixed Effect Fama-MacBeth Dynamic Panel 
2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 
%IndDirFnd -0.0664
 a -0.0420 b -0.0410 c -0.0498 b 0.0047 -0.0181 -0.0701 -0.0298 
(-3.15) (-2.16) (-1.78) (-2.32) (0.22) (-0.59) (-1.26) (-0.55) 
#IndDirFnd -0.0001 -0.0012 0.0023
 a 0.0004 -0.0022 b -0.0031 c -0.0004 -0.0005 
(-0.07) (-1.54) (2.63) (0.40) (-2.98) (-1.95) (-0.20) (-0.27) 
UnexpCompIndDir -0.0139 -0.0072 -0.0079 -0.0085 0.0353 -0.0682 -0.0458
 c -0.0204 
(-1.51) (-1.36) (-0.77) (-1.47) (0.68) (-0.68) (-1.81) (-1.55) 
%IndDirOwn>50K -0.0190
 c  -0.0059  -0.0051  -0.0035  
(-1.66)  (-0.44)  (-0.47)  (-0.11)  
%DirFemaleFnd 0.0003 0.0445
 a 0.0346 c 0.0632 a -0.0056 0.0427 -0.1024 b -0.0910 c 
(0.02) (3.20) (1.84) (3.45) (-0.28) (1.58) (-2.09) (-1.96) 
#BoardMtngFnd -0.0013
 a -0.0012 a -0.0004 -0.0013 a -0.0016 b -0.0022 b -0.0022 b -0.0031 a 
(-4.90) (-4.30) (-1.33) (-4.48) (-2.76) (-2.24) (-2.32) (-2.96) 
AveTenIndDirFnd -0.0002 -0.0003 0.0009 0.0006 -0.0002 -0.0001 -0.0028 -0.0047
 c 
(-0.23) (-0.29) (0.72) (0.49) (-0.31) (-0.13) (-1.20) (-1.96) 
AveIndDirAgeFnd 0.0483 0.0738
 b -0.0472 -0.0057 0.1152 c 0.0188 0.1001 0.0534 
(1.22) (1.98) (-1.00) (-0.13) (2.06) (0.34) (1.32) (0.80) 
LnMarketCap 0.0039 0.0050
 c 0.0253 b 0.0327 a -0.0060 b -0.0069 c -0.0096 -0.0074 
(1.50) (1.81) (2.52) (3.03) (-2.25) (-1.92) (-1.05) (-0.98) 
LnSharePrice 0.1061
 a 0.0979 a 0.1319 a 0.1102 a 0.0507 a 0.0569 a 0.1439 a 0.1237 a 
(13.51) (14.28) (7.73) (7.45) (7.05) (7.61) (5.90) (4.80) 
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Table 3.6. Cont’d 
Independent Variables 
/ Statistics (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
LnFndTurnover -0.0006 0.0004 -0.0014 -0.0006 0.0014 -0.0004 0.0030 0.0050 (-0.60) (0.41) (-1.48) (-0.64) (1.01) (-0.29) (0.77) (1.09) 
StdNAV 0.0151 -0.2334 0.7324
 a 0.1778 0.5159 c 0.3997 c 0.5755 0.5460 
(0.07) (-1.35) (3.48) (0.94) (1.70) (1.71) (1.31) (1.27) 
DivYield 0.0099
 a 0.0095 a 0.0050 a 0.0058 a 0.0134 a 0.0143 a 0.0118 a 0.0099 a 
(11.71) (9.15) (5.36) (5.16) (7.63) (6.57) (4.97) (4.43) 
Leverage -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0007
 a 0.0006 b -0.0003 c -0.0005 a 0.0013 b 0.0006 
(-1.37) (-1.08) (2.67) (2.49) (-2.20) (-3.25) (2.24) (1.22) 
ExpenseRatio 0.0107
 b 0.0130 b -0.0003 0.0013 0.0106 c 0.0034 0.0099 0.0141 
(2.07) (2.44) (-0.06) (0.21) (1.66) (0.57) (0.60) (0.80) 
LnFndAge 0.0102
 b 0.0154 a 0.0327 a 0.0332 a 0.0017 0.0098 0.0354 a 0.0377 a 
(2.30) (3.55) (3.43) (3.29) (0.43) (0.98) (2.66) (2.78) 
FixedIncome 0.0135 0.0079 -0.0813
 a -0.0438 -0.0153 -0.0131 -0.1022 a -0.0769 b  
(1.55) (0.86) (-2.86) (-0.64) (-0.88) (-0.74) (-3.42) (-2.46) 
Foreign -0.0186
 b -0.0194 b -0.0021 -0.0194 -0.0283 a -0.0314 a -0.0572 c -0.0732 b 
(-2.08) (-2.12) (-0.13) (-0.98) (-5.25) (-4.86) (-1.88) (-2.08) 
Premiumt-1 
      0.2601 a 0.3038 a  
      (7.96) (7.99) 
Premiumt-2 
      0.0369 c 0.0359 c 
      (1.73) (1.73) 
Constant -0.5827
 a -0.7129 a -0.5137 b -0.7925 a -0.6230 b -0.2177 -0.6857 b -0.5634 b 
(-3.56) (-4.66) (-2.30) (-3.44) (-2.40) (-0.94) (-2.05) (-1.97) 
AR(1) test (p-value)       0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (p-value)       0.98 0.78 
Hansen J-stat (p-value)       0.78 0.80 
Observations 4,724 5,562 4,724 5,562 4,750 5,599 3,963 4,541 
R-squared 0.280 0.225 0.359 0.308 0.320 0.407 0.255 0.299 
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Table 3.7. Summary results for panel regressions for the relationships between CEF board compensation with various board 
characteristics 
This table reports the coefficient estimates of the panel regressions to examine the relationships between CEF board characteristics and CEF board 
compensations using OLS, fixed-effects, Fama-MacBeth and system-GMM specifications and their t-values in parentheses over the 2002-2013 
and 1994-2013 periods for all available individual U.S. closed-end funds (CEFs). The dependent variable is the median compensation (in millions 
of dollars) of the independent directors from a CEF board (MedIndDirCompFnd) for a given year. AR(1) and AR(2) are first-order and second-
order, respectively, tests for no serial correlation in the first differenced standard errors. Hansen J-stat is the test of over-identification under the 
null that all instruments are valid. The R-square values are also reported. The independent variables are defined in the appendix. The CEF 
governance variables are lagged one-year in all models except for the system-GMM. The fixed-effects and system-GMM models control for the 
fixed-effects. The standard errors are clustered. The year dummies are supressed for brevity. a, b and c indicate statistical significance at the 0.01, 
0.05 and 0.10 levels, respectively. 
 
 
Independent Variables / 
Statistics 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) 
OLS Fixed Effect Fama-MacBeth Dynamic Panel 
2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 2002-2013 1994-2013 
%IndDirFnd 0.0011 0.0101
 a -0.0021 0.0089 b -0.0021 -0.0037 -0.0005 -0.0013 
(0.50) (3.44) (-0.81) (2.40) (-0.40) (-1.10) (-0.17) (-0.45) 
#IndDirFnd -0.0004
 a -0.0002 c -0.0003 a -0.0002 -0.0009 a -0.0003 -0.0001 -0.0001 
(-5.28) (-1.74) (-3.47) (-1.45) (-11.68) (-0.46) (-0.69) (-1.02) 
%IndDirOwn>50K 0.0089
 a  0.0040 b  0.0178 a  0.0088 b  
(5.64)  (2.41)  (5.68)  (2.54)  
#otherboardsIndDirFam -0.0023
 a -0.0021 a -0.0006 -0.0011 b -0.0000 -0.0003 -0.0022 a -0.0013 a 
(-6.76) (-5.02) (-1.21) (-1.99) (-0.04) (-1.12) (-3.86) (-2.97) 
%DirFemaleFnd -0.0059
 a -0.0186 a -0.0103 a -0.0247 a -0.0170 a -0.0259 a 0.0002 -0.0015 
(-2.87) (-4.69) (-3.38) (-4.74) (-7.23) (-3.40) (0.09) (-0.83) 
#BoardMtngFnd 0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0002 -0.0011 0.0002
 a 0.0001 c 
(1.28) (-1.10) (1.59) (-0.27) (-1.24) (-1.58) (2.90) (1.86) 
AveTenIndDirFnd -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0001 -0.0003
 c 0.0001 0.0004 -0.0003 b -0.0003 a 
(-0.18) (0.35) (-0.65) (-1.78) (0.87) (1.43) (-2.44) (-2.95) 
AveIndDirAgeFnd -0.0005 -0.0247
 a -0.0032 -0.0257 a -0.0032 -0.0094 -0.0007 0.0009 
(-0.10) (-3.07) (-0.36) (-2.59) (-0.87) (-1.52) (-0.19) (0.31) 
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Table 3.7. Cont’d 
FndSize 0.0062
 a 0.0084 a 0.0049 b 0.0041 0.0066 a 0.0078 a 0.0046 c 0.0016 
(5.22) (5.49) (2.08) (1.57) (10.81) (6.67) (1.72) (1.06) 
FamSize -0.0001
 a -0.0005 a -0.0002 a -0.0009 a -0.0002 a -0.0003 a -0.0000 -0.0000 
(-5.58) (-4.90) (-3.73) (-4.14) (-6.23) (-3.20) (-1.02) (-0.27) 
LnFndAge 0.0013
 a 0.0009 -0.0017 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0014 0.0002 0.0006 c 
(3.04) (1.21) (-1.31) (0.27) (1.55) (-0.66) (0.35) (1.66) 
ShareReturnt-1 
-0.0005 c 0.0003 -0.0022 a -0.0017 a 0.0016 0.0012 0.0008 -0.0005 
(-1.67) (0.82) (-3.43) (-2.69) (1.35) (1.12) (0.66) (-0.36) 
FixedIncome -0.0011 0.0038
 b -0.0076 a -0.0176 a -0.0005 0.0005 0.0019 0.0017 
(-1.55) (2.04) (-7.70) (-2.90) (-0.82) (0.22) (0.66) (1.01) 
Foreign -0.0008 -0.0026
 c -0.0001 0.0016 0.0005 -0.0014 c 0.0024 0.0020 
(-1.20) (-1.74) (-0.25) (0.81) (0.67) (-1.66) (1.22) (1.46) 
MedIndDirCompFndt-1 
      0.3991 a 0.7318 a 
      (4.59) (8.36) 
MedIndDirCompFndt-2 
      0.0860 a 0.1101 c 
      (3.51) (1.91) 
Constant 0.0190 0.1161
 a 0.0355 0.1256 a 0.0330 c 0.0658 b 0.0102 0.0004 
(0.96) (3.42) (0.97) (3.09) (2.00) (2.40) (0.69) (0.04) 
AR(1) test (p-value)       0.00 0.00 
AR(2) test (p-value)       0.42 0.22 
Hansen J-stat (p-value)       0.13 0.11 
Observations 4,445 5,023 4,445 5,023 4,562 5,150 4,361 4,789 
R-squared 0.033 0.081 0.070 0.173 0.498 0.419 0.693 0.838 
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Table 4.1. Summary statistics for the returns and MERs of fixed-income funds 
 
This table reports summary statistics for the monthly returns and annual MERs (both in %) for Canadian fixed-
income funds for the 144 month period from January 2000 through December 2011. Panel A provides statistics on the 
distribution of various return parameter estimates for three cross-sections based on investment objectives for all 
individual funds. Panel B reports some summary statistics on the returns for seven total asset value or TNA-weighted 
portfolios of funds grouped by fund type (T) and fund sponsor type (S) respectively; namely: “T1” (Canadian Bond 
funds); “T2” (Short-term Canadian Bond funds); and “T3” (High-yield Bond funds); S1 (“Independents”) for those 
not categorized into one of the remaining groups; S2 (“Banks”) for those sponsored by chartered banks or their 
wholly owned securities firms; S3 (“Insurers”) for those sponsored by insurance companies; S4 (“Member-Fins”) for 
those with member owned or controlled (either specific professional or fraternal groups or open to all) sponsors 
organized as financial entities (caisse, credit union or financial cooperative). The summary statistics are each 
portfolio’s average monthly TNA in billions of dollars for each sponsor type; the average monthly net and gross (net 
returns plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual expense ratio) returns in % and standard deviations; average yearly 
management fees in % (Mgmt) and their standard deviations, and average yearly MER in % and their standard 
deviations for size-weighted portfolios of funds in each sponsor group. Panel C provides fund observations and fund 
numbers, based on individual funds aggregated over their share classes, for different fund types, fund sponsor types 
and fund sponsor ownerships, where private for S3 refers to mutual ownership. Panels D and E report summary cross-
sectional statistics (mean, std. dev. and median) in the rows for the annual management expense ratios (MER) and 
trailer fees (TrailerFee) based on the time-series statistics for each individual Canadian fixed-income fund (not) 
differentiated by fund type over the 144-month period 2000-2011. 
Panel A: Monthly return distributional statistics based on individual mutual funds 
Fund group Statistics Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
Canadian 
Bond 
Mean 0.372 0.392 0.161 -0.537 0.959 -1.061 7.292 
Std. Dev. 1.032 1.017 0.332 0.043 3.172 2.332 15.693 
Median 0.409 0.428 0.179 -0.630 0.909 -0.944 7.031 
Short-term 
Canadian 
Bond 
Mean 0.239 0.257 0.191 -0.536 0.777 -0.884 6.991 
Std. Dev. 0.580 0.528 0.501 0.043 3.387 3.820 21.233 
Median 0.246 0.261 0.180 -0.333 0.655 -0.292 3.515 
High-yield 
Bond 
Mean 0.160 0.277 0.552 -3.447 0.928 -3.285 18.959 
Std. Dev. 2.104 1.829 1.083 0.524 7.616 2.012 9.668 
Median 0.333 0.430 0.604 -2.737 1.334 -1.912 9.402 
All 
Mean 0.301 0.357 0.310 -3.447 0.959 -5.000 10.75 
Std. Dev. 1.079 1.018 0.792 0.043 7.616 2.814 9.441 
Median 0.363 0.403 0.328 -2.737 1.334 -2.861 9.404 
 
Panel B: Distributional statistics for size-weighted fund portfolios based on fund type and fund sponsor type 
Portfolios TNA 
Monthly Return (%) Annual Mgmt (%) Annual MER (%) 
Net Gross 
Average SD Average SD Average SD  Average SD  
Canadian Bond (T1) 37.44 0.387 0.940 0.508 0.939 1.134 0.072 1.420 0.074 
Short-term 
Canadian Bond (T2) 11.88 0.279 0.419 0.412 0.419 1.260 0.066 1.572 0.111 
High-yield Bond (T3) 6.60 0.335 1.453 0.468 1.482 1.212 0.114 1.576 0.148 
Independent 
sponsors (S1) 
21.75 0.322 0.764 0.461 0.770 1.368 0.055 1.695 0.054 
Banks (S2) 21.89 0.402 0.746 0.499 0.746 0.859 0.089 1.160 0.108 
Insurance companies 
(S3) 
8.93 0.370 0.908 0.512 0.906 1.471 0.164 1.743 0.154 
Member-based 
financial entities (S4) 
3.34 0.367 0.836 0.507 0.836 1.380 0.054 1.779 0.115 
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Panel C: Fund observations (obs.) and numbers (#) based on fund type and fund sponsor type 
Fund 
Obs. 
T1 T2 T3 Total 
Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total 
S1 6826 4223 11049 2244 1118 3362 2104 626 2730 11174 5967 17141 
S2 5086 0 5086 2705 0 2705 1790 0 1790 9581 0 9581 
S3 5919 1438 7357 878 225 1103 1399 163 1562 8196 1826 10022 
S4 0 1838 1838 0 337 337 0 260 260 0 2435 2435 
Total 17831 7499 25330 5827 1680 7507 5293 1049 6342 28951 10228 39179 
Fund # T1 T2 T3 Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total Public Private Total 
S1 94 66 160 29 17 46 42 19 61 165 102 267 
S2 60 0 60 34 0 34 29 0 29 123 0 123 
S3 85 19 104 19 2 21 27 2 29 131 23 154 
S4 0 21 21 0 5 5 0 3 3 0 29 29 
Total 239 106 345 82 24 106 98 24 122 419 154 573 
 
 
Panel D: Annual MER 
Fund group Statistics Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Canadian 
Bond 
Mean 1.766 1.840 0.648 0.227 6.393 
Std. Dev. 0.071 0.035 0.181 0.000 2.930 
Median 1.763 1.835 0.622 0.200 4.900 
Short-term 
Canadian 
Bond 
Mean 1.568 1.505 0.532 0.420 2.900   
Std. Dev. 0.062 0.038 0.079 0.000 0.567 
Median 1.575 1.505 0.539 0.420 2.900 
High-yield 
Bond 
Mean 1.950 2.097 0.589 0.298 4.733 
Std. Dev. 0.086 0.033 0.167 0.000 1.445 
Median 1.965 2.100 0.622 0.240 5.430 
All 
Mean 1.770 1.861 0.626 0.227 6.393 
Std. Dev. 0.073 0.037 0.164 0.000 2.930 
Median 1.773 1.850 0.619 0.200 5.430 
 
 
Panel E: Annual trailer fee (TrailerFee) 
Fund group Statistics Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Canadian 
Bond 
Mean 0.340 0.309 0.228 0.000 1.136 
Std. Dev. 0.059 0.037 0.078 0.000 0.490 
Median 0.341 0.300 0.232 0.000 1.150 
Short-term 
Canadian 
Bond 
Mean 0.330 0.290 0.191 0.024 0.944 
Std. Dev. 0.067 0.041 0.077 0.000 0.469 
Median 0.337 0.300 0.207 0.000 1.000 
High-yield 
Bond 
Mean 0.455 0.418 0.268 0.000 1.643 
Std. Dev. 0.063 0.033 0.082 0.000 0.410 
Median 0.461 0.430 0.280 0.000 1.640 
All 
Mean 0.363 0.329 0.236 0.000 1.643 
Std. Dev. 0.062 0.037 0.079 0.000 0.490 
Median 0.367 0.320 0.244 0.000 1.640 
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Table 4.2. Determinants of individual fund fees by sponsor and fund type based on panel regressions 
 
This table reports the panel regression (1) coefficients and their t-values in parentheses for the 11-year period 2000-2011 for determinants of the management expense ratios 
(MER), management fees (MgmtFee) and trailer fees (TrailerFee) of the individual Canadian fixed-income funds managed by different fund and sponsor types. S1, S2, S3 and 
S4 are dummy variables which take a value of 1 if the fund is sponsored by an independent, bank, insurance company or member-owned or controlled financial entity 
(Member-Fins), respectively, or zero otherwise. We use demeaned values of the fund size (FundSize) to control for its effect. LnNumFund and Flow are the natural 
logarithms of number of mutual funds managed by the sponsor and fund flows, respectively. LnAge is the natural logarithm of the age of a fund. PerfRank is the percentile 
ranking of each fund’s total return or benchmark-adjusted return within each investment objective. The Public dummy variable takes a value of 1 for a fund with a public 
sponsor and 0 otherwise. The Mutual dummy variable takes a value of 1 for a fund with a mutually-owned sponsor and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are adjusted for 
clustering for fund effects as proposed by Petersen (2009). W is the p-value based on the Wald test for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the sponsorship dummy 
variables (S1, S2, S3 and S4) are jointly equal to zero. S.R is the saturation ratio defined as the total number of observations divided by the number of parameters to be 
estimated. The adjusted R-square values are also reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 Undifferentiated Cdn Short-term High-yield MER MgmtFee TrailerFee MER MgmtFee TrailerFee MER MgmtFee TrailerFee MER MgmtFee TrailerFee 
S1 
0.2393*** -0.0041 0.1751*** 0.2575*** 0.0675* 0.1046*** 0.2738* -0.2723 0.1687* 0.1725 0.0796* 0.1370 
(4.15) (-0.03) (3.02) (4.12) (1.79) (3.23) (1.86) (-0.87) (1.78) (1.43) (1.70) (1.24) 
S3 
0.1867** 0.0222 0.0875 0.3375*** 0.0848 0.0943** 0.1440 -0.2794 0.0205 -0.1788 0.1252** -0.2403* 
(2.09) (0.18) (1.29) (3.43) (1.59) (1.99) (0.92) (-0.82) (0.22) (-1.29) (2.28) (-1.87) 
S4 
0.0665 -0.1782 0.2079*** 0.0753 -0.2427 0.2471*** 0.1095 -0.2806 0.0099 0.1081 0.1737 -0.1293 
(0.40) (-1.13) (2.75) (0.39) (-1.59) (3.15) (0.38) (-0.64) (0.08) (0.54) (1.14) (-0.62) 
FundSize -0.0000** 0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 0.0000 -0.0000 (-2.12) (0.30) (-2.14) (-1.72) (-0.59) (-1.61) (-1.02) (0.42) (-1.08) (-0.82) (1.18) (-1.42) 
LnNumFund 0.0630*** -0.0228 0.0804*** 0.0702*** -0.0025 0.0561** 0.0383 -0.1059 0.1184* 0.0631 -0.0145 0.0869** (3.71) (-1.07) (3.51) (3.84) (-0.12) (2.45) (0.80) (-1.26) (1.81) (1.21) (-0.47) (2.25) 
LnAge -0.0239 0.0226 -0.0464*** -0.0149 -0.0042 -0.0085 -0.0308 0.0934 -0.1275* -0.0558 0.0395 -0.0975*** (-1.36) (1.39) (-2.81) (-1.01) (-0.69) (-0.66) (-0.84) (1.50) (-1.95) (-0.75) (0.76) (-2.65) 
Flow -0.0003 0.0004 -0.0007 -0.0005 0.0006 -0.0011 -0.0039 0.0008 -0.0048 0.0003 -0.0002 0.0003 (-0.52) (0.74) (-1.13) (-1.40) (0.83) (-1.41) (-1.11) (0.32) (-1.20) (0.26) (-0.22) (0.24) 
PerfRank -0.0068 -0.0048 -0.0016 0.0035 -0.0086 0.0132 -0.0133 0.0100 -0.0196 -0.0370 -0.0206 -0.0191 (-0.71) (-0.51) (-0.12) (0.29) (-0.67) (0.79) (-0.89) (0.55) (-0.88) (-1.02) (-0.95) (-0.75) 
Public 0.1390* 0.0473 0.0499 0.0678 0.0418 0.0179 0.3496** -0.0764 0.0889 0.2535 0.4535** 0.0732 (1.92) (0.72) (0.84) (0.90) (0.78) (0.43) (2.06) (-0.40) (1.07) (1.28) (2.31) (0.15) 
Mutual 0.1653 0.0647 0.0471 0.0792 0.0428 0.0128 0.7006*** 0.5145* 0.1054 0.3095 0.4934** 0.0906 (1.62) (1.05) (0.84) (1.06) (0.84) (0.30) (2.96) (1.74) (0.82) (1.53) (2.44) (0.19) 
Intercept (S2) 
1.9295*** 1.5241*** 0.4686*** 2.0041*** 1.6213*** 0.4744*** 1.5813*** 1.7388*** 0.3620** 2.4349*** 1.4006*** 0.8766 
(8.75) (7.64) (3.29) (9.80) (8.41) (4.74) (3.40) (3.07) (2.25) (3.45) (6.29) (1.59) 
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adj.R2 0.1580 0.0729 0.0658 0.2302 0.1677 0.1221 0.3147 0.0061 0.2089 0.0628 0.1756 0.0149 
S.R 237 237 237 156 156 156 46 46 46 36 36 36 
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Table 4.3. Summary statistics for the bond indices 
 
This table reports the summary statistics (including unadjusted kurtosis) for the monthly returns of the bond indices 
and information variables in conditional five-factor models. The factors for the Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011) model 
are the DEX Long Term Government Bond Index (DEXLTGOV), the DEX Medium-term Government Bond Index 
(DEXMTGOV), the DEX Long-term Corporate Bond Index (DEXLTCORP), the DEX Medium-term Corporate 
Bond Index (DEXMTCORP) and the DEX Mortgage-backed Securities Overall Bond Index (DEXMBS). The 
information variables are default premium (DEF) and the slope of the term structure (TERM). The data cover the 
period from January 2000 to December 2011, for a total of 144 monthly observations. 
 
Factors and information variables Average Std. dev. Min Max Skewness Kurtosis 
DEXLTCORP 0.74812 2.07748 -8.61028 6.96130 -0.57263 5.44375 
DEXMTCORP 0.62781 1.23522 -3.70054 3.48991 -0.37310 3.36754 
DEXLTGOV 0.70668 1.92592 -3.64388 5.19922 -0.18763 2.43290 
DEXMTGOV 0.57755 1.41538 -3.87330 4.74895 -0.14869 3.30564 
DEXMBS 0.47640 0.68786 -1.14278 2.68809 0.13834 2.99172 
Detrended DEF 0.00001 0.00019 -0.00250 0.00175 -1.24678 13.04840 
Detrended Term -0.00000 0.00029 -0.00331 0.00318 0.89701 9.61680 
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Table 4.4. Summary statistics for benchmark-adjusted returns for individual funds 
This table reports summary cross-sectional statistics (mean, std. dev. and median) in the rows for the monthly 
unconditional benchmark-adjusted returns based on the time-series statistics for each individual Canadian fixed-
income fund (not) differentiated by fund type over the 144-month period 2000-2011. The cross-sectional summary 
statistics for benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross and net returns, which are reported in Panels A, B and C, 
respectively, are calculated by subtracting gross (net returns plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual MER), quasi-gross (net 
returns plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual trailer fee) and net returns from their expected returns based on the 
unconditional five-factor model used by Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011). 
Panel A: Benchmark-adjusted monthly gross returns 
Fund group Statistics Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Canadian Bond 
Mean -0.000 0.000 0.002 -0.008 0.006 
Std. Dev. 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.031 
Median 0.000** 0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.006 
Short-term 
Canadian Bond 
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.002 0.004 
Std. Dev. 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.010 
Median 0.000 0.000 0.001 -0.003 0.003 
High-yield Bond 
Mean 0.002*** 0.002 0.003 -0.004 0.009 
Std. Dev. 0.018 0.017 0.007 0.009 0.041 
Median 0.003*** 0.003 0.003 -0.004 0.007 
All 
Mean 0.000** 0.000 0.002 -0.008  0.009 
Std. Dev. 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.041 
Median 0.001*** 0.000 0.002 -0.007 0.007 
 
Panel B: Benchmark-adjusted monthly quasi-gross returns 
Fund group Statistics Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Canadian Bond 
Mean -0.001*** -0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.005 
Std. Dev. 0.005 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.031 
Median -0.001*** -0.001 0.002 -0.007 0.005 
Short-term 
Canadian Bond 
Mean -0.001*** -0.001 0.001 -0.003 0.003 
Std. Dev. 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.000 0.015 
Median -0.001*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.002 
High-yield Bond 
Mean 0.001* 0.001 0.002 -0.005 0.008 
Std. Dev. 0.016 0.017 0.006 0.009 0.043 
Median 0.001*** 0.002 0.003 -0.005 0.006 
All 
Mean -0.001*** -0.001 0.002 -0.009 0.009 
Std. Dev. 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.041 
Median -0.001*** -0.001 0.002 -0.007 0.006 
 
Panel C: Benchmark-adjusted monthly net returns 
Fund group Statistics Mean Median Std. dev. Minimum Maximum 
Canadian Bond 
Mean -0.002*** -0.002 0.002 -0.010 0.005 
Std. Dev. 0.006 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.031 
Median -0.001*** -0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.005 
Short-term 
Canadian Bond 
Mean -0.001*** -0.001 0.001 -0.004 0.002 
Std. Dev. 0.003 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.010 
Median -0.001*** -0.001 0.001 -0.005 0.002 
High-yield Bond 
Mean 0.000 0.000 0.003 -0.006 0.008 
Std. Dev. 0.018 0.017 0.007 0.009 0.041 
Median 0.001*** 0.001 0.003 -0.005 0.005 
All 
Mean -0.001*** -0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.008 
Std. Dev. 0.007 0.005 0.006 0.000 0.041 
Median -0.001*** -0.001 0.002 -0.010 0.005 
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Table 4.5. Determinants of monthly unconditional benchmark-adjusted returns by sponsor and fund type based on panel regressions 
 
This table reports the coefficient estimates for panel regression (4) and their t-values in parentheses over the 144-month period 2000-2011 for all available 
Canadian fixed-income funds for various combinations of sponsor and fund types. The dependent variable FundRTN is the benchmark-adjusted gross (net return 
plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual expense ratio) or quasi-gross (net return plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual trailer fee) or net return for month t using the unconditional 
five-factor model used by Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011). S1, S2, S3 and S4 are dummy variables which take a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to the 
Independent, Bank, Insurer, or member-owned or controlled financial entity category (Member-Fins), respectively, and 0 otherwise. MER controls for the effect 
of the management expense ratios on the after-controls benchmark-adjusted returns of the individual funds. We use the demeaned value of the fund size 
(FundSize) to control for its effect. LnNumFund is the natural logarithm of number of mutual funds managed by the sponsor. Other control variables include the 
natural logarithm of the age of a fund (LnAge) and fund flows (Flow). The Public dummy variable takes a value of 1 for public sponsors and 0 otherwise. The 
Mutual dummy variable takes a value of 1 for a fund with a mutually-owned sponsor and 0 otherwise. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering for fund 
effects as proposed by Petersen (2009). W is the p-value based on the Wald test for the hypothesis that the coefficients of the sponsorship dummy variables (S1, 
S2, S3 and S4) are jointly equal to zero. S.R is the saturation ratio defined as the total number of observations divided by the number of parameters to be 
estimated. The adjusted R-square values are also reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 levels, respectively. 
 Undifferentiated Cdn Short-term High-yield Net Gross Quasi-gross Net Gross Quasi-gross Net Gross Quasi-gross Net Gross Quasi-gross 
S1 
-0.0004* 0.0000 -0.0003* -0.0003* 0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0005* -0.0001 -0.0004 0.0000 0.0002 0.0002 
(-1.85) (0.13) (-1.67) (-1.69) (1.53) (-1.09) (-1.76) (-0.40) (-1.29) (0.03) (0.14) (0.16) 
S3 
-0.0010*** -0.0005** -0.0010*** -0.0007*** -0.0000 -0.0006*** -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0024* -0.0022 -0.0025* 
(-4.49) (-2.02) (-4.32) (-3.83) (-0.11) (-3.63) (-0.43) (0.54) (-0.51) (-1.81) (-1.62) (-1.82) 
S4 
-0.0009* -0.0006 -0.0007* -0.0009*** -0.0004 -0.0007** 0.0010 0.0010 0.0009 -0.0032* -0.0032* -0.0030* 
(-1.75) (-1.07) (-1.71) (-2.89) (-1.46) (-2.12) (0.79) (0.83) (0.74) (-1.91) (-1.88) (-1.74) 
MER -0.0183 0.0544 0.0351 -0.0503 0.0541 -0.0020 -0.0579** 0.0117 -0.0074 0.1662 0.2367 0.2045 (-0.47) (1.40) (0.89) (-1.16) (1.50) (-0.05) (-2.29) (0.46) (-0.31) (0.61) (0.87) (0.76) 
FundSize -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000* -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-1.84) (-1.97) (-1.96) (-2.18) (-3.15) (-2.40) (-3.16) (-3.23) (-4.27) (0.09) (0.09) (0.06) 
LnNumFund -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0003 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0001 0.0002 0.0002 -0.0018 -0.0018 -0.0018 (-0.99) (-0.86) (-0.91) (-1.46) (-1.26) (-1.41) (0.46) (0.75) (1.23) (-0.71) (-0.71) (-0.70) 
LnAge 0.0015*** 0.0015*** 0.0016*** 0.0008*** 0.0008** 0.0008*** 0.0002 0.0002 0.0003 0.0077*** 0.0076*** 0.0076*** (3.87) (3.89) (3.95) (2.60) (2.49) (2.64) (0.79) (0.82) (1.49) (4.28) (4.29) (4.26) 
Flow 0.0497 0.0494 0.0587 0.0115 0.0129 0.0113 0.0316*** 0.0314*** 0.1676 2.2728*** 2.2906*** 2.2635*** (1.25) (1.25) (0.96) (0.50) (0.58) (0.50) (12.14) (11.32) (1.58) (2.75) (2.77) (2.76) 
Public -0.0009** -0.0006 -0.0009** -0.0006** -0.0003 -0.0006** -0.0006 -0.0004 -0.0007 0.0004 0.0002 -0.0008 (-2.33) (-1.61) (-2.31) (-2.43) (-1.55) (-2.52) (-1.09) (-0.72) (-1.36) (0.19) (0.09) (-0.36) 
Mutual 0.0003 0.0006 0.0003 0.0001 0.0003 0.0001 -0.0014* -0.0008 -0.0014* 0.0089*** 0.0089*** 0.0079*** (0.85) (1.61) (0.81) (0.37) (1.55) (0.38) (-1.83) (-1.26) (-1.69) (4.72) (4.60) (4.12) 
Intercept (S2) 
-0.0033*** -0.0025*** -0.0030*** -0.0025*** -0.0019*** -0.0022*** -0.0011 -0.0007 -0.0011 -0.0123* -0.0112 -0.0113 
(-4.43) (-3.54) (-4.04) (-3.85) (-3.27) (-3.52) (-1.31) (-0.95) (-1.33) (-1.67) (-1.54) (-1.53) 
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adj.R2 0.0423 0.0266 0.0410 0.1374 0.1767 0.1558 0.1802 0.1373 0.1686 0.1462 0.1270 0.134 
S.R 1949 1949 1949 1298 1298 1298 428 428 428 223 223 223 
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Table 4.6.  Determinants of monthly conditional benchmark-adjusted returns by sponsor and fund type based on panel regressions 
This table reports the coefficient estimates for panel regression (4) and their t-values in parentheses over the 144-month period 2000-2011 for all available Canadian 
fixed-income funds for various combinations of sponsor and fund types. The dependent variable FundRTN is the benchmark-adjusted gross (net return plus 1/12th of a 
fund’s annual expense ratio) or quasi-gross (net return plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual trailer fee) or net return for month t using the conditional five-factor model used by 
Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011). S1, S2, S3 and S4 are dummy variables which take a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to the Independent, Bank, Insurer, or member-
owned or controlled financial entity category (Member-Fins), respectively, and 0 otherwise. MER controls for the effect of the management expense ratios on the 
benchmark-adjusted returns of the individual funds. Demeaned values of fund size (FundSize) are used to control for its effect. LnNumFund is the natural logarithm of 
number of mutual funds managed by the sponsor. Other control variables include the natural logarithm of the age of a fund (LnAge) and fund flows (Flow). The Public 
dummy variable takes a value of 1 for public sponsors and 0 otherwise. The Mutual dummy variable takes a value of 1 for a fund with a mutually-owned sponsor and 0 
otherwise. The standard errors are adjusted for clustering for fund effects as proposed by Petersen (2009). W is the p-value based on the Wald test for the hypothesis that 
the coefficients of the sponsorship dummy variables (S1, S2, S3 and S4) are jointly equal to zero. S.R is the saturation ratio defined as the total number of observations 
divided by the number of parameters to be estimated. The adjusted R-square values are also reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 
0.01 levels, respectively. 
 Undifferentiated Cdn Short-term High-yield 
Net Gross Quasi-gross Net Gross Quasi-gross Net Gross Quasi-gross Net Gross Quasi-gross 
S1 
-0.0006** -0.0001 -0.0005** -0.0004** 0.0001 -0.0003* -0.0005 -0.0001 -0.0003 -0.0012 -0.0008 -0.0009 
(-2.44) (-0.61) (-2.08) (-2.12) (0.79) (-1.67) (-1.58) (-0.38) (-1.07) (-0.88) (-0.64) (-0.67) 
S3 
-0.0013*** -0.0007*** -0.0013*** -0.0009*** -0.0003 -0.0009*** -0.0002 0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0028*** -0.0026** -0.0029*** 
(-5.49) (-3.08) (-5.31) (-5.18) (-1.55) (-4.92) (-0.51) (0.41) (-0.55) (-2.63) (-2.50) (-2.67) 
S4 
-0.0014** -0.0011* -0.0012** -0.0012*** -0.0006** -0.0010*** 0.0008 0.0009 0.0008 -0.0059*** -0.0056*** -0.0055*** 
(-2.38) (-1.88) (-2.14) (-3.47) (-2.21) (-2.76) (0.67) (0.72) (0.66) (-4.24) (-3.82) (-3.74) 
MER -0.0443 0.0213 0.0034 -0.0473 0.0456 -0.0009 -0.0416* 0.0191 0.0024 0.0692 0.1850 0.1684 (-1.20) (0.58) (0.09) (-1.16) (1.20) (-0.02) (-1.70) (0.77) (0.10) (0.27) (0.66) (0.61) 
FundSize -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000 -0.0000** -0.0000 -0.0000*** -0.0000*** -0.0000*** 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 (-0.45) (-0.70) (-0.78) (-0.96) (-2.17) (-1.22) (-2.70) (-2.73) (-3.63) (1.03) (0.89) (0.94) 
LnNumFund -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0001 -0.0002 -0.0002 -0.0002 0.0003 0.0004 0.0004** -0.0006 -0.0006 -0.0006 (-0.45) (-0.20) (-0.24) (-1.22) (-1.02) (-1.03) (1.36) (1.58) (2.40) (-0.21) (-0.22) (-0.22) 
LnAge 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0018*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0009*** 0.0004 0.0004 0.0004 0.0077*** 0.0080*** 0.0079*** (4.13) (4.13) (4.17) (2.89) (2.78) (2.84) (1.27) (1.32) (1.55) (4.78) (4.79) (4.79) 
Flow 0.0385** 0.0386* 0.0524 0.0205** 0.0213** 0.0207** 0.0106*** 0.0104*** 0.2280** 1.3660*** 1.5522*** 1.5220*** (1.96) (1.95) (1.47) (2.00) (2.13) (2.01) (3.77) (3.99) (2.13) (2.78) (3.07) (3.04) 
Public -0.0011*** -0.0009*** -0.0012*** -0.0007*** -0.0004* -0.0007*** -0.0014*** -0.0011** -0.0014*** 0.0026 0.0024 0.0016 (-3.30) (-2.64) (-3.34) (-2.59) (-1.73) (-2.72) (-2.80) (-2.29) (-3.18) (1.35) (1.34) (0.87) 
Mutual 0.0005 0.0008* 0.0005 0.0003 0.0005* 0.0003 -0.0019*** -0.0013** -0.0019** 0.0109*** 0.0109*** 0.0098*** (1.04) (1.77) (1.06) (1.00) (1.89) (1.12) (-2.84) (-2.37) (-2.56) (6.95) (6.91) (6.30) 
Intercept (S2) 
-0.0032*** -0.0024*** -0.0029*** -0.0025*** -0.0019*** -0.0023*** -0.0013 -0.0008 -0.0013 -0.0135** -0.0131** -0.0133** 
(-4.30) (-3.42) (-3.93) (-3.88) (-3.20) (-3.62) (-1.34) (-0.99) (-1.36) (-2.06) (-2.19) (-2.20) 
W 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 
Adj.R2 0.0600 0.0322 0.0483 0.1636 0.1673 0.1727 0.1801 0.1348 0.1561 0.1666 0.1374 0.1420 
S.R 1949 1949 1949 1298 1298 1298 428 428 428 223 223 223 
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Table 4.7. Determinants of individual fund fees and returns based on panel regressions and accounting for Member-Prof sponsors 
This table reports the coefficient estimates for panel regressions (1) and (4) and their t-values in parentheses over the 144-month period 2000-2011 for funds with 
a Canadian Bond objective whose sponsors are private. Panel A reports the results for the determinants of the management expense ratios (MER), management 
fees (MgmtFee) and trailer fees (TrailerFee) for funds sponsored by Member-Prof (all private and mutual) versus private (mixed share/mutual) Independent 
(Private_S1) excluding Member-Prof, private (all mutual) Insurers (Private_S3) and Member-Fins (all private and mutual) (S4) for funds with a Canadian bond 
investment objective. Member-Prof is a dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to a professional member-owned or controlled non-
financial entity category and 0 otherwise. Panel B reports the results for the determinants of the dependent variable FundRTN, which is the conditional 
benchmark-adjusted gross, quasi-gross or net return for month t using the five-factor model of Ayadi and Kryzanowski (2011). MER as an independent variable 
controls for the effect of the management expense ratio on the benchmark-adjusted returns of the individual funds. The demeaned values of the fund size 
(FundSize) are used to control for its effect. LnNumFund is the natural logarithm of the number of mutual funds managed by the sponsor. Other control variables 
include the natural logarithm of the age of a fund (LnAge) and fund flows (Flow). PerfRank is the percentile ranking of each fund’s total return or benchmark-
adjusted return within each investment objective.The Mutual dummy variable takes a value of 1 for mutually-owned sponsors and 0 otherwise. The standard errors 
are adjusted for clustering for fund effects as proposed by Petersen (2009). S.R is the saturation ratio defined as the total number of observations divided by the 
number of parameters to be estimated. The adjusted R-square values are also reported. *, ** and *** indicate statistical significance at the 0.10, 0.05 and 0.01 
levels, respectively. 
Panel A Independent variables  Intercept Private_S1 Private_S3 S4 FundSize LnNumFund LnAge Flow PerfRank Mutual Adj.R2 S.R. 
MER 1.8726*** 0.4491** 0.2465 0.0163 -0.0000** 0.0978*** 0.0213 -0.0005 -0.0064 0.6003*** 0.1804 55 (4.87) (2.41) (0.93) (0.06) (-2.33) (3.09) (0.55) (-0.95) (-0.24) (3.61) 
MgmtFee 1.2261*** 0.5115*** 0.3080 -0.1517 -0.0000 0.0339 -0.0010 -0.0001 0.0065 0.5769*** 0.2257 55 (3.27) (2.63) (1.20) (-0.61) (-0.57) (1.56) (-0.05) (-0.65) (0.70) (3.95) 
TrailerFee 0.6407*** -0.0616 -0.0592 0.1714 -0.0000** 0.0631** 0.0226 -0.0004 -0.0124 0.0216 0.1709 55 (2.85) (-0.49) (-0.42) (1.15) (-2.21) (2.05) (0.77) (-0.90) (-0.48) (0.38) 
 
Panel B Independent variables  Intercept Private_S1 Private_S3 S4 MER FundSize LnNumFund LnAge Flow Mutual Adj.R2 S.R. 
Gross -0.0011 -0.0004 -0.0014* -0.0018** 0.0970 0.0000 0.0001 0.0002 0.1070 0.0011 0.0131 409 (-1.17) (-1.27) (-1.85) (-2.34) (1.33) (0.17) (0.47) (0.36) (0.99) (1.61) 
Quasi-gross -0.0021** -0.0008** -0.0017** -0.0018** 0.0313 -0.0000 0.0001 0.0003 0.0949 0.0008 0.0144 409 (-2.00) (-2.29) (-2.01) (-2.04) (0.41) (-0.26) (0.24) (0.51) (0.86) (1.02) 
Net -0.0028*** -0.0007** -0.0017* -0.0020** -0.0256 -0.0000 0.0000 0.0003 0.1011 0.0009 0.0162 409 (-2.73) (-2.04) (-1.92) (-2.20) (-0.32) (-0.04) (0.11) (0.48) (0.90) (1.05) 
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Appendix  
Variable Definition Data Source 
 The number of advisors and sub-advisors providing service in a CEF (item 8 A and B of NSAR form) NSAR form 
 The difference between current value of   and its value in previous NSAR filing NSAR form 
 The average dollar value of compensation received by board from a CEF  DEF-14A SEC form 
 The average dollar value of compensation received by board from a CEF family DEF-14A SEC form 
 The average number of years independent directors sit on a CEF board DEF-14A SEC form 
The difference between current value  and three-year lagged value of 
this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 The total number of directors on a CEF board DEF-14A SEC form 
 The difference between current value of  and one-year lagged value of this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 The difference between current value of and three-year lagged value of this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 The number of meetings (regular and special) that a CEF holds for a given year DEF-14A SEC form 
 A variable which takes values of -1, 0 and 1 if the fund decreases, does not change and increases its advisory rate, respectively NSAR form 
 The percentage of female directors on a CEF board Public online sources 
 The difference between current value  and three-year lagged value of this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 Dividend amount (Item 73-A1 of NSAR form) as a percentage of CEF share price (Item 76 of NSAR form) NSAR form 
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 CEF’s annual expense ratios Morningstar Direct 
 A dummy variable which take one if the CEF family has at least one other star CEF within the complex sample in a given period.   Calculated 
 Calculated as the NAV of CEF family divided by sum of all NAVs in the market Calculated 
 A dummy variable which takes value of one for CEFs with bond and municipal bond fund type and zero otherwise.  
Morningstar 
Direct 
Flow The net of all cash inflows and outflows in and out of various financial assets for a fund as proposed by Sirri and Tufano (1998) Calculated 
 The lesser of purchases (item 71A of form NSAR) or sales (item 71B of form NSAR)  divided by average monthly net assets (item 71C of form NSAR) NSAR form 
 The difference between current value of   and the value of this variable in previous NSAR filing Calculated 
 A dummy variable which takes value of one if CEF being registered outside the U.S. (Item 68-B) NSAR form 
FundSize Demeaned value of fund size Morningstar Direct 
FundRTN Benchmark-adjusted return based on equation (4.2) as proposed by Brennan et al. (1998) Calculated 
Gross Return Net return plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual expense ratio Calcualted 
 The difference between CEF family NAV of current and previous NSAR filing Calculated 
 The difference between CEF NAV of current and previous NSAR filing Calculated 
 A dummy variable equals to one if the advisory rate ( ) is higher than sample median advisory rate in a given period. Calculated 
 A dummy variable which equals one if the CEF  is above the sample median dividend yield in a given period.   Calculated 
 A dummy variable which takes value of one if the CEF family growth ( ) is on top decile of the sample given the period. Calculated 
 A dummy variable which takes value of one if the CEF growth ( ) is on top decile of the sample for a given the fund type and period. Calculated 
 A dummy variable which equals one if the CEF  is above the sample median leverage in a given period.   Calculated 
 A dummy variable which equals one if the CEF  is above the sample median Calculated 
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premium in a given period.   
 The percentage of independent directors in CEF boards DEF-14A SEC form 
 The difference between current value of  and one-year lagged value of this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 The difference between current value of  and three-year lagged value of this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 The percentage of independent directors who hold more than $50,000 worth of funds shares 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 
The difference between current value of   and three-year lagged 
value of this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 The percentage of independent directors who hold zero dollars of fund assets DEF-14A SEC form 
 The percentage of independent directors who hold $1 to $10,000 of fund assets DEF-14A SEC form 
 The percentage of independent directors who hold $10,001 to $50,000 of fund assets DEF-14A SEC form 
 The percentage of independent directors who hold $50,001 to $100,000 of fund assets DEF-14A SEC form 
 The percentage of independent directors who hold more than $100,000 of fund assets DEF-14A SEC form 
 The percentage of independent directors who hold more than $50,000 worth of fund shares DEF-14A SEC form 
 The ratio of non-common equity (Item 74-N minus Item 74-F) to CEF total assets (Item 74-N of NSAR form). NSAR form 
LnAge Natural logarithm of fund’s age as given by the fund launch date Morningstar Direct 
 The logarithm of average age of independent directors (years) on the CEF board DEF-14A SEC form 
The difference between current value of  and three-year lagged 
value of this variable 
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
 The natural logarithm of family’s total net assets in CEFs NSAR form 
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 The natural logarithm of fund’s age as given by the fund launch date  Morningstar Direct 
 The natural logarithm of the fund’s total net assets (Item 74-U01*74-U01) NSAR form 
 The difference between current value of  and one-year lagged value of this variable Calculated 
 The natural logarithm of the lesser of purchases (item 71A of form NSAR) or sales (item 71A of form NSAR)  divided by average monthly net assets (item 71C of form NSAR) NSAR form 
LnNumFund The natural logarithm of the number of funds that the fund management company manages Calculated 
 CEF market capital (item 76 times item 74U1 of form NSAR)   NSAR form 
 The advisor marginal rate of compensation (advisory rate). For linear contracts, we use the item 48 of NSAR forms. For concave contracts, this rate depends on the NAV of the CEFs.  NSAR form 
 
The change of marginal rate or advisory rate from previous NSAR filings. Following 
Warner and Wu (2011), we use the same NAV for current and previous NSAR filings to 
remove the mechanical effect of asset growth on the concave contracts.  
NSAR form 
MER Mutual fund’s annual expense ratio Morningstar Direct 
 Calculated as the CEF NAV divided by sum of all NAVs in the market Calculated 
Mutual Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the fund sponsor has mutual ownership and 0 otherwise (i.e., 0 for stock ownership) 
Websites of 
Mutual funds 
 Annualized returns net of fees Morningstar Direct 
 
A dummy variable which takes value of one if the CEF is outsourced. Following Chen et 
al., (2013), we define if a CEF is outsourced if the CEF has at least one advisor which is 
not affiliated to the fund family complex.  
NSAR form 
 
 
The number of other boards an independent director serves on as a director with a fund 
family  
DEF-14A SEC 
form 
PerfRank Percentile ranking of each fund’s benchmark-adjusted return within each investment objective Calculated 
Public Dummy variable which takes a value of 1 if the fund sponsor is publicly traded and 0 otherwise 
Websites of 
Mutual funds 
 (share price - NAVPS)/NAVPS (item 74V1 and 76 of form NSAR for NAVPS and share price) NSAR form 
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Quasi-gross Return Net return plus 1/12th of a fund’s annual trailer fee (TrailerFee) Calculated 
 
We obtain the ReturnAlpha following Chen et al. (2013), Ferreira et al. (2013). 
Specifically:  
 
Where  is the benchmark-adjusted share return of fund i at time t, 
is the realized share return of fund i at time t, K is the number of factors in 
the benchmark model,  is the realized return for benchmark factor k at time t, and  
are the estimated factor betas of fund i at time t obtained by regressing the previous 36 
months of realized share returns against the corresponding realized benchmark factor 
returns. The benchmark-adjusted share return performances for funds with an investment 
objective of equity, international equity and specialty are calculated using a 5-factor model. 
The factors are the monthly excess returns on the CRSP value-weighted index, the 
differences in returns between small and large stock portfolios, the differences in returns 
between high and low book-to-market stock portfolios, the Carhart (1997) momentum 
factor, and the Pastor and Stambaugh (2003) liquidity factor. The factor data are collected 
from Wharton Research Data Services (WRDS). For the bond and municipal bond CEFs, 
we use a 7-factor model that includes the Barclays Aggregate Bond Index, Barclays U.S. 
Treasury Long, Barclays U.S. Treasury Intermediate, Barclays U.S. Mortgage Backed 
Securities, Barclays U.S. Corp Investment Grade, Barclays Municipal Bond and Barclays 
U.S. Corp High Yield Bond, which is consistent with the models used in Blake, Elton, and 
Gruber (1993) and Chen et al. (2013). For the allocation CEFs, we use a 12-factor model 
that includes the 5 factors used for the equity CEFs and the 7 factors used for the bond 
CEFs. CEFs are included in the samples for the tests of benchmark-adjusted return 
performances only if they have at least 36 non-missing monthly return observations. The 
monthly benchmark-adjusted returns are compounded to annualize them. 
Calculated 
S1 
Sponsorship dummy which takes a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to Independents 
(if not in the other three categories), otherwise zero Calculated 
S2 
Sponsorship dummy which takes a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to Banks (all 
public), otherwise zero Calculated 
S3 
Sponsorship dummy which takes a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to Insurers, 
otherwise zero Calculated 
162 
 
S4 
Sponsorship dummy which takes a value of 1 if the fund sponsor belongs to Member-Fins, 
which are member-owned or controlled financial entities (all private), otherwise zero Calculated 
 The number of services provided by advisors (item 54 A through O of NSAR form) NSAR form 
 The difference between current value of  and the value of this variable in previous NSAR filing Calculated 
 CEF holding period return   Morningstar Direct 
 Residual standard deviation of CEF’s NAV return as explained in section 7 Calculated 
 A dummy variable which take one if the CEF share return was on the top 5% of the sample in a given the fund type and period.   Calculated 
 A dummy variable which equals one if CEF family market share ( ) is on top decile of the sample market shares in a given period. Calculated 
 A dummy variable which equals one if CEF market share ( ) is on top decile of the sample market shares in a given period. Calculated 
TrailerFee The difference between the MER and the management fees ratio Calculated 
 
Average residual obtained (in millions of dollars) from annually regressing the total 
compensation of a director from fund family  on the number of boards that the director 
serves on and the total assets overseen by that director, as in Tufano and Sevick (1997)  
Calculated 
The difference between current value of  and three-year lagged value 
of this variable Calculated 
 
 
 
